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WORLD ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

No. 12, December 1983



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20 March 1984

**USSR REPORT
WORLD ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

No 12, December 1983

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ENGLISH SUMMARIES OF MAJOR ARTICLES IN MEMO JOURNAL

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 12, Dec 83
pp 158-159

[Text] V. Falin in the article "Summing up the Results of the Year" turns to the events of 1983 in the field of policy, economy and ideology to the acute struggle which has determined the universal climate on the Planet. The author scrutinizes the history of the struggle for disarmament and demonstrates the unshakable devotion of the Soviet Union and the CPSU to the ideals of peace. At the same time the author exposes the demagogic imperialist policy on issues of war, and peace with its flagrant gap between words and deeds. The article traces the chronology of the development and preparation for deployment of American medium-range nuclear armaments in Europe, exposes the U.S. negative stand during the whole of 1983 at the Soviet-American talks on the limitation and reduction of strategic armaments in Geneva as well as at the Vienna talks on the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments, stationed in Central Europe which demonstrate that Washington pursues a policy, excluding cooperation and agreement with the Soviet Union and disrespects the legitimate Soviet interests and shows lack of desire to observe the principles of equality and mutual security.

G. Vorontsov in the article "Security of Europe and Medium-range Nuclear Weapons" considers a problem which has acquired of late particular importance and features prominently among the issues dealing with detente, strengthening of peace and security. The author considers the problem of parity in medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe and convincingly explains the unsoundness of NATO's repeated assertions about the allegedly existing imbalance in this field. The article pays much attention to the history of NATO's "missiles decision". It shows the negative role of the USA in the adoption of this decision in 1979. It reveals the community of interests and divergencies between the USA and their West European allies. The author exposes the U.S. obstructionist approach to the Geneva talks on medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe aimed at the unilateral disarmament of the Soviet Union and the nuclear superiority of NATO on regional and global levels. He also exposes Washington's policy of deploying at any cost new American ballistic Pershing-2 and long-range cruise missiles in Western Europe in the vicinity of the territory of the USSR and its Warsaw Treaty allies. The article highlights in detail the USSR's recent numerous peaceful initiatives.

The article by Yu. Barsegov, "Two Approaches to a Problem, Common to All Mankind" considers a set of problems dealing with the World Ocean sea-bed resources as a global problem of international relations, where each of its components is tightly linked with such human problems as food, raw materials, power, ecology, disarmament and peace. The author notes that the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea has clearly revealed two different approaches to these problems on the part of the USSR and the USA, boiling down to different conceptions of the problem, ways and means of tackling it. The article shows how the USA has been guided by its imperial aspirations. Their sea policy is based on the desire to obtain special unwarranted privileges in the World Ocean, to turn the expanses of the World's Ocean into their economic territory for the preparation of a nuclear war. The author speaks of a quite different approach on the part of the USSR to the solution of the problem of the World Ocean. This approach proceeds from the very nature of its social system. In common with many other countries the USSR opposes this Washington's imperialist policy and stands up for broad international cooperation in the use of the World Ocean's expanses and resources for the establishment of a stable order, governed by law in the interests of all the peoples of the world.

The article by B. Zanegin "Chinese Policy of Reagan Administration" examines American-Chinese present-day relations within the context of the changes which were introduced into Washington's foreign policy by the Reagan right-conservative administration. The author speaks of the contradictory nature of American policy in relation to the Chinese People's Republic which includes essentially incompatible components: the development of "strategic relations" with the CPR and simultaneous military and strategic support of the Taiwan regime. The author points to some American-Chinese contradictions and to the aggravation of their relations in the initial stage of the Reagan administration. At present American-Chinese relations are determined by two factors: on the one hand by discrepancies due to socio-political and ideological distinctions, on the other by the impact of parallel or concurrent interests what is manifested in the common approach of the USA and CPR to some problems, serving in world politics as a dividing line between the forces of progress and socialism and reaction and imperialism. This imparts a complicated and contradictory nature to the present relations between the USA and the Chinese People's Republic.

The credit system occupies an important role in the whole structure of the modern state monopoly capitalism, providing for the mobilization and redistribution of timely spare financial resources, necessary for the circulation of capital. V. Usoskin in the article "New Trends in the Sphere of Credit Services in the U.S.A." examines essential changes in the domain of credit and finance, stemming from the new dimensions of the credit structure and qualitative shifts inside it, taking into consideration affluent statistical data.

The author subsequently investigates the following groups of problems, concerning the contemporary features and particulars of the U.S. credit system. Primarily, the new phenomenon in the organisational structure of credit institutions, the evolution of their operations, pinpointing the emergence of universal, so to say, financial supermarkets along with the development of commercial dealership, trust-holdings, etc. Secondly, it's worth mentioning the vast computerization of credit, spurring the growing efficiency of banking as a whole.

Thirdly, the monopolistic competition exerts significant influence on the diversification of credit operations, extending them towards lately independent activities namely leasing of industrial equipment, medium-term loans, factor stock operations and so on.

The promoted analysis visualizes the contradictory role of credit in the process of capitalist reproduction. On the one hand, credit provides for the progress of productive forces, overall growth of productivity, increase of industrial potential. On the other hand, it's capitalist credit that aggravates the existing antagonisms, accelerates inflation, speeds up concentration of capital and class polarization of the bourgeois society.

"Reproduction and Domestic Markets in Afro-Asian Economies: Some Recent Developments" by I. Ivanov highlights the industrialization process in the countries of Asia and Africa leading to the new pattern of productive forces development. The years of independence and accomplishments of the economic decolonisation struggle contributed greatly to the alteration of the reproduction circumstances in the countries under review. The interior factors take priorities in their economic advance, in the integration of their once fragmented markets into all-nation ones. It's the state that plays the crucial role in the regulation of the rate and main proportions of the reproduction, in strengthening of its weaker parts. Nevertheless, the positive shifts are hampered by discrepancies inherited from the colonial past along with the dependent position of the developing countries within the framework of the world capitalist economy, along with the increasing differentiation among them.

Under the analysis are the major factors and trends transforming the traditional sectors in the developing countries into modern economies, and also the efficiency of capital formation, production and marketing, backing the investigation by statistical data.

The author traces the objective conditions under which the commodity exchange and the development of market structure contribute essentially to the economic progress of Afro-Asian countries. But these objective conditions don't necessarily exclude, however, the other than capitalist ways of development, those of socialist orientation, for instance. This orientation based on the democratic moves of the state could provide for the situation when the market mechanism serves not selfish and private, but democratic and public interests.

In the article "International Migration of Labour Force" L. Smirnyagin analyses the main and most common aspects of this peculiar phenomenon in international economic relations. The mechanism of migration process depends primarily on the growing gap between the donors and recipient countries on the level of economic development and natural increase of the population. The author compares the advantages enjoyed by the countries with the disadvantages which accompany such participation. The root of the contradiction lies in the fact that all the positive sides of international migration usually turns out to be short-term, being limited economically and only comparatively narrow circle of direct participants in the process benefit from them, whereas the disadvantages are of a permanent nature, embrace the socio-cultural sphere and involve the entire society.

All the contradictions resulted in the crisis of international migration in Western Europe where the influx of cheap and ruthlessly exploited labour force from the developing countries, served for a long time as an important factor of economic development. Nevertheless international migration tends to expand, embracing ever more and more countries and breaking through regional boundaries.

The author believes that this process will evidently develop in future, acquiring more complex character, aggravating the existing problems and causing new ones.

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RETROSPECTIVE ON DISARMAMENT, INF DEPLOYMENT, CHANGED SITUATION IN 1983

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 12, Dec 83
pp 3-15

[Article by V. Falin: "Summing Up..."]

[Text] The year of 1983 has not been an ordinary one in the infinite succession of years. In terms of the saturation with memorable dates, which, by virtue of the phenomena and events connected with them, invite serious reflection. In terms of the intensity of the struggle--political and economic, ideological and military--which determined the general climate in the world. In terms of the significance of the decisions which were adopted or whose adoption, contrary to commonsense, was avoided--decisions programming development for decades ahead. No, it cannot be called ordinary.

The jubilee year of Karl Marx--the very great scholar and practical revolutionary--who made it possible by his discoveries to turn socialism from utopia into a science and who initiated the world revolutionary movement of the proletariat. A whole century has elapsed since this amazing man's life came to an end. "A century of dramatic upheavals, revolutionary tempests and fundamental changes in man's fate. A century which overturned and swept away a multitude of philosophical concepts, social theories and political doctrines. And a century of victories of Marxism following one after the other and of its growing impact on social development. The more time progresses, the clearer become the meaning and scale of Marx's life exploit,"* Yu. V. Andropov observed. Open to all that is best and progressive modern science and culture, Marxism-Leninism "is taking possession of the minds of millions and millions of people. This is the ideological credo of the ascending class which is liberating all mankind. This is the philosophy of social optimism, the philosophy of the present and the future."**

The chronicle of the past century--to take the main thing in the history of the liberation of the peoples from social oppression and national enslavement and in the history of the confrontation of the forces of reaction and progress--is at the same time the chronicle of the coming into being and the activity

* Yu. V. Andropov, "Karl Marx's Teaching and Certain Questions of Socialist Building in the USSR," Moscow, 1983, p 3.

**Ibid., p 30.

of the CPSU. Eighty years ago, at the Second Russian Social Democratic Workers Party Congress, Bolshevism became established as an ideological current and organizationally shaped as the vanguard of the Russian proletariat able and ready to rise up against the capitalist orders and be the first to move into the communist future.

The great service of the Lenin Party to the working people of the world and all mankind is also that it was the first to lay bare with the utmost clarity the roots of militarism, declared an uncompromising war on war and took the initiative in overthrowing the age-old "rules" blessing violence in all its forms and types and justifying aggression, intervention and other imperialist tyranny. Lenin's Decree on Peace heralded the birth of a qualitatively new official policy oriented toward the peaceful coexistence of states, irrespective of the differences in social system, a profound reorganization of the entire system of interstate relations and the conversion of international relations into relations truly between peoples. To V.I. Lenin and the CPSU belongs the honor of putting forward at the 1922 Genoa Conference a program for the strengthening of peace and the development of international cooperation and proposals on general or partial disarmament--ideas which since then have firmly become a part of the agenda of world politics.

And in the year of the 80th anniversary of the Second Social Democratic Workers Party Congress also we may with legitimate pride say: no other revolution, no other political party, no other country could have recorded to its credit such efforts as have been exerted by the motherland of October, the CPSU and the Soviet people to bring the peoples peace, curb the military danger and cover up the guns of war forever and then destroy them.

This needs to be recalled constantly--and not only for the sake of historical justice. The attitude of parties, members of parliament and governments toward war and peace is the key, fundamental question of the present day. Against this primarily today are checked the true value of declarations about freedom and equality, humanity and democracy--shining concepts cynically emasculated by the bourgeoisie. Through the prism of war and peace there unerringly shines through the essence of demagogues--those who love to talk about human rights. For here the gap between word and deed is paid for not in bank notes but the sufferings and lives of millions of people.

The ridiculous inventions concerning Soviet foreign policy founder against the facts, which prove the CPSU's unshakable adherence to the ideals of peace. It is facts and facts alone which may be the objective arbiter in the dispute over whose policy expresses the fundamental interests of the peoples, which system does not need weapons to assert its soundness and worth and which one clings to them like a sheet anchor. This always needs to be recalled, particularly at such moments of the dangerous rise in tension as we are now experiencing. What is being decided essentially is the question of whether mankind will be able to break the shackles of militarism and concentrate on peaceful matters and sweep from its path the barriers of hatred, prejudice and lies which imperialism is erecting in order to disunite the peoples.

If we do not leave the firm ground of reality, it has to be acknowledged that of all the weapons systems at modern capitalism's disposal, one of the most powerful and most suited for proliferation has been and remains the lie. It is not enough to furnish the army with lethal arms. It is also necessary to cultivate in it a readiness to use them with the maximum ruthlessness, without thought of the consequences. Such was the aim of the Hitlerites, who converted the Wehrmacht into a refined instrument of murder and a machine of total destruction. The same technique, but on the vaunted American scale is being employed in the U.S. armed forces, where "volunteer"-mercenaries are trained to perform, without asking any unnecessary questions, any, the most dirty, work. So it was in Vietnam, Kampuchea or Laos, so it is in the Near East.

Befuddling the public consciousness and paralyzing its will, the lie becomes a driving belt from imperial designs directly to the guns of war. The mechanical or electronic detonator is activated by the psychological detonator, when the image of a specific enemy takes shape in the consciousness and when the lie substantiates and justifies the use of force and spares one in advance a feeling of guilt for what has been done and from the at times painful need to remain a man. The apologists of power confrontation, on the other hand, dream of the targets embedded in missile-guidance instruments merging with the targets being inserted in people's consciousness--and then they will merely have to select a suitable moment for a "disarming" strike against the other side.

It is not fortuitous that surges of chauvinist demagogic and lies anticipate and accompany each new round of the arms race spurred by the West. In periods of a restructuring of military doctrines real psychological battles, in which all the imperialist information and propaganda mass media are enlisted, develop in an even more aggressive mode. We recall the development in 1949-1950 of the plan for nuclear war against the USSR codenamed Dropshot, which envisaged the start of combat operations on 1 January 1957. This creation under the U.S. State Department of a "National Psychological Strategy Agency," which was entrusted with "psychological warfare against international communism," was announced on 17 August 1950. By a presidential order of 20 June 1951 this body was converted into the Psychological Warfare Agency under the jurisdiction of the National Security Council. Representatives of the joint chiefs of staff group were seconded to the agency as advisers in order that "the agency's policy and program correspond to the plans of military operations." The "psychological warfare" departments of the CIA and in the State Department and the armed forces were subordinate to it. The position of special presidential assistant for psychological warfare was established in 1953. In addition, the Psychological Warfare Committee was created under the presidency with the mission of studying methods of coordinating and intensifying all cold war operations, subversive activity and sabotage. By an irony of fate it was this committee which proposed dropping such "unsuccessful terms" as "cold war" and "psychological warfare". In accordance with its recommendations, the "psychological warfare" service underwent the next reorganization. It was given new signs--Operations Coordinating Agency under the National Security Council and USIA. The rest remained as before.

The U.S. Government avoids disturbing these black pages of its history, in which things are called by their real names. It is not good, however, for others to forget about them. Yet it is not a question of the past but the very present.

Never before has the madness of war been so obvious to such a large number of people. The combined potential of world medicine would not be sufficient to administer effective assistance to the victims of an accidental or pre-meditated explosion of a 1-megaton bomb over any large city. Medicine would be an impotent bystander and, of course, itself a casualty of a nuclear conflict. Nonetheless, hardly ever have such energetic, persistent and purposeful actions been taken to rehabilitate war and to pass it off as a "natural" instrument of policy in order to extinguish in people the anxiety over the inevitable consequences of a nuclear catastrophe and sow the illusion that "for the chosen" there will be a spot in a rescuing ark, which, it is promised, will sail through oceans of radioactive dust toward the unknown shores of the promised land.

The paradox is that at a time when scientists, physicians and specialists of other branches of knowledge are showing cogently and with scientifically verified data in their hands that nuclear war would be an unprecedented disaster for all mankind, some politicians are simply rejecting this prognosis. It "seems" to them that there are "insufficient grounds" for pessimism. According to Washington, "it has not been empirically proven" that nuclear war would put an end to civilization. U.S. leaders refer here to the experience of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which "rose from the ashes". Consequently, others will not necessarily perish either. It is practicable, the White House believes, to pose the task not of banning nuclear weapons but of "limiting the damage" upon their use to "acceptable" levels--for the West, of course--of risk. What seems most promising for some people across the Atlantic is the creation of missiles based on the latest technology ensuring the surmounting of the present "stalemate" in the correlation of forces and the "assured"--in the event of first use of nuclear weapons--destruction of the enemy before he can raise a finger.

So, following a brief burst of clarity which dawned on the U.S. ruling circles at the time of detente, the gloom or prejudice and the denial of certain irrefutable truths again reigned in Washington's corridors of power. Whereas in May 1972 the USSR and the United States expressed the "common belief that in the nuclear age there is no other basis for relations between them than peaceful coexistence," a decade later Washington declares the USSR the "evil empire" and calls for a "crusade" against it as far as the "eradication of socialism as a sociopolitical system." Thus not peaceful coexistence but the Soviet Union's adoption of the social system of the United States as a model--this is the American prerequisite for maintaining peace between the two countries. Not equal, mutually profitable relations but dealing with the USSR, negotiations included, "from a position of strength" and a persistent aspiration to destabilize the Soviet state, undermine its economy and cause the disintegration of the Soviet socialist society. Not a lowering of the level of military confrontation but the utmost intensification of the rivalry in the arms race and in the creation of increasingly dangerous and complex weapons systems making possible concealed preparations for a surprise, perfidious attack and turning the arms race itself into a variety of a war to exhaustion.

In the Middle Ages the Inquisition lit "cleansing" bonfires to the glory of the "true faith". Today Washington cannot wait to ignite nuclear bonfires for the sake of eradicating the anti-imperialist "sedition". Earlier the score of the victims of ideological fanaticism ran to hundreds of thousands, now an "expenditure" of hundreds of millions and even billions of lives is calculated. Earlier insanity gathered in its harvest in years and decades, now everything has to end in a couple of days or weeks. "Conservative extremism," as the most senior American politician--the Republican Harold Stassen--characterized the import of R. Reagan's activity, is driving the United States away from the positions from which it approached detente. Canceling out the experience of recent decades, Washington would like to make the reference point 6 August 1945, when the nuclear mushroom rose over Hiroshima, when time and space acquired entirely new political parameters and meaning and when man became physically stronger than the nature which had given him birth, without having learned to intelligently control his behavior. The mind sometimes only manages to record the changes occurring in the world, but not comprehend them. But the changes of recent decades and years are so far-reaching and profound that only the collective wisdom of the peoples is capable of comprehending them.

But there are changes and changes. The essence of the changes which have been observed in recent years on the U.S. political landscape are qualified by their initiators themselves as "a change of direction in international policy" (R. Reagan) or as a "revolution" (C. Weinberger) and by certain American bourgeois experts as a "counterrevolution" (W. Griffith). This is a very important circumstance. The causes of the present sharp exacerbation of the state of affairs in the world are not a change in the policy of the USSR and not its departure from the political platform which in the 1970's revealed many points of contact with the American frame of mind at that time but Washington's abrupt turnabout in a direction diametrically opposite to the goals of detente and its endeavor to revive the cold war in a worse and enlarged edition.

In other words, at the start of the 1970's U.S. ruling circles mustered the spirit to tune themselves, by way of experiment, for a year or two to the principles of peaceful coexistence. Peace agreements were concluded, as formerly, for a certain term. Sometimes to within 6 months. For the majority, in terms of the concepts of our enlightened age, this was strange and absurd. But from Washington's standpoints, it transpires, every relatively tranquil year which affords no pretext for using or, at least, flexing its muscles is lost and harmful since it weakened and dulls anticommunist "vigilance" and disposes people in favor of sensible thoughts, which, the present occupants of the White House believe, should be swept from a "pluralist society".

Erasing the difference between the state of peace and war and turning war and the preparations for it into a permanent occupation--this is what is being called for and aspired to. The periods of cooperation, W. Stoessel, then undersecretary of state, declared in November 1982 were temporary and situational. Rivalry, confrontation and outright hostility are, in his version,

the constant objective factors in Soviet-American relations. Given such an understanding of detente and everything connected with it, there can be no thought even of freeing the minds of a considerable part of the American nation from captivity to false ideas about other states and peoples and of bringing down to earth the notions, particularly in the ruling upper strata, concerning the actual limits to U.S. possibilities in current world politics. Without this, however, it is impossible to create a stable world, ensure equal security for all and make equality a perceivable, visible value.

Any good work may be derailed--it is only necessary to choose the right occasion and put the mine in the right place. Or, to be absolutely sure, several mines. Washington was engaged in this even before R. Reagan, but the rage of militarism under his presidency has eclipsed everything that has gone before. The U.S. military budget has exceeded \$280 billion and by 1988 will have grown to \$425 billion. And R. Reagan and his cabinet still boast that they are exercising "restraint". Given their will, the already astronomical figures would have to be doubled, that is, the militarization of the U.S. budget brought roughly to the Israeli level. But whereas Tel Aviv has a rich uncle who pays for all its adventures, Washington has no such uncle, and the militarist urge can be satisfied solely by deceiving and robbing today's generation and burning up the property of future generations of Americans.

On Judgment Day it will be necessary to include on the service record of the R. Reagan administration the decisions on the production and deployment of the first-strike MX and B1-B and Stealth strategic aircraft systems and a whole set of strategic cruise missiles--ground-, sea- and air-based--on the speeding up of work on the Trident II missiles adapted to use in counter-force strategy and on the design of the Midgetman mobile intercontinental missile. Orders have been given for the series production of neutron warheads and for the chemical rearmament of the U.S. Army. Programs for modernizing the navy and the construction of 130 new major ships by 1989 have been approved. As a result the authorized number of operational warships of the main types will be increased to 600, and "the necessary superiority at sea will have been achieved." The network of bases and other military facilities of the United States on foreign territory is being expanded and reorganized. The armed forces' aircraft, tank and artillery pools are being replaced. Ammunition stocks are being brought up to wartime requirements. A new central command (supplementing the European and Far East commands) in the Indian Ocean region, which has been added to the sphere of the United States' "vital interests," has been created. It has simultaneously been decided to double the "rapid deployment" corps. A joint command has been set up which will undertake military operations in space and from space. R. Reagan has announced wide-ranging R&D on the subject of the creation of space systems capable of destroying the enemy's nuclear missiles in flight or on the ground and making the United States "invulnerable" to a retaliatory strike. Such is a far from complete list of dishes from the fixed menu prepared for the American taxpayer by militarism. The menu will cost approximately \$2.5 trillion over the next 7 years.

On what society should spend its resources--on houses or command bunkers, on baby carriages or mobile missiles--is not simply its internal affair. And

it is of no significance here that a wealthy country may at some moment or other permit itself to have both. Nuclear, neutron and binary weapons are not being created for domestic needs. They do not have to be used, it is enough to possess them for them to lay as a heavy burden on the shoulders of the whole world, cause a chain reaction of retaliatory steps, aggravate mistrust where such already exists and arouse mistrust where it was not or might not have been.

Something else also is no less significant. Relations between states in specific spheres ultimately reflect the possibilities and limits of the compatibility of their fundamental interests. At the same time, however, objective possibilities are translated into the language of practical policy by actual people, and it is on their maturity and poise in judgements and conduct (and, often, disposition) that whether states will emphasize circumstances and factors bringing them closer together or confine themselves to disagreements and contradictions and artificially limit the sphere of cooperation depends. Experience shows that in politics more often than anywhere else from identical premises opposite conclusions are drawn, depending on the poles of attraction, and this leads--the United States being the most eloquent example of this--to twists of official policy, disruption of the principle of continuity and to political "turbulence," which makes international development dangerous and unpredictable.

In 1972 it was recognized in official Soviet-American documents that "the differences in the ideology and social systems of the USSR and the United States are not an obstacle to the development between them of normal relations based on the principles of sovereignty, equality, noninterference in internal affairs and mutual benefit." Ten years later Washington, you see, "denies" the Soviet Union the right to be itself, to have its own interests and commitments to its friends and to protect its security and sovereignty. The interference in our affairs is assuming increasingly brazen forms. It is proposed that the Soviet people pay for a desire to live in peace by fundamental concessions to the United States and its imperialist fellow travelers.

It is obvious that Washington's disavowal of the fundamental principles of Soviet-American relations agreed in the 1970's and recognition as the common goal the need to prevent a nuclear catastrophe and halt the arms race and strengthen peace could not have failed to have been reflected in its foreign policy line, primarily in negotiations on various aspects of international security. This has also been reflected in the present administration's approach to treaties which have already been signed. To justify the refusal to ratify the SALT II Treaty Washington does not shrink from forgeries and portrays matters such that this document envisaged no reductions in the sides' strategic potentials and placed the United States in a "detrimental" position compared with the USSR. The present American leaders' hatred is aroused by the concept which is at the basis of the strategic arms limitation process--the principle of equality and equal security and the mutual commitment not to seek military superiority. The refusal to ratify the SALT II Treaty is sabotage of the very idea of a mutually acceptable limitation of strategic arms and an attempt to cancel out all the work that had been done previously and cut short a process that had started successfully.

Let us listen--if some people find such a conclusion too categorical--to K. Adelman, whom R. Reagan promoted to the position of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency director. "The President points out perfectly clearly," he declared in an interview with THE WASHINGTON POST, "that he is not recommending ratification of this treaty and never will make a recommendation for ratification of SALT II. It seems to me that, were this the case, this would create a dangerous precedent for future arms control negotiations inasmuch as the criteria envisaged by SALT II would be employed, and this treaty would thus become something like our country's highest law, and I do not believe this...."

Properly speaking, the same may also be repeated in connection with the United States' refusal to ratify the 1974 and 1976 treaties on halting underground nuclear tests and on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and also in connection with its refusal to conduct negotiations with the USSR on a general and complete ban on nuclear tests, on banning antisatellite systems and chemical weapons and on limiting military activity in the Indian Ocean. Initially the R. Reagan administration had wobbled and referred to the need to "strengthen" the agreements which had already been signed "with stricter and more all-embracing provisions" concerning supervision and the need to provide in any new agreement for "improved opportunities for inspection." But finding itself pressed to the wall by American legislators, the administration forced out of itself that it needed to continue testing to solve "important problems" of America's nuclear arms program. "Nuclear tests," the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency declared in response to written questions from the House Appropriations Committee in September 1983, "are essential for the development, modernization and classification of warheads, the preservation of dependable stockpiles and an evaluation of the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons."

Indeed, it would have been almost unbelievable had Washington ceased test explosions at a time when it is engaged in the complete replacement of nuclear arsenals and plans in the next 6 years to produce approximately 17,000 new nuclear warheads. But nonetheless, you will agree, it is not often that the U.S. Administration so boldly, in such "bold type," so to speak, acknowledges a lie, certifying itself before the world public to be an extremely unreliable partner who does not have the faintest respect for his own word. What respect is to be expected from it for the interests and the word of others?

The story concerning the problem of nuclear tests is instructive in many respects. It reveals the procedure of evading problems for whose solution Washington is losing its taste. It shows why most important negotiations have for years been at a standstill and why precious time which can never be made up is being wasted. It fills out the ominous meaning of the declarations which U.S. officials make from time to time.

The fact that the U.S. Administration is employing various expressions to denote one and the same thing--the breakup of the strategic parity and the United States' acquisition of military superiority--cannot, if course, get past the attention of the Soviet side. There is talk of "reliable containment potential," "a more secure balance of containment," a "reserve of strength," "assured destruction potential," "closing the window of vulnerability" and "the capacity of the U.S. armed forces for performing their set assignments."

A multitude of variations, and behind them all the endeavor to acquire the capability of waging a nuclear war against the USSR in any part of the world with a chance of success. It is declared with rare arrogance that the United States will attain its objective regardless of whether there are negotiations with the Soviet Union or not. LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE was not exaggerating in the least when in the February 1983 issue it observed in the article "The World a la Reagan": "Reagan's policy in the form that it is formulated at present offers the Soviet leaders a choice between confrontation and capitulation.... U.S. foreign policy is nothing other than a means of creating the conditions the most conducive to an inevitable East-West war."

We would not be overstating it in saying that the present U.S. Administration's position at the talks on limiting and reducing strategic arms has from day one been based on a rejection of the principle of equal security and a rejection of the very idea of equal, partner relations. The talks were viewed as a continuation of war by diplomatic means. In themselves the talks meant nothing to the United States. It would have done without them had it not been for the allies and international public opinion. Explaining the true meaning of things to American senators, Undersecretary of State R. Burt declared without undue philosophizing that the administration had had to consent to negotiations with the USSR on medium-range weapons inasmuch as otherwise it would not have been possible to gain the allies' consent to the deployment of Pershing 2's and cruise missiles in West Europe. Vice President G. Bush expressed the same thought thus: Pershing 2's will be deployed in Europe at the end of 1983 even if progress is observed at the arms control talks with the Soviet Union. In short, the Geneva negotiations were conducted by Washington pro forma. Whatever happened there, they were not to influence the United States' military plans.

When did these plans appear and acquire actual outline? Western propaganda usually points to the NATO Council December (1979) session in Brussels, the Bermuda meeting of the leaders of a number of leading capitalist states (United States, Britain, France and the FRG) or then Chancellor H. Schmidt's London speech in 1977. The decision to deploy new American missiles in West Europe is linked with the Soviet Union's creation and installation of SS-20 missiles. It has to be emphasized as categorically as possible that NATO propagandists are deliberately distorting the picture. The true causes and chronology of the development of the plans to advance the "forward boundaries" of American medium-range strategic weapons appear totally different.

Gen B. Rogers, supreme commander of NATO Joint Armed Forces Europe, candidly said in an interview which he gave THE NEW YORK TIMES and the West German magazine QUICK in the summer of 1983 that the "military basis for the deployment of cruise missiles and Pershing 2's was the discrepancy which had begun to take shape in our (American--V.F.) arsenal of means of containment." "The deployment of these missiles," he specified, "is not only a response to the deployment of the Soviet medium-range SS-20 missiles. Some people are making such claims, it is true, but gaps existed in our nuclear containment potential before the appearance of the SS-20. In deploying the Pershing 2's we are thereby attempting to close the yawning gap which has existed for more than a decade now."

B. Rogers did not show all his cards, of course, but said enough. The need for new weapons of the Pershing 2 type arose long before the 1979 "twin decision" and the positioning of even the first SS-20. If he wished, B. Rogers could inform us that the order to industry for the development of the new generation of Pershings was issued by the Pentagon at the end of the 1960's. The decade about which the general was speaking opened with top-secret Presidential Memorandum 242 of 17 January 1974, which ordered preparations for two types of nuclear war with the USSR. First, for the delivery of a "surgical" nuclear first strike to achieve the speediest cessation of military operations on terms "acceptable to the United States and its allies...while the scale of the conflict is limited as much as possible." Second, for waging a large-scale war in the hope of final results beneficial to the West, for which it would be necessary: a) to hold part of the strategic forces in reserve in order to put pressure on the enemy during and after a nuclear conflict; b) destroy political, economic and military targets of paramount significance for the enemy's preservation of his power, influence and capacity for acting the part of a big power; and c) limit the damage to the political, economic and military resources of paramount significance for the United States' preservation of its power and influence.

It is not difficult to see that Memorandum 242 inherited many of the ideas of National Security Council Directive 20/1 of 18 August 1948, whose compilers had prepared for the Soviet Union the lot of protectorate--so that "even a noncommunist regime and one nominally friendly to us (the United States--V.F.)" would not have important military power and it would economically depend to a considerable extent on the outside world. It imbibed the imperial charge of the Charioteer and Dropshot plans. The memorandum prepared the ground for presidential directives 18 (August 1977) and 59 (July 1980). According to THE NEW YORK TIMES, U.S. Defense Department and National Security Council employees predicted a "revolution" in nuclear strategy in the period of preparation for Presidential Directive 59. Even then it was a question of the United States' capability, in the words of then U.S. Defense Secretary G. (sic) Brown, of waging "a limited, but lengthy nuclear war" with strikes against "targets of the political and military control system, nuclear and nonnuclear means of warfare and also against industrial targets of military significance." The logic of militarism is distinguished by far greater consistency and continuity than American political logic in the form in which it is presented for general review.

But let us return to B. Rogers' disclosures. If the deployment of the SS-20's was not the cause and if as the reason for the transfer of the United States' nuclear potential to West Europe on the basis of medium-range missiles the general gives the increased vulnerability of launcher aircraft as a result of the refinement of air-defense missiles, R. Reagan's "zero option" also was merely a colorful show designed to divert the gaze. The "yawning gap" could not have remained unbridged, and the "vacuum" had to be filled, the more so in that technology had brought "to the surface" the systems suitable for this. Whence the conclusion: the achievement of an accord taking the legitimate interests of the sides into equal consideration was not for one minute part of Washington's intentions. Such an accord would have been contrary to the basic postulate of the United States' current policy--the

aspiration to secure for itself "advantages" sufficient to satisfy the claims to "world leadership" in peacetime and for victory (officially called "success") in the event of war.

Under the conditions of actual parity at a level making essentially pointless the continued quantitative growth of intercontinental-range arms and also for lack of effective methods of intercepting missiles after launch there is an increased temptation to create and stockpile weapons which are essentially strategic, but which have such specific characteristics as special accuracy, mobility, speed and secrecy of deployment in launch positions with maximum distribution around the perimeter of the borders of a probable enemy. Hitting targets for certain from close range in order to keep in reserve part of the long-range strategic forces--this was how Memorandum 242 defined the task. With his characteristic bluntness B. Rogers informed us of the same thing in mid-September 1983. According to him, 108 Pershings would be targeted on one-tenth of Soviet intercontinental missiles and would afford the United States the opportunity of "accurately hitting analogous weapons deployed in the western part of the USSR." Here is your "time link". Here is your talk about the Pershings as "theater" weapons. The NATO commander in chief removes the masking screen--the Pershings and their cruise colleagues are actually strategic weapons comparable in the missions they perform with the "analogous" intercontinental Soviet weapons.

No, the United States' actions throughout 1983, whether at the nuclear weapons in Europe or strategic arms negotiations or whether at the long-suffering Vienna negotiations or at other forums where problems of disarmament are being discussed, have built up, stone after stone, into the foundation of a policy precluding cooperation and consent. Washington has done everything to ensure that 1983 be not simply critical but also a precursor of the upheavals at which American imperialism would like on the latest occasion to warm its hands. The "zero," "interim" and "renewed interim" and other options were merely stages of the propaganda support for the operation to break up the strategic parity. They were, according to the well-known NEW YORK TIMES commentator L. Gelb, "absolutely essential" for "helping the European leaders persuade the population that the United States is making genuine efforts for a settlement."

All the options precluded in advance an agreement, if by it we mean equal agreement. They were constructed on demands, absolutely unacceptable for the USSR, that the American forward-based missiles and also the British and French nuclear potential be disregarded. They were designed to bless a missile arms race in the so-called nonnuclear version per the requirements of the "Airland Battle" doctrine, which provides for the destruction at the initial stage of a conflict of the enemy's armed forces for the entire depth of his defense. They proceeded from the fact that the Soviet Union would obviously not acknowledge the validity of the United States' claim to form for itself--besides global--American-Soviet "parities" in Europe, the Far East and everywhere where Washington takes it into its head to outline additional circles of its "inviolable interests".

Equally the USSR could not accept as evidence of the United States' constructive intentions its attempt at the strategic arms limitation and reduction talks to break up the structure of Soviet strategic defense and in this way

acquire a triple preponderance in nuclear warheads. If we proceed from Washington's desire to restore for itself the "safety reserve" of the start of the 1960's, the American position is logical. If we proceed from the "Directives in the U.S. Defense Sphere for Fiscal Years 1984-1988," which were signed by C. Weinberger and which provide for the imposition on the Soviet Union of an exhausting arms race in spheres "favorable" to the United States, this behavior is also explicable. But if we look at the calendar, having first removed the militarist blinders, it is revealed that the United States is running from an agreement like the devil from incense.

"The arms limitation talks," K. Adelman cynically declares, "are a device to which we simply must resort to reassure the American people and the European allies." Commenting on the R. Reagan administration's approach to the "war and peace" dilemma, the commentator F. Lewis wrote in THE NEW YORK TIMES: for the United States "arms are becoming the bottom line of an increasingly broad range of foreign policy problems. Diplomacy is being expressed predominantly in the art of arms transfers. Relations with the European allies revolve around the deployment of the American missiles." And so it is to continue until the achievement of the principal goal--"the destruction of socialism as a socio-political system." If possible, without the use of nuclear weapons, if necessary, not stopping short at war.

For a quarrel the ill will of one side is sufficient, for an accord the benevolence of both sides is needed. Having set as the goal at all costs upsetting parity and putting the Soviet Union in a difficult position, having moved first-strike nuclear weapons right up to the borders of the Warsaw Pact countries, Washington was not about to show respect for legitimate Soviet interests, study the Soviet arguments in a businesslike manner and give thought to Soviet proposals. U.S. "flexibility" amounted to the question of deploying all 572 missiles immediately or partly, and if partly, in what correlation between Pershings and cruise missiles. But such "flexibility" is only fresh wrapping for the American pretension to superiority--military and political. What remains, given such "flexibility," of equality if the parties to an agreement are in an incomparable (in the sense of the actual status of their actual security) position? If "two securities" emerge and are legalized, two "equalities" will inevitably appear. Somewhat more for the United States, somewhat worse for the USSR. There is hardly anyone in Washington, of sound mind and strong memory, who would believe that the Soviet Union would accept terms detrimental to its interests and insulting to its dignity. And if, nonetheless, the demands on the USSR that it stand under the American palm continue to be put forward, this is done in the correct calculation that they will be turned down.

The Soviet Union is not soliciting any advantages and privileges for itself and its allies. It does not demand of the United States anything that would be contrary to its principles, on which in the 1970's accords were constructed on limiting nuclear arms, in the sphere of ABM defense and on reducing the danger of the outbreak of nuclear war. Washington now declares that it is these principles which no longer suit it. They are indeed incompatible with the policy of anticommunist "crusades". But even this is not a reason to call in question the justice of the principles of the peaceful coexistence of the

USSR and the United States, to which there was not, is not now nor will there be a sensible alternative. This is not a reason to be like, as are some, a weathervane, open to all the winds and infections from Washington.

The year of 1983 could have marked a return to cooperation between the USSR and the United States. The Soviet Union wished for precisely such a turn of events and did everything within its power for it to come about. The USSR submitted proposals on the liquidation of all medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe and a tactical or threefold reduction in medium-range launchers on both sides. It expressed a readiness to reduce the number of its medium-range missiles in the European zone to the number of missiles of Britain and France, come to an equality in nuclear warheads and undertake to liquidate Soviet missiles above the aforesaid number after withdrawing them from the positions they occupy--in the event, of course, of agreement being reached on the problem of nuclear arms in Europe as a whole. A scrupulous observance of balance at a level lower than in 1976--and nothing else.

How did the NATO countries, primarily the United States, react to the Soviet initiatives? They did not even honor such proposals, as a genuine and not imaginary zero option, with a reply. They called the proposal for both sides to bring the number of medium-range missiles to the present level of the British and French potential unsuitable, citing the particular "national predestination" of the nuclear forces of London and Paris, as if they do not fit within the NATO framework. Having taken up the baton from Bonn, France's leaders argue that together with the medium-range missiles their country is confronted by the entire Soviet strategic arsenal since it is capable of reaching French territory. From this proposition is deduced Paris' right to perfect and build up its nuclear forces without the USSR being able to raise the question of their being considered or offset. If F. Mitterrand and F. Mauroy were consistent, in conformity with the "defense in all bearings" logic and doctrine, they would have to add to the "threats to France from outside" also the American and, in any event, the British and Chinese nuclear weapons. To fantasize is to fantasize.

The year of 1983 could have been the year of the conclusion of a treaty on the mutual nonuse of force and the maintenance of relations of peace between the NATO and Warsaw Pact states, in accordance with which the sides would undertake not to be the first to use against the other either nuclear or conventional weapons and military force in general. A year has passed, but this proposal of the Warsaw Pact states also has remained unanswered on the part of the West.

The proposal on the creation of nuclear-free zones in Europe, the development of conventions banning neutron, radiological and chemical weapons, the prevention of the militarization of space and many, many others submitted by the Soviet Union together with allied countries or following coordination with them encountered no understanding or elicited an openly hostile reaction. The United States and its fellow travelers had something to choose from, had they the least desire to consolidate the foundations of peace or encourage in people a belief in the possibility of peaceful coexistence. However, such a desire did not emerge in Western leaders. The United States and certain of its allies did not find time for peace matters. Besides sending off on the dangerous path across the ocean the Pershings and cruise missiles, Washington was engaged in expanding military interference in Lebanon, increasing

armed support for subversive operations against Afghanistan and organizing a major war in Chad and new provocations against Angola. The year of 1983 will be remembered by the peoples for the scale of the terrorist activity of American imperialism against Nicaragua and El Salvador, the brazen and cruel aggression against Grenada and the increased political and military pressure on Cuba and many other states of Central and Latin America.

The sole gratifying exception was the successful culmination of the Madrid meeting of the 35 participants in the All-European Conference. It adopted the important decision to convene a conference on confidence-building and security and disarmament measures in Europe, the first stage of which is to begin in Stockholm on 17 January 1984. Against what background will the conference begin? This is not an idle question. Of what strengthening of confidence can it be a question of if the United States switches from threats to begin undermining the security of the socialist countries to real steps in this direction? One further question arises: how sincere were Washington and its friends in appending their signatures to the final document of the Madrid meeting? Was this not the latest trick, one further farce, at which Western figures are such masters, when military plans cannot be insinuated directly? However they may hide the truth, life will soon bring clarity to this question.

Time is fleeting, and for this reason it is particularly annoying to observe that once again opportunities for progress toward a goal useful for all peoples have been missed. Sooner or later the problems which have to this day been blocked by militarist circles will have to be tackled and, evidently, in a more complicated situation. The exacerbation will be paid for by new hundreds of billions which will be swallowed up by the arms race. Millions of people will because of this be deprived of the necessary medical assistance, food and water, knowledge and the opportunity to apply their labor with benefit to themselves and society. Some people will profit from the exacerbation and conflicts and remelt into gold the blood and sweat shed by others. This negligible minority will continue to oppose a recovery of the international climate, but it does not have authority over the laws of history. Its economic and military power is very great and its capacity for preventing the peoples living in good-neighborly fashion is forever seeking a field for its application. But the minority is not capable of halting progress and impeding the change of eras. The future undoubtedly belongs to those who assert the sensible, the bright and the good, to those who are ready to say with conviction and from a clear conscience: "Farewell, arms!"

The question as to what line to follow in international affairs in the present acute situation does not arise for the Soviet leadership. "Our policy," the statement of Yu.V. Andropov, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, points out, "is aimed, as before, at the preservation and consolidation of peace, the relaxation of tension, curbing the arms race and the expansion and intensification of cooperation between states. Such is the invariable will of the CPSU and the entire Soviet people. Such, we are convinced, are the cherished hopes of all peoples." Mankind, the statement emphasizes, deserves a better fate than to live in a world torn by conflicts, choking under the burden of lethal arms.

The freeing of the material resources being pointlessly spent on the arms race and the disclosure of man's inexhaustible creative potential--this is what could unite people, this is what should be determining states' policy at the boundary of the 21st century. All peoples and each inhabitant of our planet must recognize the danger which threatens. Recognize in order to unite his efforts in the struggle for his own existence.

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PARITY OF MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE EXAMINED

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 12, Dec 83
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[Article by G. Vorontsov: "European Security and Medium-Range Nuclear Weapons"]

[Text] The current international situation is characterized by an exacerbation of tension and the further destabilization of international relations. The arms race unleashed by the United States and NATO is assuming unprecedented proportions. American imperialism is pursuing a militarist policy representing a serious threat to peace. "Its essence," Yu.V. Andropov, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, observed, "is an attempt, disregarding the interests of other states and peoples, to secure for the United States dominating positions in the world."

The central question of our time is that of curbing the arms race and switching to disarmament, particularly nuclear. It is now that it is necessary to do everything to preserve peace and life on earth itself. "Removal of the threat of nuclear confrontation on the European continent," the joint statement of leading party and state figures of Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, Romania, the USSR and the CSSR, which was adopted at the meeting in Moscow in June 1983, observes, "is most important in this plane."¹ Aspiring to the complete liberation of Europe from nuclear weapons, both medium-range and tactical, its participants declared that they believe it essential to seek at least an agreement which would exclude the deployment of new American nuclear missiles in West European countries and provide for the corresponding reductions in medium-range missiles in Europe for ensuring a balance of forces at a lower level.²

The question of medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe is of particular significance under present conditions. It is primarily a question of a most dangerous exacerbation of the situation on the densely populated European continent, where the biggest concentration of armed forces and arms compared with other regions can be observed already. Two military-political alliances--the Warsaw Pact organization and NATO--are in direct contact here.

It is here that the United States would like to break up the evolved correlation of forces and achieve unilateral advantages to the detriment of the

Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries. Europe has been chosen by Washington as the most felicitous spot from its viewpoint in direct proximity to the USSR for creating in the guise of "eliminating" the imaginary Soviet advantages on the continent of Europe an additional strategic threat to the USSR and thereby changing to its benefit the balance of forces not only regionally but also globally. The European "theater" is designed to be a feeler for Pentagon strategists' polishing up of plans for a "limited nuclear war," a "demonstration" explosion of nuclear weapons and so forth. Europe is assigned in Washington's plans the role of a kind of lightning conductor by means of which it would like to exclude from a possible conflict the territory of the United States itself. Finally, the deployment of the additional U.S. nuclear arms is designed to make worse--and very considerably--the prospects of European security and destabilize the situation. It is difficult to predict what consequences this could have for Europe and the whole world.

I

The cause of peace and detente in Europe is based on the balance of forces which has evolved here. And it is precisely the correlation of forces in Europe, primarily in medium-range nuclear weapons, which is the subject of the most intensive speculation and conjecture in the West. They amount essentially to the USSR being ascribed an appreciable advantage in this sphere and sometimes--without any grounds for this--virtually a monopoly on medium-range nuclear weapons.

Thus the second edition of the Pentagon brochure "Soviet Military Power" claims that the USSR "has increased its advantage over NATO"¹ thanks to the SS-20 missiles. The authors of the brochure cannot pass over in silence the fact that "the forces of the United States and NATO have increased in recent years," but it turns out that this process has occurred more slowly than within the Warsaw Pact framework.³

The facts refute such assertions. The Soviet Union and the NATO countries confronting it have here rough equivalence in delivery systems--medium-range missiles and aircraft. Among these on the NATO side are the corresponding nuclear missiles of the United States and its bloc allies--Great Britain and France. For the United States this is more than 650 F-111 and F-4 launcher aircraft in the FRG and Britain and also the A-6 and A-7 launcher aircraft on aircraft carriers off the shores of Europe. Great Britain has 64 Polaris-A-ZTK missiles. France has 98 missiles and 44 Mirage-IV bombers. Altogether NATO has 162 sea- and ground-based medium-range missiles and approximately 700 launcher aircraft. As a counterweight to this potential, the USSR has SS-20 and SS-4 missiles and medium bombers. Their total number is 938. Soviet nuclear weapons and the weapons of the NATO countries of medium range balance each other out, creating a rough equivalence in which neither side has an advantage.

It is fitting to recall that right until recently the United States and NATO recognized the existence of rough equivalence between the two sides' nuclear potentials. This was stated by officials, at the highest level included, repeatedly. The turnaround in evaluations which has occurred is explained

exclusively by the evolution of the strategic goals of the ruling circles of American imperialism in response to the changes in the correlation of class-political forces in the world and the general shifts in the military sphere. Evidence of this is contained, in particular, in an official State Department report pretentiously entitled "Security and Arms Control: The Search for a More Stable Peace," which was published in the summer of 1983. It follows from this that the strategic situation in the past, given American superiority, did not cause concern in Washington, as did not, incidentally, the Soviet SS-4 and SS-5 medium-range missiles, which were in the European part of the USSR at that time. As the report observes, right until the start of the 1970's the U.S. military leadership was putting its hopes in its strategic advantages and hoped to preserve them.

However, the Soviet Union's achievement of strategic parity with the United States was given a hostile reception by Washington. The report cited calls it a "critical development". It is clear that it was by no means the imaginary Soviet superiority but the state of equality which was most not to the liking of the United States, which had been accustomed to rely on force in tackling its foreign policy tasks.

"The United States," the State Department ambitiously asserts, "is washed by two great oceans and has important economic, political and humanitarian interests in each part of the world."⁴ Naturally, such a historical gain of socialism as the achievement of strategic parity with the United States fetters American imperialism's freedom of action. Whence the growth of anti-Soviet sentiments and the intensification of militarist preparations in the vain hope of restoring the past superiority and making it possible to dispose of the fate of other peoples and states.

Nonacceptance of the fact of military balance is the true cause of the increase in anti-Sovietism and militarism in the United States. According to Princeton Professor S. Cohen, the "evil empire" bugbear--to use R. Reagan's vocabulary--is being used to justify the aspiration to superiority over the USSR. In fact, the author observes, the United States "has not yet fully recognized that the Soviet Union--whether we like it or not--has become a truly great power with the corresponding interests and rights in world affairs."⁵

In the attempt to disturb the evolved balance of forces the United States has relied predominantly on the deployment of nuclear missiles in Europe, calculating that it is here that advantages may be gained the most successfully and rapidly. Having declined to continue detente, the United States made power methods and means paramount and set course for the achievement of its superiority.

Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe were created and deployed in response to the threat on the part of the United States and NATO. This is recognized by such an authoritative source in the West as the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. "Soviet medium-range theater nuclear forces (medium-range missiles--G.V.)," its yearbook observes, "were to a considerable extent a response to U.S. forward-based systems.... Finally, Soviet medium-range

nuclear forces have to be seen in connection with the British and French and, in Asia, the Chinese nuclear forces, which are capable of reaching Soviet territory."⁶

In this sphere, as in other arms spheres, development has proceeded according to the well-known outline: challenge on the part of the United States--the response from the USSR necessary to ensure its security. The USSR's modernization of its missiles in Europe is an act which is perfectly legitimate and customary in military organizational development. The NATO states also are engaged in such modernization. It is sufficient to say that the American nuclear weapons in Europe--both their delivery systems and warheads--have been improved considerably. It is by no means a secret that the United States constantly pays great attention to the modernization process.

It is fitting to recall that the American Jupiter ballistic missiles were deployed in West Europe long before the deployment of the Soviet SS-20's. Sixty of the former missiles were deployed from 1960 through 1965 in Italy and also in Turkey. Another model of a similar type of weapon--the Thor ballistic missile--had been deployed in Britain even earlier. Sixty such missiles were deployed on the territory of Great Britain from 1959 through 1963. In addition 96 Mace winged missiles were deployed on FRG territory.

In those years former FRG Chancellor H. Schmidt evaluated the appearance of new American ballistic missiles on the continent in his book devoted to military-political problems as "a sharply expressed aggressive provocation of the Soviet leadership inasmuch as everyone knows that, being deployed in Europe, medium-range missiles are intended only for a first and by no means a second (that is, retaliatory--G.V.) strike." H. Schmidt also emphasized that these missiles should be deployed anywhere in sparsely populated parts of the world, but by no means in Europe inasmuch as they are "centers of attraction for the nuclear missiles of the enemy."⁷ And in the events of the 1980's, as in the 1960's, NATO's "missile decision" is precisely an aggressive provocation of the USSR.

The said American missiles were later dismantled by no means from altruistic considerations. The United States proceeded to the modernization of medium-range nuclear missiles, having in mind the increased accuracy of the corresponding types of weapons and their range and effectiveness. And the old-model launcher aircraft and the missiles which were deemed imperfect were replaced by new, modern models. Among these were the launcher aircraft mentioned above and also new missile models.

The nuclear forces of the two other NATO nuclear powers--Great Britain and France--were also modernized constantly. Plans for their further improvement in the direction of an increase in yield, range and accuracy have been determined at the present stage. Thus by 1990 France will have seven missile-carrying submarines instead of five. French monobloc missiles will be replaced by missiles with seven warheads. Great Britain is fitting its submarines with the sophisticated Polaris missiles. The number of their warheads increases to six. And in the 1990's it is planned to deploy the new Trident-2 systems, which have a great range and carry 14 warheads.

For a complete picture of the correlation of forces account should be taken of NATO's considerable superiority in warheads. The medium-range arms of the United States and its NATO partners are capable of carrying on a single launch/flight approximately 1.5 times more nuclear warheads than the USSR. Under these conditions the deployment of new American nuclear missiles on the territory of the West European states changes the situation considerably. Per the plans of the United States and NATO in accordance with the 1979 "missile decision" it is proposed deploying in the FRG 108 Pershing 2 and 96 cruise missiles, in Great Britain 160 cruise missiles, in Italy 112 cruise and in Belgium and the Netherlands 48 cruise missiles each. It is clear to everyone how considerable the change in the correlation of forces in favor of the United States and NATO will be in this event.

II

However Washington and its allies may attempt to portray the deployment of the American missiles as a retaliatory measure for the imaginary "superarmament" of the USSR, the history of the preparation and adoption of the "missile decision" convincingly testifies to the reverse. In fact this action was for a whole number of years purposefully and consciously developed in the United States and NATO in order to change the correlation of forces in Europe and the world and obtain advantages of a military and political nature.

The official U.S. and NATO version in connection with the "missile decision" amounts to it having been formulated and adopted at the request of the West Europeans. The latter, concerned about the "growing threat" on the part of the USSR, allegedly turned for assistance to Washington, which had allegedly previously given this no thought. In accordance with such a version, the original impetus to this development was given by a speech made by FRG Chancellor H. Schmidt in 1977 in the International Strategic Studies Institute in London (in his interpretation of the correlation of forces in Europe H. Schmidt stated the imbalance in favor of the nuclear forces of the USSR which had allegedly occurred).⁸

This speech came to be considered among officials of the United States and a number of West European countries as the first serious "request" of the allies to Washington that it "restore" the balance, equalizing the imaginary Soviet superiority. As far as Washington itself is concerned, it had allegedly not studied the question of the deployment of new missiles on a practical plane. In addition, the U.S. Administration had for a long time, it said, resisted the persistent "demands" of the West Europeans, who, finally, "forced" it to consent to such an "unwanted" step.

This version of the adoption of the "missile decision" is investigated in detail in the West in a whole number of official materials, books and articles. We will cite such an authoritative source as the systematized analysis of this question in a report prepared in the International Relations and National Security Service Department of the Library of Congress. "American officials' reaction to the (West) Europeans' concern in connection with the imbalance of theater nuclear forces (medium-range weapons--G.V.) consisted of an attempt to persuade them that the problem was illusory," the report

asserts. "During the hearings on the SALT II negotiations in October 1977 Secretary of State Vance had confirmed...that, armed with Polaris (missiles launched from submarines--G.V.) and the existing forward-basing system, we do not need any additional long-range ground- or sea-based system."⁹

The above quotation testifies to at least two very important points. First, a persistent endeavor to establish Washington's noninvolvement in the development of the "missile decision" is discerned in it. Second, C. Vance's speech in Congress convincingly confirms once again that the United States by no means believed that it lacked an adequate counterweight to the USSR's nuclear missiles.

The idea that the United States has sufficient military potential "to repulse a Soviet threat" and that a balance of forces exists in Europe was also confirmed repeatedly by other top leaders of the J. Carter administration. Whence it is clear that the "missile decision," whose preparation was under way at full speed at that time, was explained by no means by the need to eliminate some "vulnerability" of the United States and NATO in the face of Soviet missiles but by a change in Washington's political course.

To judge by everything, from the start of its term in office the J. Carter administration had been preparing for a change from detente to confrontation and a transition to power methods and forms. And the deployment of new missiles in direct proximity to vitally important areas of the USSR was even then regarded by Washington strategists as a most important component of gaining superiority and creating a "position of strength" in respect of the USSR.

Back in 1975 then U.S. Defense Secretary J. Schlesinger, the author of the concept of the retargeting of U.S. nuclear missiles toward strategically important centers of the USSR, had submitted to Congress a report on theater nuclear forces in Europe. The report pointed out that the United States was studying such areas of an improvement in these forces as the addition of the new Poseidon missiles for NATO needs, ensuring greater strike accuracy, and a number of nuclear warhead storage measures. An area indicated by J. Schlesinger pointed in the future toward the adoption of the "missile decision". It provided for "modernization of theater nuclear forces for the purpose of maintaining and increasing deterrence...."¹⁰

At the same time for the purpose of substantiating the future decision plans were being developed in the heart of NATO in 1975-1976 on the impact of new military technology. Two subcommittees were engaged in this: one on military aspects, the other on the political aspects. Naturally, the Americans, who guide NATO activity, exerted a corresponding influence on the results of their work.

It was the J. Carter administration which initiated the convening of two NATO summit meetings in 1977-1978. It was at the initiative of the United States and under its leadership that the so-called longterm program of satisfaction of military requirements was prepared and presented for confirmation by the heads of state and government of the countries of the North Atlantic alliance in 1978.

An idea of the program, which is secret, may be formed merely on the basis of the brief NATO publicity statement for the press and a number of other sources describing with this degree of accuracy or the other certain details which had become well known. As a whole the program, as observed in the official NATO communication, represents a "broad range of measures" designed to "adapt the alliance to the tasks of the 1980's." It consisted of 10 parts. The final part, as noted in U.S. Senate Armed Forces Committee hearings, was devoted to substantiation of the "missile decision": "The NATO Nuclear Planning Group, which has already prepared corresponding studies on modernization of theater nuclear forces, will draw up a draft long-term program for the purpose of ensuring that our theater nuclear forces continue to perform their key role in deterrence."¹¹

The "missile decision" was prepared by two NATO bodies--a so-called "high-level group," which developed the military part of the decision, and a "special group," which dealt with the political aspect.¹²

The "high-level group" was created in October 1977 at a session of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group in Bari (Italy) as a body subordinate to the latter. It consisted of official representatives of the NATO countries with the exception of France, Iceland, Luxembourg and Portugal. The creation and functioning of this group is interpreted in official Western publications as evidence of the increased role of the West Europeans in the determination of NATO policy. However, the group is headed by the U.S. representative, who has exerted the determining influence on its work.

The "special group" was created considerably later, in April 1979, in response to the growing public concern in connection with the exacerbation of tension and NATO's militarist programs. In order to beat back the wave of protests the United States and NATO preferred to act the part of supporters of arms reductions.

Whereas the "high-level group" adopted the decision to deploy the missiles, the "special group" catered for its political cover, attempting to prove the unprovable, namely, that the missile decision had been adopted virtually for the purpose of creating the conditions for disarmament. This body also was headed by the U.S. representative. It hardly needs to be said that here also the United States played the decisive part. It is sufficient to see the recommendations for negotiations prepared by the group in the fall of 1979, the Leitmotiv of which is the American demand for the USSR's unilateral disarmament and the liquidation of Soviet medium-range missiles.

At the same time the "high-level group" was determining the number of American missiles to be deployed in West Europe. Various versions were studied--from 200 to 600 missiles. Ultimately the United States stopped at 108 Pershings and 464 cruise missiles. In November 1979 this version was formally approved by the NATO Nuclear Planning Group.

In the period of adoption of the "missile decision" and also subsequently a difference in the positions of the United States and the West European states was determined quite distinctly. Although it is customary to speak

officially in NATO about the allies' unity on this issue, nonetheless, certain documents contain a recognition of serious differences in views. Of considerable interest in this plane is the report on nuclear weapons in Europe prepared by a special committee of the North Atlantic Assembly.

It emphasizes that American officials impart different functions to the medium-range weapons than their partners. The West Europeans view these weapons within the framework of NATO's "flexible response" concept--as a means of "deterring" the enemy. As distinct from this, the United States believes that the new missiles should be "rather a means of waging war than a means of political demonstration of the readiness therefor, as the (West) Europeans are inclined to think."

Thus Washington imposed the decision to deploy the new missiles on its partners from the viewpoint of its "direct confrontation" strategic doctrine, which plainly presupposes the possibility of the waging of nuclear wars. Europe, in accordance with these plans, represents a convenient theater of "limited" nuclear conflict. Nor is the following fact without interest: in the United States the 572 missiles were often regarded "more as a basis and not as a ceiling". As distinct from this, West European officials point out that "an increase in the quantity of systems for deployment is ruled out."¹³

It is perfectly obvious that the NATO decision was ultimately inspired and adopted under U.S. pressure. The same H. Schmidt, who is frequently referred to as the initiator of the "missile decision," told American journalists 2 years after it had been adopted that he "never showed enthusiasm" for this decision. "It was not my idea," he emphasized in 1981. Subsequently H. Schmidt declared that the "missile decision" had been suggested by U.S. President J. Carter in January 1979 at a meeting of the leaders of four leading Western countries (the United States, Britain, France and the FRG) on the island of Guadeloupe.¹⁴

The reason why the American side preferred to remain in the background, referring to its West European allies, is also perfectly obvious. To judge by everything, even then Washington had calculated how far the American leadership was prepared to go in its aspiration to a "position of strength". Justifiably anticipating a considerable deterioration in the international atmosphere as a result of the adoption and implementation of the "missile decision," U.S. ruling circles wished to absolve themselves in advance of the responsibility for this and shift it onto its partners in order to appear before the world community as a "true ally" who had been pushed into the adoption of such an unpopular decision only by "concern for the security" of its partners.

However, the world community exposed the maneuvers of the United States. It is clear to any unbiased observer that the "missile decision" was developed and prepared in the corridors of power of the United States. Even experts not harboring sympathies toward the Soviet Union are forced to acknowledge this. "Only when the United States had made the decision," M. Leitenberg, an employee of Sweden's International Relations Institute, observed, "did the question of long-range theater nuclear missiles begin to be transformed very

vividly into the form of 'alliance unity,' NATO loyalty, NATO's opportunity to demonstrate that it can reach major joint military decisions and so forth."¹⁵

It is with good reason that American figures are still forced to justify themselves, reluctant to appear in such an unenviable role as "architects" of the preparation of nuclear war in Europe. Thus former U.S. Defense Secretary J. Schlesinger directly accused European leaders of "portraying the missile plan as a U.S. initiative and, possibly, a plan to reduce the nuclear risk for the United States."¹⁶ Such true friends of Washington as NATO Secretary General J. Luns are also attempting actively to whitewash the United States, proving its innocence. He has repeatedly expressed his acute discontent at the spread of the idea that "modernization is the initiative of the United States in respect of its European allies."¹⁷

However, whether American leaders like it or not, the question of the initiator of the deployment of the new U.S. missiles in Europe is settled unambiguously: it was precisely the United States essentially which developed and imposed the "missile decision" on the allies. This step is an integral part of the policy of achieving the United States' strategic superiority, spurring tension and preparing for war.

A high-minded characterization of the essence of the "missile decision" and the hopes which are linked with it is given in the statement of Yu.V. Andropov, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium: "From Washington's footbridge the operation to install these American nuclear missiles in Europe is seen as the simplest and most profitable for the United States--profitable at the expense of Europe. The United States regards the European allies as hostages. A candid policy, but cynical."

III

The policy has acquired its final outlines in the period of the term in office of the present leadership in Washington, which has openly made confrontation paramount in its policy. Whereas the J. Carter administration had done much in the sphere of preparation and adoption of the "missile decision," the present masters of the White House have applied exceptional efforts for its realization. "...On questions of NATO's missile 'rearmament' the R. Reagan administration," BUSINESS WEEK, the organ of U.S. business circles, observed, "is persistently pushing the army and the Martin Marietta Corporation, the chief Pershing 2 supplier, to start production of the missile as quickly as possible...."¹⁸

The present leaders of the White House by no means conceal their intentions. Washington needs both the Pershing 2's and the cruise missile to attempt to break up the balance of forces in Europe and also in the world and create a new and extremely dangerous strategic threat to the USSR and other socialist states. This step is wholly a part of the "crusade" against socialism framework.

The R. Reagan administration's persistent endeavor to realize NATO's "missile decision" at all costs convincingly confirms that U.S. ruling circles intend making the military sphere the decisive sphere of competition between socialism and capitalism. The reliance on the achievement of military superiority is cynically linked with attempts to put political pressure on the USSR for the purpose of forcing it into concessions along the entire spectrum of international affairs.

The U.S. Administration is openly disregarding the will of the overwhelming majority of the population of the West European countries. However, the anxious peoples understand that the appearance of American nuclear missiles on the European continent is a step which is exceptionally dangerous for the cause of peace. It is with good reason that the antiwar movement in Europe, which is of unprecedented scale, is, exposing the United States' militarist plans, perfectly definitely concentrated around the problem of averting nuclear war in Europe, primarily by way of the nondeployment of the new American missiles.

In the event of realization of the "missile decision," the nuclear balance in Europe in medium-range missiles would be changed--and very noticeably--in favor of the United States and NATO and to the detriment of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact. As a result the United States and NATO would gain a more than 1.5-fold advantage in the number of medium-range delivery systems. As far as the nuclear warheads are concerned, the advantage, which is with NATO even now, would increase even more appreciably.

The following consideration is of fundamental significance. For the USSR deployment of the new American missiles means not only a change in the regional nuclear balance on the European continent; the point is that the U.S. missiles would be predominantly strategic weapons in respect of the USSR. They are capable of reaching targets over the entire territory of the European part of the Soviet Union, and in a very limited interval of time, moreover (for the Pershing 2 missiles, which it is wished to deploy on the territory of the FRG, this time constitutes 5-6 minutes). Furthermore, the highly accurate cruise and Pershing 2 missiles are intended for "preventive," that is, first strikes against the European part of the territory of the USSR. The United States would thus create a new strategic threat to the Soviet Union.

It is sufficient to recall that the SALT II Treaty, which, although not ratified, is nonetheless observed by both sides, provides for an equal total level of strategic weapon delivery systems both for the USSR and the United States. The United States, which currently has approximately 2,200 strategic weapon delivery systems, would in the event of fulfillment of the "missile decision," acquire in Europe approximately a further 600 nuclear delivery systems capable of hitting targets on the territory of the Soviet Union. It is obvious that such a situation would ensure for the United States manifest superiority in relation to the USSR. Thus by the terms "rearmament" or "restoring the balance," with which the United States and NATO like to operate, are understood the creation of a "position of strength" and an endeavor to gain superiority to the detriment of the interests of the USSR and the other socialist community countries.

In the event of implementation of the "missile decision," the USSR and its allies will not be able to remain indifferent. At a session in October 1983 the Warsaw Pact states' foreign ministers once again recalled the statement of the participants in the Moscow meeting of 28 June 1983 concerning the fact that "they will in no event permit military superiority over them. The governments of the NATO states would be making a serious mistake in underestimating the significance of this statement of the socialist countries."

Recently Washington, endeavoring to confuse the international public, has been impressing upon it that deployment of the Pershings and cruise missiles in West Europe will lead to a change in the USSR's position and compel it to be more compliant and be accommodating toward the United States' demands, which are aimed at the Soviet Union's unilateral disarmament. "The prevailing viewpoint in the U.S. Administration," THE NEW YORK TIMES wrote, "is that the Russians will not agree to a solution of key problems until at least the first group of American missiles is deployed."¹⁹

Such assertions, intentionally disseminated by Washington, have nothing in common with the truth. The Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact states have emphasized repeatedly that implementation of the American arms buildup programs will lead to a higher level of military confrontation. Peace would become less stable and more fragile.

However, to judge by everything, the American leadership does not intend to listen to the warnings of the USSR and the other Warsaw Pact countries and is unwilling to heed the appeals of millions of participants in the antimissile movement in Europe and the United States itself. NATO's "missile decision" is entering the practical stage. Preparatory work is under way at full speed for the deployment of the cruise missiles in Great Britain. The same thing is happening in the Italian city of Comiso. Preparations are being made in the FRG for the deployment of the Pershing 2 missiles. Similar measures, albeit less noticeably, are being carried out in Holland and Belgium, where the United States wishes to deploy cruise missiles.

Political and military figures of the United States and NATO are constantly making speeches and giving interviews in which they would have us believe that, despite any obstacles, the timetable for deployment of the missiles will be observed. And as of now it is indeed being observed. American military personnel for servicing the new weapons are already arriving in West Europe. The U.S. Congress has appropriated \$8.5 billion for military construction in 1984. This sum includes \$1.4 billion intended for the fulfillment of the United States' commitments in West Europe, including the installation of launchers for the new missiles.²⁰

The prolix rhetoric about a "love of peace" gushing like a fountain in the speeches of Reagan and his cabinet deceives no one. The actual foreign policy actions of his administration show convincingly how low for it is the "threshold" of the transition from "word to deed" and from threats to a show of strength and direct military intervention. There are many examples. THE NEW YORK TIMES wrote about this sufficiently eloquently in evaluating West

Europeans' reaction to U.S. foreign policy: "The gunboat diplomacy, which is developing from threats to shooting, will most likely bring new demonstrators onto the streets (of West Europe--G.V.) and focus attention on the question of whether the Reagan administration can be relied on in its approach to international affairs."²¹ It is understandable, therefore, that the antiwar movement in Europe has grown as the start of realization of the "missile decision" draws nearer. The peoples of the continent by no means wish to be the target of the "nuclear exchanges" being discussed so airily in the United States.

The round of the nuclear arms race in Europe which is being imposed by Washington threatens unpredictable consequences. The American side itself should not delude itself inasmuch as the USSR will take steps in response to the new threat capable in the event of deployment of the American missiles of also putting U.S. territory itself in an analogous position.

As far as Europe is concerned, the situation would change rapidly here also. Yu. V. Andropov told FRG Chancellor H. Kohl this during the latter's visit to the USSR. It is planned to turn FRG territory, he pointed out, into a launch installation for American first-strike nuclear missiles targeted at the Soviet Union and its allies. Essentially this would mean a revival of the threat of a war against the USSR being unleashed from German soil.

"The conversion of West German territory into a launch installation for nuclear weapons aimed against the socialist countries," a joint communique on A.A. Gromyko's visit to the GDR in October 1983 says, "would be a step of a fundamental nature hostile to the cause of peace. This would be contrary to the spirit and letter of the Moscow and Berlin treaties and would do serious harm to the FRG's relations with the Soviet Union and the GDR. The FRG Government should clearly realize that by unreservedly following the policy of the U.S. Administration and opening wide its country's doors to the new American missiles it is gambling with its vitally important interests. It would be myopic from both the political and military viewpoints to attempt on the contrived pretext of strengthening its own security to create a threat to the security of others."

It is absolutely clear what unfavorable political, economic and other consequences would arise as a result of such a development for the entire system of international relations. If, contrary to the will of the majority of the population of West European countries, the American nuclear missiles nonetheless appear on the continent, this would be a step capable of considerably destabilizing the evolved situation. The Soviet leadership has stated this repeatedly with all due responsibility. Speaking on 20 July 1983 at a dinner in honor of a Hungarian party-government delegation, Yu. V. Andropov warned: "The deployment of the new American nuclear missiles in Europe will inevitably lead to consequences of a military and political nature which would complicate appreciably the entire situation in the world."

IV

The Soviet Union and the fraternal socialist countries believe that a new round of the nuclear arms race in Europe has to be averted. For this it is necessary

not to deploy new missiles but find a solution of the problem on an honest basis which takes account of the interests of both sides, a solution aimed at an improvement in the atmosphere in Europe and the world. The USSR prefers to settle questions which arise by way of negotiation in order to reach agreement on specific and effective measures aimed at limiting and reducing medium-range nuclear arms in the European region or at their total liquidation even.

As a result of the persevering and purposeful efforts of the Soviet side it was possible to begin negotiations with the United States, which was of positive significance inasmuch as hopes for an improvement in the situation in Europe, an easing of tension and a quest for a peaceful solution of cardinal problems of an improvement in the European situation are connected with the negotiations. At the same time negotiations are not an end in themselves. The main thing is the need to achieve actual and impressive results which should be based primarily on the principle of equality and equal security.

However, the practice of conducting negotiations in Geneva shows that the task of the American side is by no means the achievement of agreement. The United States has endeavored to spin out time and subsequently embark on the deployment of the Pershing 2 ballistic missiles and cruise missiles in West Europe. An analysis of the American position shows that it is aimed essentially at liquidating all the Soviet medium-range missiles, and not only those on the European part of the territory of the USSR, furthermore, but also those deployed in the eastern parts of the country and which are totally unrelated to the problem of nuclear arms in Europe.

Realization of the United States' "zero option" would mean radical changes in the rough equivalence of nuclear forces between the USSR and NATO which exists now and about which we spoke earlier. The number of the USSR's medium-range missiles would be more than halved. NATO would forgo nothing here. The result of such an approach would be NATO's dual superiority in the number of medium-range nuclear weapon delivery systems and three fold superiority in the quantity of nuclear warheads. This provocative approach of the American side has been maintained essentially throughout the negotiations.

The so-called "interim option" put forward by the American side is just as unrealistic as the "zero option" inasmuch as the U.S. Administration remains in its former positions, is endeavoring to harm the USSR's security and is unwilling to take its legitimate interests into consideration.

Primarily the United States is unwilling to count in the overall balance the ground- and sea-based nuclear missiles of France and Great Britain. The opponents of counting these missiles usually refer to their allegedly independent status and negligible size. However, such an approach is wrong. Both Britain and France are members of the North Atlantic alliance. In NATO's overall balance these countries' missiles constitute one-fourth of the nuclear potential. This is over 200 delivery systems, including 162 missiles, which accommodate more than 400 warheads. They are all targeted at the USSR and other socialist countries.

The R. Reagan administration's stubborn reluctance to consider the nuclear forces of Britain and France is perfectly understandable. By withdrawing them from the negotiating framework the United States and NATO are counting on achieving primarily military advantages. In fact it is on this that the entire position of the United States at the negotiations is built.

Counting the British and French nuclear forces in NATO's overall balance is so logical and justifiable that serious experts are in no doubt as to it. Such an authoritative research center in the West as the International Strategic Studies Institute in London deems it necessary in compiling the consolidated table of NATO's nuclear forces to include here the corresponding arms of Great Britain and France.²²

Nor has there yet been any change in the American position on another fundamental question--nondeployment of the American missiles. Essentially Washington has made a decision to deploy in Europe as many American missiles as there are Soviet missiles not only in the European but also Asian part of the USSR. There is no logic in such a formulation of the question since there are separate reasons for the deployment of medium-range missiles in the eastern parts of the USSR, and the Soviet Union has notified the leadership of the United States and its allies of these, moreover.

Attempting to camouflage such an incongruous approach, the United States has recently been speaking of "global limits". Essentially this means that Washington in this case also reserves for itself the right to deploy supplementary to the forward-based nuclear missiles in parts of Europe and Asia as many new medium-range missiles as the USSR has. The entire "innovation" of the position is that now it is promising to deploy not all the missiles in Europe but a certain part of them, as the U.S. President declared, "someplace else" in the vicinity of USSR territory.

Further, Washington has now announced that in the event of the USSR's consent to the United States' deployment of, say, 450 and not 572 American missiles in Europe and other adjacent regions and, correspondingly, its consent to a reduction in its own missiles, the United States could examine the question of the combination in which to deploy its missiles of the said two types.

The basis of this approach also is an unacceptable attempt to force the USSR to reduce its missiles, while the United States, on the other hand, intends to deploy its missiles. Washington is leaving its "hands free" here to determine the number of Pershing 2 missiles which it wishes to deploy in Europe. Such "constructiveness" on the part of Washington represents nothing other than outright cynicism.

A further element of the United States' "new position" is connected with the fact that up to the present Washington has insisted that any agreement should apply only to ground-based medium-range missiles. The United States emphatically objected here to the inclusion of NATO's launcher aircraft in an agreement, endeavoring to maintain its superiority in the number of such medium-range aircraft. Now the United States is seemingly expressing a readiness to study the question of the inclusion of aviation in an agreement also. However, this readiness is hedged about by a number of conditions unacceptable

to the Soviet Union. First, the USSR must consent to the United States' position on the missiles, including the deployment of the new American missiles in Europe and other parts of the world. Second, not all medium-range launcher aircraft come under the restriction, only those which the American side will choose. The United States makes no secret here of the fact that it intends for the agreement to encompass all types of Soviet aircraft of the corresponding range and simultaneously exclude therefrom hundreds of American medium-range aircraft based on the territory of West Europe and on carriers off its shores and also all the aviation of the United States' NATO allies.

It is clear that the "new" American proposals are Washington's latest propaganda maneuver with the sole purpose of attempting to reassure the peoples, who are worried about the dangerous consequences of the approaching deployment of the American missiles. Essentially the R. Reagan administration is concerned not about how to avert a nuclear arms race in Europe but how to facilitate the realization of its plans to deploy the new missiles and how to deceive the public.

Characterizing the so-called new American proposals, Yu.V. Andropov observed: "Leaving the details to one side, the essence of the so-called new move in the American position, publicized as 'splendid,' amounts to a proposal on agreement being reached, as before, on how much to reduce Soviet medium-range missiles and how many new American missiles to deploy in Europe in addition to the nuclear potential which NATO already has."²³

As a counterweight to this the USSR has repeatedly demonstrated readiness for a search for a mutually acceptable solution and a realistic compromise. The Soviet Union is pursuing a persistent policy aimed at limiting and halting the nuclear arms race in Europe. It proceeds here from the need to maintain rough equivalence between the USSR and the United States and the USSR and NATO and lead matters in the direction of a reduction in the existing weapons. The USSR has proposed the introduction for the period of the negotiations with the United States of a moratorium on the growth of medium-range arms, which also envisages a ban on the modernization of these weapons. In the event of the other side adopting this proposal, the USSR has expressed readiness to cut back some of its medium-range arms unilaterally. In addition, for the purpose of improving the conditions for the achievement of an agreement the Soviet Union has resolved to impose and has imposed such a moratorium unilaterally, embarking simultaneously on a unilateral reduction in these missiles.

The USSR has counterposed to the destructive position of the United States at the Geneva negotiations a realistic, constructive approach based on the principle of equality and equal security. The Soviet position incorporates several options. The most far-reaching of these consists of an agreement on renunciation of nuclear weapons in Europe, both medium-range and tactical. This would truly be a "zero solution" of the problem.

Yu.V. Andropov's proposal of 3 May 1983, which expressed readiness to agree on the equality of nuclear potentials in Europe both in terms of delivery systems and warheads, testifies to the USSR's sincere readiness for an intelligent compromise and the flexibility of the Soviet position. Account should be taken

here, of course, of the corresponding arms of Britain and France. The USSR has advocated that it have no more missiles and warheads on them than on the NATO side in each mutually conditioned period.

Given a reduction in the number of warheads on the British and French missiles, the number of warheads on the Soviet medium-range missiles would be reduced by the same amount. A similar approach would extend to this class of aircraft weapon systems deployed in Europe. Rough equivalence between the USSR and NATO would thereby be maintained both in medium-range missile delivery systems, that is, missiles and aircraft, and the number of warheads on them, and this equivalence would be at a considerably lower level than now, moreover.

The Soviet initiative concerning the USSR's readiness--given nondeployment of the American missiles--to liquidate its medium-range missiles subject to reduction in the European part of the country may rightly be called far-reaching.

Yu.V. Andropov's proposal, which was put forward in his replies to questions from PRAVDA on 27 August 1983, could have been an important step by the USSR in the direction of progress toward an agreement. In the event of a mutually acceptable agreement being reached, including the United States' renunciation of the deployment of the new missiles in Europe, the Soviet Union would, when reducing its medium-range missiles in the European part of the country to a level equal to the number of Britain's and France's missiles, liquidate all the missiles to be reduced, including a considerable number of the most modern SS-20's.

The Soviet proposals contained in Yu.V. Andropov's replies to questions from PRAVDA on 27 October 1983 were exceptionally important. As is known, the USSR expressed readiness to reach agreement on a reduction in medium-range nuclear arms in Europe to equal levels on both sides both in terms of delivery systems and warheads. Considering the number of warheads on the British and French missiles currently, the USSR could have in Europe approximately 140 SS-20 launchers, that is, markedly fewer than Britain and France's medium-range missile launchers.

Further, given the achievement of a mutually acceptable agreement, including the United States' renunciation of the deployment of missiles in Europe, the Soviet Union would not transfer its missiles from the East to the West. In the event of the achievement of an agreement and its validation, from this moment there would also be an end to the deployment of SS-20 missiles in the eastern parts of the Soviet Union. The USSR would proceed firmly from this on condition of there being no appreciable changes in the strategic situation in the Asian region. This means primarily that the United States would not deploy new medium-range nuclear missiles in areas from which they could reach the eastern part of USSR territory.

Displaying additional flexibility, the USSR expressed its consent to the establishment of total levels of medium-range launcher aircraft equal for the USSR and NATO within a mutually acceptable numerical range. The actual value of these levels could be agreed.

If the United States renounces deployment of its missiles in Europe at the declared time, the Soviet Union could embark even now on a reduction in its SS-4 missiles (and there are over 200 of them) and complete their liquidation in 1984-1985. If it is possible to conclude an agreement in Geneva on a just basis, a considerable proportion of the currently existing SS-20's would be liquidated also.

However, the decisions adopted by the governments of the FRG, Britain and Italy under pressure from the masters of the White House, who are possessed by the insane idea of a "crusade" against socialism, testify that the green light has been given to the installation of the American missiles, which is aimed at breaking up the existing military balance. These governments have hereby, contrary to the will of the peoples, assumed together with Washington the entire responsibility for the implementation of the monstrous plans of American imperialism, whose intention it is to turn Europe into the center of and bridgehead for a thermonuclear war, vainly counting on this protecting the United States from just retribution. In the face of all mankind the American militarists are playing a game which is impudent in the extreme and fraught with the gravest consequences for its fate and the fate of civilization.

The appearance on the European continent of the American Pershings and cruise missiles is becoming a fait accompli. Having thoroughly considered all aspects of the situation, the Soviet leadership has been forced to announce the impossibility of the USSR's continued participation in the Geneva talks on limiting nuclear arms in Europe.

The statement of Yu.V. Andropov, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, of 24 November 1983, which was imbued with a sense of deepest concern and responsibility for the fate of general and European peace, made public the Soviet leadership's decision on the adoption of a set of specific retaliatory measures aimed at ensuring the security of the USSR and the other socialist community countries. At the same time, however, the document emphasizes, "the Soviet Union declares with all certainty and firmness that it remains devoted to the high-minded policy of a halt to the arms race, primarily nuclear, and a lessening and ultimately the complete removal of the threat of nuclear war. It will continue to exert every effort to achieve these noble goals."

FOOTNOTES

1. PRAVDA, 29 June 1983.
2. In establishing rough equivalence between the USSR and the NATO countries in medium-range nuclear missiles it should be stipulated in advance that it should not be understood such that the weapons of one side are opposed

2. (Cont'd) by an equal number of weapons of a similar type of the other side. Essentially this equivalence consists of certain asymmetries in individual types of arms. Thus right until recently the United States was emphasizing launcher aircraft in the development of its medium-range weapons, whereas the Soviet Union paid considerable attention to the creation of the corresponding missiles. These asymmetries compensate one another, taking shape in rough equivalence.
3. See "Soviet Military Power," Washington, 1983, p 46.
4. "Security and Arms Control: The Search for a More Stable Peace," U.S. Department of State, Washington, 1983, pp 9, 21, 28.
5. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 26-27 March 1983.
6. "World Armaments and Disarmament. SIPRI Yearbook 1982," London, 1982, pp 7-8.
7. H. Schmidt, "Verteidigung oder Vergeltung," Stuttgart, 1961, pp 108, 109.
8. See SURVIVAL, Jan-Feb 1978, pp 2-10.
9. S. Lunn, "The Modernization of NATO's Long Range Theater Nuclear Forces," Report, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. Congress, December 31, 1980, Washington, p 18.
10. M. Leitenberg, "Background Information of Tactical Nuclear Weapons" ("SIPRI. Tactical Nuclear Weapons: European Perspectives," London, 1978, p 125).
11. "NATO Posture and Initiatives. Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, Senate, 95th Congress," Washington, 1977. p 7.
12. See H.J. Neuman, "Nuclear Forces in Europe," London, 1982, pp 7-8.
13. See "North Atlantic Assembly. Interim Report of the Special Committee on Nuclear Weapons in Europe," September 1981, pp 7-9.
14. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 2 November 1981.
15. Leitenberg. "The Genesis of the LRTNF in NATO" ("The Military Balance in Europe," Stockholm, 1982, p 73).
16. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 26 May 1981.
17. THE WASHINGTON POST, 1 October 1981.
18. BUSINESS WEEK, 16 May 1983, p 31.
19. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 25 July 1983.

20. Ibid., 24 July 1983.
21. Ibid., 31 July 1983.
22. See "The Military Balance 1982-1983. International Institute for Strategic Studies," London , 1982, pp 136-137.
23. PRAVDA, 29 September 1983.

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DIFFERENT U.S., USSR OBJECTIVES NOTED AT LAW OF SEA CONFERENCE

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 12, Dec 83
pp 31-44

[Article by Yu. Barsegov: "Two Approaches to the Solution of a Universal Problem"]

[Text] A special place in present-day international relations is occupied by global, that is, the most large-scale and fundamental, problems affecting the vital interests of all peoples and the international community as a whole and requiring for their solution states' concerted, purposeful activity. As Yu. V. Andropov emphasized at the CPSU Central Committee June (1983) Plenum, the solution of these "major problems, which affect all countries and whose significance is growing increasingly," corresponds to the interests of the peoples on both sides of the social barricade dividing the world. Among them is the manifold complex problem of the oceans, each of whose components is connected with other universal problems: rational use of marine biological resources with the food problem; development of the ocean's mineral and energy resources with the raw material and energy problem; preservation of the marine environment with the ecology problem; and the demilitarization and prevention of nuclear war. Such states as the USSR and the United States are called on to play and can play a special part in the solution of these questions, including the problem of the oceans. What is needed for this is a high-minded and constructive approach oriented toward the search for mutually acceptable solutions presupposing political prudence, farsightedness and a readiness to take account of both the legitimate interests of each side and the interests of the world community as a whole.

Whereas the position of the USSR corresponds fully to the requirements of such an approach, this simply cannot be said about the United States. This was manifested graphically at the Third UN Law of the Sea Conference, which, as already mentioned in this journal, formulated and adopted an all-embracing UN Law of the Sea Convention.*

As is known, both the USSR and the United States are among the highly developed powers with diverse maritime interests in need of dependable navigation and other types of maritime activity. It is not surprising, therefore, that their

*See, for example, MEMO Nos 3 and 9 for 1982.

positions on a number of questions concurred. This contributed to the development of decisions on given questions acceptable to all the participants. At the same time there were fundamental differences between the United States and the USSR on a number of cardinal problems. Washington's line was determined by its imperial pretensions, the narrow egotistical, class interests of monopoly capital and the endeavor to establish its domination in the oceans, appropriate a large and the best part thereof and convert the sea expanses in its own economic territory and the seabed and ocean floor into a gigantic proving ground for nuclear weapons.

The military factor is a central component of American imperialism's maritime policy. Proceeding from the fact that all ground targets have become accessible to nuclear strikes from ocean sectors and that the ocean nuclear missile systems are the most mobile and least vulnerable thanks to the possibility of using the depth of the water for protection and the vast ocean expanses for maneuvering, the United States is accelerating the large-scale buildup of naval forces, increasingly extending the nuclear arms race to the oceans, and employing naval power to achieve the goals of its aggressive foreign policy. In speaking of the military factor in the hierarchy of the United States' maritime interests it should be borne in mind that its resource strategy also is largely determined by militarist considerations. Accordingly, the United States is seeking the creation of a procedure in international law in respect of the oceans which would afford it practically unlimited rights to the unhindered exploitation of untouched mineral raw material and energy resource reserves. It is putting the interests of the Pentagon and the U.S. oil and mining companies higher than the interests of the entire international community.

Washington's ambitions were laconically, but capacious expressed by A. Spilhaus, chairman of the Oceanographic Committee of the National Academy of Sciences: "The ocean," he said, "is our nation's business."* Senator E. Hollings, who is considered a top specialist in the formulation of the "integrated ocean policy," substantiated it by the fact that "sea power has acquired new meaning and is now the result of a nation's use of the oceans."**

The Soviet Union emphatically rejects the globalist pretensions of American imperialism in general and in the sphere of the oceans in particular. Evaluating the policy pursued in international affairs by the present U.S. Administration, Yu. V. Andropov observed in his statement: "Its essence is disregarding the interests of other states and peoples and attempting to secure for the United States the dominating positions in the world."

Fully in accordance with the peace-loving goals of its foreign policy, the USSR advocates broad international cooperation in the use of the oceans, prevention of the monopolization of its natural resources, a guarantee of the legitimate interests of the USSR and the other socialist states in the oceans

*A. Spilhaus, "Address Before the Conference on the Oceans and National Economic Development," sponsored by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Washington, 17 July 1973.

**MARINE POLICY, January 1977, p 22.

and also consideration of the particular requirements of the developing countries and the establishment of a stable rule of law in the oceans in the interests of all peoples.

From the first through the final day of the Third UN Law of the Sea Conference the Soviet delegation consistently pursued a policy aimed at equal negotiations and the search for concerted solutions in a spirit of realism and mutual understanding, displaying respect for the agreements reached.

I

The fundamental differences in the goals and tasks of the USSR and the United States were revealed in full in their approaches to specific questions. To take just the problem of the use of the seabed solely for peaceful purposes, with whose formulation the process of the shaping of the new rule of law in the oceans began. The UN Committee on the Peaceful Use of the Seas and Oceans Beyond National Jurisdiction was set up for its solution in 1967. This was a very timely measure inasmuch as the real threat of the spread of the nuclear arms race to the oceans had arisen. This threat emanated from the United States and its NATO allies, who were hatching plans to deploy offensive arms and various military facilities on the seabed. Does it need to be proved that the militarization of the oceans not only increases the danger of thermo-nuclear war but also undermines the prospects of international cooperation in the use of their expanses and resources for the good of man.

From the very outset the USSR submitted for the committee's examination a number of far-reaching proposals on banning the use of the seabed beyond territorial waters for military purposes. Considering the situation that had evolved, it also allowed of the possibility of the stage-by-stage demilitarization of the seabed. The Soviet ideas were approved and supported by the developing countries, but constantly blocked by the United States and its partners, who proved the "impracticability" or "harmfulness" even of general and complete demilitarization. The United States attempted to justify its position by references to the alleged "defensive" purposes of its military activity and also "substantiated" it either by national jurisdiction within the limits of the shelf or freedom of the open seas beyond these limits.

Although the Soviet proposals in combination with other initiatives put forward outside of the committee framework represented a reasonable and realistic basis for the solution of this question, at the insistence of the United States it was removed from the agenda of the committee and also the Third UN Law of the Sea Conference and passed on for examination to the Disarmament Committee. The convention limited itself merely to a proclamation of the general principles of the peaceful use of the open seas and the international area of the seabed.

What was the United States' attitude toward universal interests in the solution of another category of problems--resources problems--which occupied a central place in the conference's work? The optimum and rational use of the oceans' biological resources is being complicated, as is known by the uneven distribution of modern fishing facilities engendered by capitalism and

colonialism. Although the need for marine products is perceived most acutely in the developing countries, where the overwhelming majority of the world's population lives, it is they which, by virtue of their economic backwardness, are deprived of the necessary implements of labor. Lacking modern material-technical resources and possessing, as a rule, obsolete and small-capacity ships, the developing countries are incapable under the conditions of traditional freedom of fishing of realizing their rights in practice.

Prior to the convening of the conference and at the initial stage thereof, the opinion was expressed that the situation which had been created could be rectified by way of the conclusion of appropriate international agreements and the use of specialized international organizations. This approach would cater for the interests of the developing countries and at the same time contribute to the fairer distribution of commercial waters. It was for this reason that prior to the convening of the conference even the USSR proposed reserving for the developing countries "special rights in respect of fishing permitting them to make extensive use of the fish resources of adjacent areas of the open seas in the interests of their countries and develop their national fishing."*

As distinct from the principle of the division of commercial areas among all littoral countries, which is subject to the blind game of the geographical factor, purposeful international regulation could satisfy all the developing countries, both littoral and those which are in an unfavorable position in relation to the sea; at the same time this would prevent the appropriation of the resources of a large part of the commercial areas by the United States and a small group of developed capitalist states possessing a vast coastline and a multitude of islands.

However, this approach did not suit the United States. Displaying an aspiration characteristic of an imperialist state to the expansion and broadening not only of state but also "economic" territory and guided by mercenary considerations, the United States in the person of President H. Truman even was the first to announce claims to the biological resources of part of the open seas. Proclamation 2668 on offshore fishing in certain parts of the open seas, which was promulgated on 28 September 1945, proclaimed the right of the U.S. Government to establish so-called "conservation zones" in coastal waters and also the exclusive right to appropriate these resources. Prior to and during the Third UN Law of the Sea Conference, the United States encouraged the extension of the national jurisdiction of a littoral state to the resources of the commercially most promising waters, opposing only the expansion of the littoral state's territorial waters.

The United States, as the Soviet Government statement observed, "is at the same time attempting to underpin its illegal claims to trust island territories and, correspondingly, the sea expanses around them, on which the

*"Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Use of the Seabed and Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, "UN Document A/8721, New York, 1972, pp 194-197.

American monopolies have long had their sights.* President R. Reagan announced on 10 March 1983 the establishment of the United States' "full rights" to the development of mineral resources and fishing within the limits of a 200-mile zone from the U.S. coastline, including the islands in the Caribbean and the Pacific over which it exercises its authority. This would mean the acquisition of "sovereign rights" to maritime resources over an area of approximately 4 million square miles. Thus of the more than 150 states with a right to the resources of the oceans, one state, which is experiencing no shortage of food and is one of its principal exporters, is endeavoring illegally to appropriate the resources of virtually one-tenth of the commercially most promising areas of all the oceans.

The United States has begun to dispose of these resources with methods which run counter to universal interests and which flagrantly ignore the demand concerning due consideration of the rights of states whose citizens prior to the establishment of the zones usually fished there or had made considerable efforts to explore and ascertain these stocks. Washington essentially intends to arbitrarily dispose of permissible catch surpluses, discriminating against other states from political motives. This practice is increasing the consequences of the uneven distribution of the commercial waters and could lead to serious negative consequences.

Bearing in mind primarily the needs of the developing states, the USSR and the other socialist countries consented to the establishment of exclusive economic zones, despite the fact that their fishing industry had depended to a considerable extent on expeditionary fishing in parts of the oceans far from shore. Also indicative is how the USSR disposes of the live resources of its economic zone. While having very limited commercial possibilities in the 200-mile coastal area the USSR nonetheless accommodates other countries, capitalist included, to the maximum extent.

II

The United States' attitude toward the problems connected with the use of the mineral and energy resources of the seabed is directly determined by its hegemonist military-political goals and the aspirations of its oil and mining companies. Whence the sharply expressed political thrust of American imperialism's raw material policy. It proceeds from the precept that in the coming decades a state's economic and, consequently, political might will be determined increasingly by the extent to which one government will be able to make others dependent on it and itself independent of others.** The "prophesies" concerning an "end to the 200-year period of independence" of the United States and the appeals for an end to the "extortions" and "blackmail" of the raw material producers--the developing countries--should also be viewed in this context.

* PRAVDA, 24 April 1983.

**R. Arad and U. Arad, R. McCulloch and J. Pinera, A. Hollick, "Sharing Global Resources," New York, 1979, p 16.

Washington began to link particular hopes with the commissioning of essentially untouched ocean resources. Its efforts were concentrated in two directions here: the maximum extension with the aid of the convention of the outer limit of its shelf and those of its allies and actual appropriation of the deep-sea resources of the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction now declared the "common inheritance of mankind".

The policy of "underwater expansion" has a history of its own. As is known, it was also the United States which was the first, in September 1945, to lay claim to the unilateral appropriation of the shelf. It is also worth recalling that under the pressure of American monopolies possessing the appropriate technical potential introduced to the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention as a criterion for determining the outer limit of the shelf together with the 200-meter isobath* coinciding with its geological limits was an additional criterion according to which the outer limit of the legal shelf could run within the limits where such exploitation was technically possible. Whereas the distance criterion per the 200-meter isobath reflected the endeavor of the majority of states to limit the growth of claims, the criterion based on technical possibilities suited primarily the industrially developed capitalist countries. It was these states and their monopolies which availed themselves of scientific-technical achievements making it possible to drill at great depths. Ignoring the convention principle of adjacency and giving the technical accessibility criterion a wide interpretation, they laid claim not only to the entire continental shelf but also to the entire continental margin to the most abyssal depths.

During discussion of the question of the shelf's outer limit at the Third Law of the Sea Conference, a small group of states composed predominantly of developed capitalist countries--the United States, Britain, Australia, Canada, Ireland and New Zealand--pushed through the so-called "Irish formula," which established the outer limit of the continental shelf beyond the economic zone as per the outer limit of the continental margin and adopted for its determination criteria based on contentious geomorphological hypotheses and concepts. Substitution for the concept of the shelf of the continental margin in combination with the imprecision of the proposed criteria of determining its outer limit was designed to legalize not only the seizure of vast and most promising areas but also the extension of the "creeping jurisdiction" of states with a wide continental margin to the area which had been declared the "common inheritance of mankind" and which is not subject to appropriation. The outdated technical accessibility criterion, which afforded an opportunity for continuously moving the shelf's limits increasingly far from shore, was replaced by another, even more contentious criterion.

The imperialist claims to vast expanses of the parts of the seabed the most convenient for development affected the interests of the international community inasmuch as they considerably constructed the limits of this part of the seabed, whose resources could have been enjoyed by all mankind and with

*The line on the map joining points with the value of equal depths.

which the developing countries connected particular hopes. These claims strengthened the trend toward actual partition of the oceans. The United States and other capitalist states sought to accomplish their mercenary goals here, referring to the position of the developing countries which possessed a wide continental margin.

The USSR's position on this question was dictated by an endeavor to halt the spread of "creeping jurisdiction" and prevent partition of the part of the seabed which had been declared the "common inheritance of mankind". At the same time, bearing in mind that the group of states with a wide continental margin also included India and several other developing states, the Soviet delegation tried to take account of their interests also as fully possible. Guided by these considerations and taking into account the fact that the conflict situation which had come about was preventing the achievement of agreement on the whole "package," the USSR delegation at the conference exerted considerable efforts in the search for a reasonable all-embracing compromise. In the Committee for the Peaceful Use of the Seabed and subsequently at the conference itself the Soviet Union submitted a number of proposals aimed at the limitation and more precise determination of the shelf's outer limit. It was proposed adopting as the distance limit for this purpose the 500-meter isobath and also 200-, 300- and, finally, 350-mile limits. The latter proposal was adopted by the conference in combination with the so-called Irish formula. In accordance with the UN Law of the Sea Convention, within the limits of the 200-mile economic zone littoral states acquire in addition to the area of the shelf within the framework of the 200-meter isobath the right to mineral resources on the bed over an area of over 19 million square miles, 53 percent of which accuring to the lot of 10 littoral states. The biggest increment here is acquired by the United States--1,676,600 square miles.*

In respect of the mineral resources of the seabed situated beyond the limits of national jurisdiction the United States pursued the same goals as on the shelf, although by other means.

The problem of the use of deep-sea resources of the seabed confronted the conference with a number of complex and difficult tasks. How to use them for the good of all peoples and not a handful of monopolies of several industrially developed capitalist states? How to protect the interests of the developing countries, which do not yet experience an immediate need for deep-sea raw material, but which need capital investments for the development of their economy? How to combine recovery of the raw material from the new sources with the interests of the developing countries exporting these types of raw material?

The international community found itself confronted by the need to organize the regulated exploitation of the ocean resources beyond the limits of national jurisdiction within the framework of the equal cooperation of states with different socioeconomic systems and far from identical levels of economic

*OCEAN DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, Spring 1973, p 41.

development and material-technical possibilities. It was necessary to establish an entirely new system of distribution of the ocean resources based on fairness and with regard for objective realities.

The essence of the idea of the "common inheritance of mankind," as understood by the developing countries, was that the mineral resources of this area of the seabed should be used in the interests of all states and peoples, account being taken of the special interests of the developing countries. It followed from this that these resources could not be the subject of unchecked appropriation by one or several states possessing a virtual monopoly on the latest supercomplex and costly equipment and technology.

As a result of the many years of search for compromise solutions a balanced "parallel" system was developed by the efforts of the conference delegates, with the active participation of the USSR and other socialist states. The idea of the "common inheritance of mankind" was embodied in a special international mechanism which is being set up and an entire system of provisions regulating the exploration, development and distribution of resources in the interests of the entire international community and all states without exception. This system took into consideration both the requirements of the developing countries struggling for a reorganization of international economic relations and such states as the United States, for which the convention reserved precisely settled rights.

The convention satisfied all except the United States and several developed capitalist states which associated with it. Washington manifestly needed a system which would operate not "on behalf and in the interests of" mankind but at its command and in favor of its monopolies. The United States was virtually the first to come out with the idea of declaring the resources of this area the "common inheritance of mankind," but only to invest in it content which would correspond to the egotistical requirements of its capitalist monopolies. The American representatives substantiated the "legality" of the demands for free access to the resources of the "common inheritance" by freely operating with the concepts of res nullius (something which is no one's property) and res communis (something which is common property), with the help of which medieval lawyers built their legal construction of the open seas. The United States aspired to the creation of a system which would confirm the formal equality of rights of states to the free exploitation of resources belonging to all mankind and thereby ensure the actual monopolization of their recovery and appropriation. In the practical plane the United States endeavored to reduce the role of the international seabed authority which was being created to a simple recording of instances of unsupervised development and appropriation of the resources of the "common inheritance". It categorically opposed limiting the number of sectors granted one state, regulation of the volume of recovered minerals and the transfer of equipment and technology to the international authority in the interests of the developing countries and insisted on the United States being granted the right of casting vote in the executive body and so forth.

Despite the tremendous advantages which the convention reserved for it, the United States continued to advance increasingly new claims. Believing that without American finance, equipment and technology the future international

authority could not cope, the United States hoped to impose an agreement on it which would reserve for it exclusive rights to the exploitation of the resources of "common inheritance of mankind". American authors candidly acknowledge that the United States was seeking free access to the resources of "common inheritance of mankind" according to the "first come, first served" principle.

While paying lip-service to allegiance to the "common inheritance of mankind" principle, the United States invested a meaning in it which ran counter to the 1969 and 1970 General Assembly resolutions and subsequently to the UN Law of the Sea Convention itself. Even the officials who led the U.S. delegation at the conference openly acknowledged that they regard this principle merely as a "pompous phrase" and as worthless words devoid of any real legal meaning. "We can leave the phrase on condition that the treaty contain the correct provisions," L. Ratiner, a leader of the U.S. delegation, said during a hearing on the question in Congress.

Imparting the nature of an ultimatum to their demands, the United States and several other industrially developed imperialist states threatened to unilaterally embark on the development of the resources of the "common inheritance," in spite of the moratorium established by the conference. They counterposed to the universal convention a policy aimed at the unilateral development and actual appropriation of ocean resources, which belong to all the peoples. As a pseudolegal basis for the illegal seizure of the most promising sectors of the seabed in the United States and certain other Western states cited national laws which they had adopted authorizing their natural persons and juridical persons to embark on the practical development of these resources, which have been declared the common property of mankind, without waiting for application of the convention, which was then only being drawn up.

The American law was intended to ensure a text of the convention "acceptable" to the United States. Its authors proceeded from the fact that it would continue to operate if the United States declined to be a party to the future convention. The possibility of the conclusion of an alternative "multilateral or other treaty on the bed of the open seas" was envisaged for this contingency. It was a question of a so-called "mini-treaty," whose participants would mutually recognize the right to develop these resources on the basis of their own national laws. The possibility of the signing of such a treaty, which is essentially counterposed to the universal convention and ignores the "common inheritance of mankind" concept, was used and is being used now as a means of pressure on the developing countries and the entire international community.*

*The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium edict "Temporary Measures To Regulate the Activity of Soviet Enterprises in the Exploration for and Development of Mineral Resources of the Area of the Seabed Beyond the Limits of the Continental Shelf," which was adopted on 17 April 1982, represented, on the other hand, as it mentions, a "forced" measure to protect its interests in connection with the unilateral actions of other states. The edict is temporary and will be cancelled when the convention takes effect. It not only is not contrary to the spirit and letter of the convention but, on the contrary, confirms with all certainty the goal of the USSR, which advocates settlement of the problems of the legal system of the oceans on an international basis.

A comprehensive examination of the course of discussion of these and other questions at the Third UN Law of the Sea Conference leads to the conclusion that on almost all items on the agenda--general and particular, important and secondary--the United States invariably pursued only its own mercenary imperialist interests and attempted to foist arbitrary and unilateral solutions on the conference. As the Soviet Government statement of 24 April 1983 observed, "in the course of the many years of work of the UN Law of the Sea Conference the United States has exerted considerable effort to prevent the achievement of balanced compromises and achieve the establishment of a special system in the oceans for itself. Washington has been guided by the sole aim of getting its hands on as much as possible."

The demand of the U.S. Administration that the work of the conference be suspended indefinitely on the pretext of its "study" and evaluation of the text of the convention served as a candid manifestation of the egocentrism of the United States. If it is considered that this text was drawn up in the period of terms in office in the United States of three administrations--one Democratic (Carter) and two Republican (Nixon and Ford)--and that in the period of the Democrats' term of office the U.S. delegation at the conference was headed by such a prominent Republican as E. Richardson, it becomes clear that it was by no means a question of lack of information and the need for additional study of the issue. The true purpose of this maneuver was seeking a revision of a number of most important provisions of the text of the convention, which had been agreed in the course of almost 10 years of negotiations and which represented a carefully balanced package of interconnected compromise solutions taking account to the maximum possible extent of the basic interests of all states and groups of states. This important international document embodied the mutual concessions of all the participants in the negotiations. Practically none of them could count on full satisfaction of all his requirements with respect to all provisions of the convention without exception and none could claim to have unilaterally derived advantages at the expense of other states. Of all the participants in the negotiations, only one presented such claims--the United States--to which adoption of the convention not only did no harm but, on the contrary, promised considerable advantages. However, the R. Reagan administration, manifestly having set itself the goal of recarving the world according to its own yardsticks, immediately began to seek a revision of the draft convention which had been drawn up on the pretext that its adoption "would undermine the future national and economic security of the United States and many of its allies."*

Having blocked the work of the conference, American diplomacy aspired to prove that without its consent the conference was doomed to fail and that its participants had no way out other than to submit to the American diktat. A month prior to the opening of its 11th session the White House, evidently believing that it had accomplished its task, announced the return of the American delegation to the negotiating table. But in reality this was done to make new--essentially ultimatum--demands on the conference. President R. Reagan left no

*THE NEW YORK TIMES, 21 February 1983.

doubt that the United States would support only a draft convention which ensured for it free access to the exploitation of resources and provided for a decision-making procedure in the executive body advantageous to Washington; and would not contain provisions which could encounter objections in the U.S. Senate (on technology transfers, for example). The U.S. position was set out comprehensively on 24 February 1982 in a document entitled "Approach to a Solution of Key Questions of Part of the 11th Draft Law of the Sea Convention" and subsequently in a so-called "green paper" containing amendments to the text of the convention.

Flagrantly violating the negotiating procedure adopted at the conference, the United States essentially adopted a policy of rejecting the accords which had been reached with the common consent of all the participants on various interconnected questions in a single package. The U.S. Administration's action ran counter to the principle of states' conscientious fulfillment of commitments they have assumed, including the accords of states' official representatives at multilateral negotiations, which is generally recognized in international law. It is obvious that if all the conferees had, like the United States, rejected continuity and sought a revision of jointly adopted solutions, this would have precluded any possibility of the achievement of any agreements at all. After all, the U.S. Administration could not have failed to have known that there was practically not one country at the conference which would have been completely satisfied by all the provisions of the draft convention. If they had all followed the United States' example, this would have led to complete chaos and the escalation of conflicts in international relations, not to mention irreparable damage to the prospects of establishing the just rule of law in the oceans. Understanding with what negative consequences a disruption of the balance which had been achieved as the result of many years of negotiations and which was based on mutual compromises on a multitude of problems was fraught, the conferees did not succumb to the blackmail and rejected the United States' importunities.

At the same time certain concessions were made to the United States in the course of the last, 11th, session of the conference within the limits of what was possible. The text of the convention incorporated, inter alia, a new provision ensuring its inclusion in the council--the executive body of the international seabed organization which is being created. The developing countries also displayed a readiness to create a special "preliminary capital investment protection" system, which would guarantee the consortia already involved in first-generation deep-sea development security of their investments for the next 20-30 years. None of this, however, moderated the insatiable appetites of the Reagan administration, which continued to insist on a radical revision of the text of the convention in the interests of its companies and the Pentagon.

Contrary to the aspiration of the overwhelming majority of conferees to adopt the text of the convention by consensus, the United States frustrated this possibility, demanding a vote--the only time in its almost 10 years of work. In addition, it sought individual voting. The United States thereby wished to show the developing countries that they were opposed by all the "rich"

capitalist states. However, it is no longer possible today to approach solutions to be adopted by the international community with the former imperial yardstick, ignoring the objective realities of the modern world. As a result the convention was adopted by 130 votes to 4 with 17 abstentions.

The R. Reagan administration failed to draw the proper conclusions from this. Disregarding the will of the international community, it began an obstructionist campaign with the aim of preventing other countries signing it. Following a discussion of the question at a session of the National Security Council, on 9 July 1982 President Reagan announced the United States' decision not to sign the convention. In addition, the U.S. Administration began to activate a long-standing threat: to conclude a "mini-treaty" between the United States, Britain, the FRG and France. Under its pressure the said countries signed an agreement in Washington on 2 September 1982 on mutual recognition of licenses issued by the corresponding governments to companies and enterprises of these countries.

The developing countries evaluated the White House's behavior as an act aimed at undermining the universal convention, an attempt to legalize the United States' "exclusive rights" to the resources of the "common inheritance," an open challenge to the international community and the latest manifestation of the "great-power complex". Washington was vigorously rebuffed, and the attempt at blackmail failed. At the final session of the conference in Montego Bay (Jamaica) on the first day the convention opened for signing--10 December 1982--the representatives of the overwhelming majority of states--119 delegations--including the Soviet Union (now the number of signatories has reached 131), appended their signatures to it.

Nonetheless, despite the indisputable confirmations of the force and viability of the convention, the United States is continuing sabotage tactics, finding increasingly new means for this. Endeavoring to impose its obstructionism on other conferees also, the White House sent its emissaries to the capitals of a number of states. Insistently urging the waverers not to sign the convention, they portrayed matters such that, irrespective of it, international law customs had already taken shape which allegedly enabled them without signing the convention and not assuming the commitments it imposes to enjoy all the rights and advantages which are accorded its subscribers.

Attempting to create the appearance of legal justification for their actions and somehow legalize their claims in respect of the oceans and their resources, American diplomats and lawyers are trying to replace the universal convention with some substitute of customary law based on an arbitrary interpretation of the very concept of custom as a source of international law. The legal groundlessness of this method is connected with the lack of such components of custom as length, continuousness and uniformity of universal practice corresponding to the will of all parties to the negotiations. After all, the task is precisely that of bringing the existing unilateral practice of states and the diverse national laws which have been enacted de facto, in which each has expressed its own understanding of the question, into line with the international convention--the universal legal basis of states' relations in the oceans--which the United States is rejecting.

Understanding the weakness of its arguments, the United States began later to sound out the possibility of the conclusion of a separate "agreement which would confirm customary international law."* In other words, on the pretext of "consolidating the parts of the convention which have acquired consensus" Washington wishes to separate from it all its decisions which are advantageous to itself, officializing them in the form of an independent international agreement which would enable the American monopolies to arbitrarily and without supervision appropriate the resources of the "common inheritance of mankind". The United States is openly ignoring here the incontrovertible fact that the convention, representing a package of mutually conditioned accords, is legally one and indivisible. The consent of all the other states to the provisions favorable to the United States is inseparably connected with the latter's recognition of the remaining clauses of the convention. It presupposes a respectful attitude toward the collective opinion of the overwhelming majority of states which participated in the negotiations and signed the convention. As the above-quoted Soviet Government statement observed, "any attempts to arbitrarily take from it some provisions and reject others are incompatible with the rule of law on the seas established by the convention and is (sic) aimed against the legitimate interests of other states."

This policy, which is contrary to international law and elementary moral-ethical principles and aimed at rejection of the accords which have been reached, flagrant diktat and imperial arrogance have become the rule of behavior of the present U.S. Administration. But it is not possible in politics to derive long-term advantages from a selective approach to international commitments and the manipulation of international treaties and international law. The Soviet Union, together with other countries, emphatically rejects the policy of arbitrariness which the United States would like to pursue in this sphere also.

While condemning the U.S. Administration's sabotage in respect of the accords which have been reached and categorically rejecting the attempts to impose knowingly unacceptable terms on the entire international community, the world public at the same time expects that in this, as in other important present-day questions, realism will ultimately prevail. Sooner or later the United States will have to understand that no one state, even a powerful one, can ignore international legality.

*THE NEW YORK TIMES, 21 February 1983.

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U.S. CHINA POLICY UNDER REAGAN CRITICIZED

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[B. Zanegin article: "The China Policy of the Reagan Administration"]

[Text] Relations between the United States and China were marked by a definite decline at the beginning of the eighties. Having shifted the accent of its China policy at the beginning of R. Reagan's presidency in favor of the Kuomintang regime in Taiwan, the Washington administration exacerbated the Taiwan problem to such an extent that it jeopardized the level of relations reached by that time with the PRC (the Chinese side even threatened the United States with recalling its ambassador from Washington, as is well known). Fears were expressed in the American press, which reported the growing complication of relations between the two states and the possibility of their sliding towards a crisis. However, the situation had changed by the second half of 1983. A further deterioration in American-Chinese relations was halted owing to mutual concessions and, more than anything else, a readiness for compromise on the part of the administration of R. Reagan, which became apparent in spite of the well-known pro-Taiwan sympathies and anticommunist aims of the President himself. It is true that despite the energetic diplomatic efforts of both sides, they have only partly succeeded in restoring the atmosphere that was characteristic of the end of the seventies: a certain caution is now revealing itself in Beijing as regards making common cause with American global strategy as a whole. For its part, Washington has begun to show optimism in its appraisal of relations with the PRC on the basis of "a community of strategic interests," although this is not always or everywhere in accord with the present stereotypes put forth by Chinese foreign political propaganda.

At the same time, considering the agreements on the exchange of state visits at high levels and, more precisely, on the visit of Zhao Ziyang, premier of the State Council, to the United States in January and the visit of President Reagan to the PRC in April 1984, it is impossible not to notice that the frictions and well-known differences in the evaluation of the nature and prospects of American-Chinese relations have not prevented Washington and Beijing not only from achieving, during the latest high-level contacts, a certain stabilization of their relations and extension of these relations to the military

sphere, but also from creating the prerequisites for deepening relations.*

All this testifies sufficiently clearly that relations between the United States and the PRC represent a complex phenomenon. They are defined by a combination of contradictions whose sphere has widened somewhat recently in view of the existence of parallel or coinciding interests; it is essential to note that a coincidence of interests are apparent in the similar approach of the United States and the PRC to a number of international problems which, in contemporary world politics, represent the watershed line between the forces of socialism and progress on the one hand, and imperialism and reaction on the other (the fate of detente, control over armaments and disarmament, the situation in connection with Afghanistan, and relations with the states of Indochina). Precisely this last circumstance has made it possible for the Reagan administration, which represents the most militant circles of American imperialism, to revert to attempts to give American-Chinese relations the nature of coalition-type relations directed primarily against the Soviet Union as well as against some other socialist countries.

In light of this, an explanation of the foundations of the China policy of the Reagan administration and of its place in the formation and development of current relations between the United States and the PRC is of doubtless interest.

American-Chinese relations have developed in cycles, and have also been distinguished by alternating rises and declines in the past, during the preceding decade. However, at the same time these fluctuations have reflected the difficulties of the two sides in adapting to one another in the process of their mutual rapprochement. As to the complications which arose in the late seventies and early eighties, they were usually connected either with the fact that when the Reagan administration came to power it activated its moral, political, and military support for the Taiwan regime or with the fact that, while obtaining trade privileges from the United States, the Chinese side until recently showed dissatisfaction with American conditions for the sale of modern technical equipment and advanced technology to China. Without denying the significance of these facts for the PRC, it should be noted at the same time that they only reflect a more serious contradiction--the differences in the notions of the aims, nature, and content of relations between the United States and the PRC.

Since the end of the seventies, the Chinese Government has shifted the accent of its policies in relation to the United States to economic, commercial, scientific-technical, and cultural ties, pulling away from openly making common cause in other respects with Washington's aggressive course. On the other hand, the Chinese policy of the Reagan administration is formed in the context of an attack on detente, a wild outburst of anti-Sovietism, and an unprecedented intensification of imperialistic aggressiveness. In these

*Negotiations were conducted in 1983 with the Chinese leaders in Beijing by: Secretary of State G. Shultz in February; Secretary of Commerce M. Baldridge in May; Science Adviser to the President G. Keyworth in May; and Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger in September; Wu Xu-qian, PRC minister of foreign affairs, made an official visit to Washington in October.

conditions, Washington's efforts are aimed at including the PRC in its imperial, global, anti-Soviet strategy, making active use of the thesis of "a community of strategic interests." The PRC's interest in economic and scientific-technical cooperation with the United States is being exploited so as to ultimately bind China to American and world capitalism as a whole.

A considerable increase in chauvinistic reaction as a response to the successes of the world liberation movement has been observed in U.S. sociopolitical life since the middle of the seventies against the background of a deepening economic crisis, internal disorders (Watergate and its consequences), and foreign political failures (the expulsion of the United States from Indochina had particular significance). Added to this is the 1980 Presidential election victory of the right-wing extremist group headed by Reagan, which represents the most reactionary circles of American imperialism. U.S. conservative publicists openly proclaimed the end of the "epoch of liberalism," foretelling an ever-great shift of the center of political forces' center to the right.

In the realm of foreign policy, the changes resulted in Washington's return to some traditional postulates called upon to support the messianic-hegemonic "philosophy" of its conduct in the international arena and, at the same time, to rid the American man on the street of an inferiority complex which had developed under the influence of class psychological stresses such as the United States' defeat in the war against the Vietnamese people, or the fall of the pro-American regime in Iran. The ideology of anticomunism and of the "crusade" against the forces of progress has begun to exert a shaping influence on all directions of American diplomacy. This is definitely shown in its striving to view any international situation, including American-Chinese relations, through a prism of confrontation between the West and the East and between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The development of an aggressive course is taking place in a situation where the United States no longer has strategic superiority in the realm of politics. At the same time, the cost of the arms race has increased excessively, and the risk level of confrontation has grown immeasurably. In these conditions, the Reagan administration's efforts to increase U.S. military might with the aim of disrupting the existing parity are supplemented by its striving to make use of all international anti-Soviet reserves: developing and expanding the system of aggressive blocs, acquiring new allies and fellow-travellers--even such "doubtful" ones, from the viewpoint of the militant anticomunists in the U.S. conservative camp, as "Communist China."

However, while counting on utilizing the resources of the various states following the lead of Washington's anticomunist policies, the U.S. leaders are building their strategy of hegemony primarily on securing their own military superiority not only over any combination of forces hostile to the United States, but also to keep their hands completely free in the event that the policies of some allies or others come into conflict with the U.S. course, or that their partners become obstinate. In other words, an essentially more rigid attitude toward its partners, a disregard for the interests of its allies and fellow-travellers, and giving preference to methods of pressure before searching for a compromise have become the key features of American

diplomacy in the eighties. Regarding the attitude towards "colored" peoples, in addition to the superiority complex which is firmly rooted in the imperial subconscious, the racial prejudices characteristic of American reactionaries affect and make themselves felt in foreign policy, as do other forms of denial of equal rights and shortsightedness in evaluating the possibilities of American diplomacy.

Washington's present China policy is formulated within this framework. The process is developing incongruously between the hostile approach of American conservatives toward the Chinese revolution and the PRC, and a new circumstance that arose in the sixties--anti-Sovietism in PRC foreign policy. What is more, the United States was drawn into the Chinese civil war for a long time, supporting the Kuomintang reaction with every available means including military intervention. For two decades after the PRC had been formed, the U.S. Government pursued a policy of "containing and isolating" China. Even now, when diplomatic relations with the PRC have been normalized, the nature and extent of the relations maintained by the United States with the Taiwan regime give every reason to consider that the American government pursues a policy of "two Chinas." This traditional anticomunist policy conflicted with the fact that China, which since 1949 has been "separated" by American political science from the "free world," entered upon a path of confrontation with the Soviet Union, the personification of the "main communist danger" in the eyes of American reaction.

As a result of these confluent circumstances, two opposing views as to what Washington's China policy should be have formed in U.S. right-wing circles, and they compete in the struggle to influence formulation of the country's foreign policy course. One of the groups of the ruling camp determines its approach to relations with the PRC, proceeding from the concept that the geopolitical situation predetermines a Sino-Soviet conflict and the long-term nature of this conflict. Viewing this as insuring "a community of strategic interests," representatives of the above-mentioned way of thinking (the most active of them being, without doubt, Z. Brzezinski) would like to see the PRC not simply as a fellow-traveller, but as an ally. Proposals are put forward by this group to develop relations with the PRC in the nature of a coalition, exploiting the above-mentioned particular features of the PRC's present foreign political position and China's interest in business-like cooperation.

The other group, including the part of the political and military elite which keeps in mind the American intervention in the civil war in China, and also the U.S. participation in the Korean War and the aggression against Vietnam, does not--on a social plan--differentiate greatly between the PRC and the USSR. This group proceeds from the fact that the PRC is a "communist country," which by its socioeconomic system, ideology, and long-term foreign policy aims, is hostile to U.S. interests and to the bourgeois "system of values." Correspondingly, this group persistently demands that "caution" be exercised in developing relations with "Communist China," and particularly that the United States should refrain from assisting the development of China's economic and military might. The demand that the United States should increasingly observe its moral, political, and military obligations to the Taiwan regime is the fundamental aspect of the position of this "anti-Beijing" group.

Since the end of the sixties, when the process of normalizing relations with the PRC began, the United States has not succeeded in working out a strategy in relation to the PRC which would be unambiguous and based on strict ideological premises. Its China policy has always been somewhere between two extreme positions. Consequently, the concept of "a balance of forces" has turned out to be its basis, which is acceptable to the rival groups, and which views China primarily as a factor that is suitable for U.S. diplomatic maneuvering on a global scale, irrespective of this factor's sociopolitical and ideological characteristics.

In any event, the "pragmatism" of the concept of "a balance of forces" has satisfied to a certain extent the advocates of American-Chinese relations on the basis of a coalition, and at the same time has "justified" the development of relations with "Communist China" in the eyes of those opposed to too close a rapprochement with the PRC. In this connection Washington has invariably strived to retain control over the pace, extent, nature, and direction of development of American-Chinese relations. U.S. China policy itself has included, as an "insurance" of its own kind, such measures for the event of zigzags in the international course of the PRC as the R. Nixon administration's decision to create the "Sentinel" anti-missile defense system (its necessity was based on the possibility of a nuclear missile strike against the United States by the PRC), the inclusion of installations on Chinese territory among the targets of the American strategic forces under President J. Carter, and the care to retain Taiwan in the orbit of American strategy as a counterweight to the PRC, including maintaining the military resources of the Kuomintang regime at a high level.

The arrival of Reagan's Republican administration at the White House did not bring anything new to the conceptual basis of U.S. China policy. Nevertheless, the return to active political activity of those opposed to "Chinese communism," who represent pro-Taiwan forces in the conservative establishment, had an immediate effect upon the relations between the two states.

A role of no small importance was played by the fact that, by nature of his ideological platform and political views, Reagan himself belongs to this group and he personifies a new edition of the McCarthyism of the fifties in contemporary American political life (McCarthyism arose as reaction, among other things, to the victory of the popular revolution in China and in particular involved the persecution of liberal "appeasers" of "Chinese communism" in the United States.) What is more, many observers consider that the Reagan administration feels its dependence upon internal factors and relationship of forces to a considerably greater extent than the governments preceding it. This also applies to the problem of relations with the PRC. This problem is the subject of sharp political and ideological differences in public opinion, academic circles, Congress, and the government, and Reagan cannot allow himself freedom of action without taking into account the various existing approaches to the China question.

The substance of present American strategy towards China has been determined under the conditions of the differences which have developed among the conservative groups, against the background of a deepening anti-Soviet course of the Reagan administration, and attempts to widen its international basis. Founded on a contradictory internal basis, this strategy includes essentially incompatible components: on the one hand, developing relations with "Communist China" and calculating to utilize the strategic advantages of an American-Chinese partnership against the world of socialism, progressive regimes, and national liberation movements; and on the other, providing military and political support to the Taiwan regime, which is still a force hostile to the PRC, the support motivated by distrust of the PRC and the desire to keep the strategically important territory of Taiwan and the adjoining islands under its control.

The implementation of this double-faced course poses before Washington the urgent task of finding effective methods to neutralize the damage done to American-Chinese relations by the rigid stand of the Reagan administration on the Taiwan question. These methods have been embodied in the practical (and not only declared, as before) implementation of the aim to develop strategic relations with the PRC.

The conservative advocates of rapprochement with the PRC on an anti-Soviet basis, proceed from the idea that the Chinese Government could continue to show readiness for a military and political partnership with the United States, as it did during the last months of the Carter administration. The real existing interest of the Chinese side in developing businesslike cooperation for the purpose of assisting the modernization of the country, including modernization in the military sphere, is taken into account in this connection.

It is typical that activation of the ties between military departments, and negotiations for military cooperation are accompanied by declarations from Beijing about the "threat from the Soviet Union" and by appeals to "take action against Soviet hegemony"--heard, for example, in the statement of Wu Xueqian, Chinese minister of foreign affairs, during a visit to Turkey in October 1983 immediately following a visit to the United States and negotiations with the American leaders. On the basis of these premises Washington concludes that the PRC can accept American conditions for developing relations.

In familiarizing oneself with American special and sociopolitical literature on the problems of U.S China policy, it is easy to notice that this concrete conclusion of the Reagan administration is founded on a whole series of widely spread, simplified theories or else simply on prejudices. Thus the geopolitical conceptions, which, as a rule, reduce the complex picture of world politics to "geometric" combinations of powers (for example, the "triangle" of the United States, PRC, and USSR) in particular exert an appreciable influence upon the formulation of Washington's China policy. Of course, the role of arbiter in these combinations is invariably assigned to the United States.

The illusory notion that American diplomacy allegedly has at its disposal decisive levers of influence on the foreign political course of the Chinese

Government has arisen on the basis of such conceptions. It is assumed that with the existence of common geopolitical interests it would be enough to offer Beijing doled-out manifestations of "friendship," such as willingness to sell some weapon or other, to thus turn China into a "junior partner," and the object of U.S. international combinations. In this respect the fact is overlooked that Washington itself could become a tool for the tactical maneuvers of Chinese diplomacy while it is absorbed in organizing its "crusade" against communism.

The conviction is also widespread among American bourgeois political scientists and politicians that Beijing is more interested than Washington in developing American-Chinese relations and that, consequently, it is not necessary for the United States to go too far to meet its Chinese partner. What is more, judging by the present aims of the American administration, Washington is clearly proceeding from the assumption that China will have to give up some of its national aims, including that of restoring its sovereignty over Taiwan, for quite some time—if not forever.

Without showing any inclination to alter its position on the Taiwan problem, the Reagan administration has recently made definite moves to restore the disrupted mutual understanding with the PRC as regards the "commonness of strategic interests." To all appearances, it intends to fulfill this task by offering Beijing assistance in developing its military-economic, and military-technical potential opening up opportunities for it to acquire equipment for military purposes, right up to armaments. Ruling U.S. circles see this as the main means of consolidating the anti-Soviet aspects of PRC foreign policy, and even—should events develop favorably for them—of drawing China toward active participation in Washington's conducting of a global anti-Soviet course. Although Washington is not inclined at present to attach too much significance to Beijing's anti-American propagandist rhetoric, it would nevertheless like to achieve a weakening in the criticism of the United States as a "hegemonic superpower," and also not permit or, at least slow down the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations and avert the possibility of American-Chinese contradictions developing regarding the developing countries.

The visit to the PRC by C. Weinberger, U.S. secretary of defense, (25–29 Sep 1983) had important significance attached to it concerning the restoration of mutual understanding on the basis of "a commonness of strategic interests," as Washington interprets it. He was instructed to comprehensively discuss the problems of global and regional security with the Chinese leaders. Washington was counting on the visit to eliminate the obstacles which had arisen in American-Chinese military cooperation. Weinberger's striving to persuade his interlocutors in Beijing to support American anti-Soviet strategy was backed up by references to relaxing restrictions on Chinese purchases of modern technical equipment and technology in the United States and by general support for plans to modernize the Chinese Armed Forces and to strengthen the economy of the country as a whole, since all this is in keeping with U.S. interests. Its readiness to sell "defensive" weapons and technology for military purposes to China was officially expressed. The two sides also agreed to renew the exchange of military specialists, in particular, in the spheres of rear and medical services. A return visit to the United States was planned for PRC Minister of National Defense Zhang Aiping.

Weinberger's negotiations were followed by a visit to the United States (11-14 October 1983) by PRC Minister of Foreign Affairs Wu Xueqian. Although the only officially announced result of the visit was an agreement to renew cultural exchanges beginning in 1984--which had earlier been broken off by the Chinese side--its significance goes far beyond the limits of the above-mentioned agreement. Wu Xueqian was received by President Reagan and Vice President G. Bush, and conducted negotiations with Secretary of State G. Shultz, Secretary of the Treasury D. Regan, and Secretary of Commerce M. Baldrige. An "unplanned" meeting with W. Casey, director of CIA, also took place--a new aspect in the development of American-Chinese relations.

Judging by press reports, Wu Xueqian discussed problems with the U.S. leaders which, in American political parlance, relate to the circle of "common strategic interests." In particular, it was concluded at the negotiations that the United States and China share a "deep distrust" regarding the "intentions of the Soviet Union," as AFP reported with reference to an unnamed official representative of the State Department. Neither side even stopped short at claiming that the "Soviet Union (allegedly) represents a threat to international stability." Wu Xueqian made an insistent appeal to the United States to give more energetic support to the anti-Vietnam forces. An important feature of the visit is also the fact that Wu Xueqian continued negotiations with P. Thayer, deputy secretary of defense, on the conditions of sale to China of technical equipment and technology, and also of arms, negotiations that were initiated in Beijing by Weinberger.

The attention devoted to problems of military cooperation in the course of negotiations between Weinberger and Wu Xueqian shows that the liberalization of export to the PRC is viewed on the other side of the ocean as one of the main means of restoring and developing relations with China in the military and political realms. The Reagan administration decided to grant the PRC the status of "a non-allied friendly power," thus meeting the demands of the PRC and at the same time closing its eyes to the traditional, ideological (anticommunist) approach of right-wing conservatives to the above-mentioned aspect of relations.

Secretary of Commerce Baldrige noted that, in accordance with the new rules, China would be permitted to purchase products in the United States made on the basis of the most up-to-date technology, including those which could be used for military purposes, reporting this in a special subcommission on trade with China, under the commission of the House of Representatives on energy and trade. The majority of Beijing's orders for these products will be considered in the "usual order,"--that is, they will be withdrawn from the control of the military department with the exception of "goods and technology whose transference carries an obvious threat to the national security of the United States," (goods belonging to the so-called "Red Zone"). Baldrige gave one to understand that this decision was dictated by the anti-Soviet aims of Washington's China policy. Washington demanded a guarantee from the PRC that goods acquired in the United States would not be re-sold to third countries as a condition of the practical implementation of the new trade rules.

Judging by Weinberger's statement in Beijing, the administration also made a decision in principle to permit the sale to China of individual types of weaponry. In this sense the Reagan government has gone further than its predecessors. The absence of an agreement on questions of procedure still stands in the way of the Chinese side making use of this opportunity. The PRC demands that it be granted particular conditions--namely, preliminary detailed information as to which kind of weaponry can be ordered without risk of being refused. Washington as yet has not shown any inclination to make such a departure for the PRC from the existing procedure.

At the same time, the Reagan administration has begun to devote more attention to perfecting bilateral interstate relations, striving to give them a stable character, to broaden the field of "peaceful" cooperation and to activate official contacts and raise their level. All this is subordinated to the general task of creating firm structural ties and lines of dependence of the Chinese economy, science, technology, and its educational system upon the United States and the world of capitalism as a whole.

The Reagan administration has given up its tough position on the question of the annual increase in the export of Chinese textile articles to the United States, which resulted in the second American-Chinese 5-year agreement of textiles being signed in August 1983. It is typical that this agreement grants the PRC more favorable conditions than it does traditional textile exporters to the United States such as Hong Kong or South Korea. Based on mutual concessions by both sides, the agreement permits an annual growth in exports of 2-4 percent (instead of 6 percent suggested by the Chinese side), and ensures a corresponding increase in the PRC's solvency in hard currency (the United States believes that the PRC's interest in purchasing American technical equipment of a scientific capacity, and "dual purpose" equipment in particular, is kept in check by lack of hard currency).

Negotiations are being conducted on the working out of an agreement for co-operation in the realm of nuclear energy and for the conditions of its implementation. The agreement would open up an opportunity for U.S. monopolies to expand supplies to the PRC of corresponding equipment, having pushed aside their Western European competitors.

Negotiations begun earlier and the implementation of agreements reached on economic cooperation continue under the Reagan administration. In particular, a program has been worked out in detail to modernize the biggest enterprises in the Chinese coal extracting industry, envisaging major capital investments by the Occidental Petroleum Corporation and a compensating form of subsequent settling of accounts. Plans for the joint exploitation of oil resources on the Chinese coastal shelf are nearing their practical implementation (it is assumed that industrial output will begin in 1986). A contract has been concluded by the American Motors Corporation to build a plant in the PRC for cross-country automobiles (jeeps) for military purposes, which is to symbolize the "new" approach of the Reagan administration to transferring "dual purpose" technology to the PRC.

The volume of American-Chinese trade in 1982 was \$5.2 billion. According to the above indicator, the PRC occupies 14th place among U.S. partners, and has risen to third place among Asian countries as a buyer of American products.

The size of scientific-technical cooperation is characterized by the fact that approximately 100 programs in 17 fields of science (nuclear physics, lasers, space research, oceanography, biochemistry, metallurgy and others) function on an intergovernmental basis alone. In addition, dozens of agreements have been concluded for direct cooperation between the university centers of both countries. With U.S. assistance, a project was begun in 1982 to modernize and technically reequip 30 Chinese higher education institutes (at U.S. initiative, the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development allocated \$200 million to this program). According to facts published in the American press, more than 8,000 Chinese students, scientific workers, and specialists are studying or working as post-graduates in the United States on the basis of agreements between government departments; another approximately 3,000 study because of relatives living in the United States, grants allocated by the universities, and subsidies from philanthropic funds. The first graduation of students from the school organized by the United States for PRC administrative cadres took place in 1983.

Striving to deepen the nature of American-Chinese relations, Washington finally reached agreement with the Chinese leadership during Weinberger's visit on a trip to the United States by Zhao Ziyang, premier of the State Council, and on an invitation to Beijing for President Reagan. It is natural that very great significance is attached to this exchange of visits in both capitals: They are intended to symbolize the restoration of mutual understanding and "dynamic relations" in conditions when their development is, nevertheless, hampered by existing problems. Calculations to raise the "strategic dialogue" to a new level are obviously linked with contacts on a high level. At the same time, it is completely clear that no less serious domestic political considerations are behind Reagan's forthcoming visit to the PRC; Having timed the President's trip to Beijing to coincide with the height of the 1984 election campaign, the White House intends to demonstrate the "diplomatic success" of the Republican government in the above-mentioned foreign political direction.

American-Chinese relations now far exceed U.S. relations with any other socialist state as to their scale, depth, and level.

Of course, Beijing is confronted with a considerable number of problems in its approach to relations with the Reagan administration. The Chinese side displays definite caution in the present phase, as regards making a common cause [solidarizatsii] with the American foreign political course. This particularly applies to the area of developing countries where the PRC is striving to strengthen its political positions, which are vacillating as a result of close relations with American imperialism. Here Beijing allows itself to criticize American policy on this or that question or in some region or other.

In interpreting the condition and prospects of relations with the United States the tone of the Chinese announcements and statements in the mass information media also differs somewhat from the euphoric cliches of official American propaganda, which now presents the voter with a rose-tinted picture of Washington's China policy and its results. Advancing the slogan of "struggle against the hegemonism of two superpowers," Chinese propaganda strives not to advertise the PRC's interest in those aspects of relations with the United States which could demonstrate a "commonness of strategic interests."

However, Beijing's real policy deeply contradicts even this slogan. You see, in essence, the Chinese side adheres to "dual standards" in its approach to the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States and China are developing their relations in the military and political spheres while proceeding from the fact that they are directed against the Soviet Union. The Chinese side is exhibiting a willingness to make concessions with regard to the rigid political and ideological aims of the Reagan administration, having linked the prospects of the country's economic, scientific-technical, and military development to a certain extent with Western assistance--and primarily U.S. assistance.

Of course, the existence of contradictions, some of them being of a long-term nature, must be taken into account when analyzing the condition and prospects of American-Chinese relations. The activization of U.S. expansion into regions adjoining China is, in particular, one of the number of causes of potential political and strategic differences: A course to establish a system of military and political alliances (plans to create an alliance between the United States, Japan, and South Korea, and attempts to give military and political functions to the ASEAN bloc), retain a network of support bases, and amass forces and arms on the close periphery of the PRC. All this cannot but put Beijing on the alert. Its displeasure is expressed in its condemnation of the U.S. military presence and demonstrations of force in South Korea, and in its measured-out criticism of those who advocate the militarization of Japan and of the U.S. role in this process.

The Taiwan problem plays a particular role. The PRC considers, and with reason, the U.S. position on this problem (its foundation being the U.S. "right"--in accordance with the 1979 "law on relations with Taiwan"--to supply the Taiwan regime with weapons and to safeguard its "security") to be practically tantamount to U.S. interference in the internal affairs of the PRC. This undermines trust in Washington and hinders the elimination of difficulties which have arisen in the process of developing bilateral relations. As Zhao Ziyang, premier of the State Council, remarked, the Taiwan problem is one of the main obstacles to the "healthy" development of relations between the PRC and the United States.

Some American political scientists view the whole zone of developing countries, among which China counts itself, as an arena of conflicts between the United States and the PRC. In this they refer to statements by Beijing such as its condemnation of U.S. policy in South Africa, its criticism of U.S. policy in the Middle East, and its condemnation of American aggression in Grenada, etc.

With respect to all this, it should be noted that the imperialist course of the Reagan administration in the zone of developing countries is not condemned as a whole: Only some of its individual aspects are criticized and even that is sometimes done through the prism of the same old conception of "the struggle of two superpowers for hegemony."

An analysis of the correlation between the contradictions and the so-called parallel interests in American-Chinese relations makes it possible to conclude that the calculations of the Reagan administration to thrust upon the PRC relations in the nature of a military coalition, which are directed against third countries and fraught with an increase in international tension, a growth of non-productive waste of material and financial resources, and the danger of conflicts, clearly run counter to the fundamental and long-term tasks of China's political and socioeconomic development, and to the real interests of the Chinese people.

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ROLE OF RELIGIOUS GROUPS IN FRG ANTIWAR MOVEMENT EXAMINED

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[Article by L. Istyagin: "FRG Religious Organizations in the Antiwar Movement"]

[Text] The most diverse political and ideological forces united by a common goal--saving peace and preventing a thermonuclear catastrophe--interact in the antiwar movement, which is currently embracing increasingly broad strata of the population of the FRG, as of a number of other West European countries. A prominent place among them belongs to the voluntary organizations directly or indirectly connected with two religious faiths, which occupy a leading position in West German society--Protestants and Catholics (according to official statistics, at the end of the 1970's some 44 percent of the country's inhabitants were Evangelists, 44.2 percent Catholics¹).

I

As shown by the June 1983 Hannover congress of the FRG's evangelical churches and other events of the summer and fall of 1983, the religious detachment of West German fighters for peace and against the NATO "rearmament," in spite of forecasts made by the rightwing press, not only have not lowered their energy but have developed it considerably. At the same time, however, it is perfectly obvious that the Christian detachment of antiwar forces has very great unutilized potential. This is why considerable significance is attached to the state of affairs in this part of the antiwar movement.

Today both Catholicism and Protestantism as such--and this is acknowledged even by conservative ideologists--no longer play the former dominating part in the life of West German society which belonged to them in the first post-war years, under the conditions of the so-called "Adenauer era".² It is also indicative that the influx of the masses in many ecclesiastical measures is not being accompanied by any pronounced increase in their participants' interest in the religious side of affairs proper, although both churches have exerted great efforts to ensure the maximum saturation of their forums with theological problems--at the Hannover congress of evangelical churches, for example, the number of services was double that of the preceding, Hamburg, congress (June 1981).

The young people, who constitute the main contingent of participants in the antiwar demonstrations, including those held by ecclesiastical organizations, are particularly indifferent to religious activity proper. Thus, according to one poll conducted by the Allensbach Public Opinion Institute, only 37 percent of young people aged 16 to 29 called themselves "Christians" and only 13 percent believers.³

Thus the reasons which prompted the antimilitarist-minded broad public strata to join religious organizational structures or enter into close contact with them are of a predominantly purely political nature. What do they consist of? Reflected primarily here, evidently, has been distrust of the official party-parliamentary mechanism and everything that is personified in their minds by the concept "state," which is typical of many inhabitants of the FRG, particularly the young people alarmed at the growth of the danger of nuclear cataclysm.

The church, on the other hand, under current conditions, precisely by virtue of the loss of its official, "state" function, has appeared to a certain extent as an independent, neutral force capable of occupying a critical position in relation to the foreign policy course supported by all parliamentary parties. Whence the relatively greater trust in the church than the "officially approved" parties and the communications media.⁴

A certain part has also been played by the fact that people who manifestly sense the falsity of official references to the need to "restore the balance," the postulates of "deterrence strategy" and the unnaturalness of the "rearm to disarm" slogan, but who for this reason or other are reluctant to identify with the political parties and movements of the left see support for the religious pacifist organizations as the methods most suitable for them of expressing their disagreement with arms race policy.

It is not without interest that the CDU/CSU leaders hastened on these grounds to accuse the antiwar movement of... clericalism. As Christian Democrat politician A. Mertes, for example, declared in his speech at the Hannover Evangelical Congress, a "new clericalism" is penetrating FRG political life "through the back door of pacifism."⁵ In other words, a party which has grown up entirely on political clericalism is vainly seeking to pin its label on the peace fighters only because some of them are disposed to take Christian motives as a basis in justification of their positions.

II

Of the West German churches, only the Protestants have definite traditions of antimilitarist struggle. In the 1950's a number of Protestant political figures headed by G. Heinemann, who at that time held ministerial office in the K. Adenauer government and was simultaneously president of the synod of the Evangelical Church (the highest body of a consultative nature), opposed the policy of the country's remilitarization. Considerable social repercussions were caused by the activity of Pastor M. Niemoeller, head of the Hessenland organization of evangelicals, who called for the abandonment of the creation of a new army in the FRG.

However, the action of the Protestant pacifists at that time did not enjoy appreciable development. Created by G. Heinemann in 1952, the All-German People's Party, although receiving 320,000 votes at the 1953 Bundestag elections (1.2 percent), went no further and soon practically disintegrated. In the Protestant Church itself M. Niemoeller and G. Heinemann were supported only by a comparatively small number of persons, basically those who had been persecuted under Nazism. Greater success in mobilizing the masses was enjoyed by the Society for Saving Peace in Europe, which was founded by G. Heinemann in 1950: it held approximately 100 meetings in the year with a total number of participants of 50,000. This was evidently the active antimilitarist potential on which the Heinemann-Niemoeller group could actually rely at that time.

Subsequently also the antimilitarist Protestants struggled selflessly against military preparations, particularly against the planned arming of the Bundeswehr with atomic weapons (the so-called "Movement Against Atomic Death" of the latter half of the 1950's). But although their protests encountered sympathy in part of the population, they did not succeed in carrying with them the evangelical political forces, which were firmly controlled by the "parliamentary" parties and the ecclesiastical stratum.

The synod of the Evangelical Church, after G. Heinemann had resigned as president, basically followed the Adenauer line. Not encountering real resistance on the part both of the leadership of the majority of the church (17 altogether) and the Protestant secular organizations, by its authority it shielded and consecrated the policy of the development of the Bundeswehr, West Germany's "contribution" to NATO and a "security policy" based on the propaganda postulate of the "Soviet military threat".

The so-called Heidelberg Theses, which were adopted by the synod in 1959, were a document which preserved right until recently the significance of the distinctive leadership orienting the Evangelical Church toward approval of the arms race. They emphasized that although the church recognized (in accordance with the constitution) the possibility of "conscientious objection" (thesis 7), it at the same time "recognizes today still as a possible Christian act participation in the attempt to ensure peace under conditions of freedom by means of the existence of atomic weapons" (thesis 8).⁶ Despite all the casuistical hair-splitting (the words "today still" hinted at the possibility at some future time of other ways of defending "peace under the conditions of freedom"), this formula is unequivocal: its meaning is approval of the arms, atomic included, policy and recognition of the need to serve in the Bundeswehr.

For over 20 years the Evangelical Church saw no reason for even a partial change in its position. In the 1960's and 1970's the forces which might have prompted it to this did not exist in public circles and in the church itself. The church leadership calmly ignored, for example, the antimilitarist declarations of the "new left" and the demands of various "alternative" groups. There was just one reason for this imperturbability--there was not in any way serious mass pressure from below on the part of ordinary members of the community. Then suddenly on the boundary of the 1980's the situation changed sharply.

What happened? Antiwar sentiments--first in the soil of the struggle against the neutron bomb (1976-1978) and then, as of the fall of 1979, mainly in connection with NATO's "twin decision" on the deployment of new American missiles in West European countries, among which the predominant role was immediately assigned the FRG--began to strengthen markedly and grow as of the mid-1970's in the FRG, as in the majority of other West European countries.

In the communities and in various voluntary organizations of the Evangelical Church, which had traditionally been receptive to a greater extent than the Catholic Church to actual secular concerns, stormy discussions, whose intensity rose constantly, seethed. Very many pastors, who were forced to listen to the voice of ordinary believers, immediately found themselves involved.

The evangelical congresses may serve as a graphic, although oblique and insufficiently precise, indicator of the profound qualitative shift which had occurred in the Protestant world. They are convened every 2 years and are of the nature of open measures--access for the heterodox is relatively straightforward and practically any social, ethical or political issues may be discussed at them together with theological subjects. As long as the leadership of the Evangelical Church managed to fetter discussion of the problems of peace and war within the rigid framework of the notorious "Heidelberg formula" the congresses were of little interest and through the mid-1970's passed virtually unnoticed.

But then came the abrupt turning point: whereas in 1973 some 7,500 participants gathered for the evangelical congress in Duesseldorf--and even this was a respectable result against the background of the altogether modest forums with almost empty halls of the 1960's--59,000 arrived for the congress in 1977 (in West Berlin), 79,000 in 1979 (in Nuremberg), 120,000 in 1981 (Hamburg) and approximately 150,000 in 1983 (Hannover).⁷ A further expansion of the influx of guests to the congresses is now limited merely by the possibilities of accommodating them. The reason for the unprecedented public attention to the evangelical assemblies was, it is generally recognized, the subject of peace, which by the will of their participants held almost undivided sway at them.

Considerable significance for the general development of the antiwar movement in the country was attached to the set of peace measures implemented by evangelical organizations both at the land and at federal levels. Two evangelical organizations--Action--Symbol of Atonement. Peace Services (ASAPS), with its center in West Berlin, and Society of the Service of Peace (SSP), with its headquarters in Bonn--assumed a kind of role of pioneers in this cause. The first was founded in 1958 and the second in 1968 to coordinate the actions of 18 pacifist organizations, among which was the ASAPS.

Despite their venerable service, both organizations were until recently practically unknown to the broad public. The ASAPS were engaged in rendering--on a very modest scale--voluntary assistance to certain countries which are the victims of fascist aggression (whence the "atonement for sins" in its name) and also supported in principle a limitation of militarism, arms and arms

exports, "development and encouragement of the strategy of nonviolent action" and preservation and development of the detente process and opposed racism and the destruction of the environment. The SSP (approximately 5,000 active members) propagandized the ideas of "Christian and nonviolent conduct," published and distributed literature on peace issues and maintained relations with similar organizations in other countries.⁸ This activity had no pronounced effect, however, either within the FRG or abroad. On the other hand, the leadership of the evangelical churches approached the "atonement for sins" with manifest suspicion, in view of which the ASAPS, as (F. Dayle), one of its leaders, acknowledged, "was systematically in need of money" and also "was invariably on the list of organizations subject to inspection."⁹

The sharp rise in the political authority and significance of both organizations occurred when they turned to the masses, which had already initiated locally a great deal of assertive activity in support of peace and for security and disarmament. To some extent this change was stimulated by outside factors and the intensification of antimilitarist trends in Protestant circles of other countries. Thus in September 1977 the International Peace Council (IPC) in Holland--a pacifist organization created in 1967 by nine Dutch churches--came out with a manifesto with the motto "Free the World From Nuclear Weapons, Begin With the Netherlands". The IPC called on the Dutch to oppose the deployment of nuclear weapons in Holland and thereby contribute to the disarmament process. Hundreds of activist groups emerged in the country in support of the IPC appeal. Figures of West Germany's ASAPS entered into contact with their Dutch colleagues and adopted the decision to take advantage of their experience at home. The result exceeded all expectations--societies and unions against nuclear arms came to be created everywhere.¹⁰

In 1978 a number of Christian public figures--priests and laymen--from the southwest of the FRG (with Stuttgart being the center) drew up a document entitled "Living Without Weapons" and initiated the collection of signatures thereto. The petition was addressed to the defense minister and contained the words: "I am prepared to live without the protection of arms. I wish to fight in our state for peace to be ensured by political means, without weapons."¹¹ The initiators called themselves a "nonviolent Christian base movement" and emphasized that they intended "taking seriously the Biblical God as the God of peace."¹² The petition was successful--by the spring of 1980, when the discussion surrounding NATO's "twin decision" was heating up, it had been signed by 14,000 persons.

Of course, this was a modest beginning compared with the subsequent growth of antiwar actions, but even it testified graphically to the change in mood, and this alarmed the conservative circles of protestanism. The latter came out in June 1980 with their own platform, "Ensuring Peace," which criticized the "radicalism" of the authors of "Living Without Arms," referring to the need to "maintain balance". However, even "moderate" evangelists deemed it necessary to support in principle measures for disarmament and the "process of understanding and detente" and condemned the "dangerous arms contest."

A further document--"Steps Toward Disarmament"--which had been drawn up by a group of experts--"peace researchers"--and religious activists, on this occasion with the participation of Catholics, was put into political circulation in May 1981. Its authors set themselves the goal of offering a compromise between the "maximalist" viewpoint of the proponents of a "life without weapons" and the approach of the compilers of "Ensuring Peace". They declared that their position was based on the "existing system of deterrence," but at the same time they believed it possible to take steps, unilateral included (the so-called "gradualism concept"), "under the atomic shield of the United States" for the disarmament of the FRG itself. They proposed, inter alia, renunciation of new types of atomic weapons and reorganization of the Bundeswehr into an army which would be structurally incapable of conducting offensive operations outside the FRG; and a ban on arms exports. All these measures, which are unilaterally practicable, would serve, the authors believe, "as an example for emulation."¹³

Despite all the insufficient clarity and imprecision of the "academic platform"--it virtually circumvents, for example, the question of the United States and NATO--it stimulated to a certain extent discussion of the problems of disarmament primarily among the scientific intelligentsia and in independent research centers and groups.

In this connection particular significance was attached to the activity of the evangelical organizations in the masses and amid the population. In 1980 and 1981 the ASAPS and SSP participated very actively in peace weeks--measures which elicited a universal response and which were held under the motto "Living Without Weapons". "Help remove nuclear weapons!" an appeal of the two evangelical organizations said in November 1981. "Let us begin with our own country! No atomic weapons in the FRG!"

Almost 3,000 evangelical communities held peace weeks, and 14 of the 17 evangelical local churches, moreover, came out with official appeals to their members to take part. The "warnings" from high levels, including then Chancellor H. Schmidt himself, who attempted to dissuade the evangelicals from these mass actions, did not have the desired effect.

III

In their overwhelming majority the religious evangelical organizations readily consented to close cooperation with the forces of the left in questions of the struggle for peace and disarmament. "We have succeeded for the first time," Pastor G. Scheufele, an initiator of the "Living Without Weapons" action, wrote in this connection, "in breaking out of the church ghetto and establishing cooperation with other groups. Nonecclesiastical organizations as far as the German Communist Party and the Union of German Working Youth are participating in the peace weeks which began under the church's aegis. Many Christians are beginning to recognize that it is not just we who are capable of fighting for peace; those of a different faith and those who do not believe at all may champion peace while remaining in their spiritual-ideological positions."¹⁴

It was precisely the religious organizations' attraction to the cohesion of the antiwar forces and the tolerance they displayed toward the heterodox, primarily toward the left both within their own camp (Christians for Disarmament, Student Communities, Christian Responsibility, Free Conference of Pastors of Osnabrueck, Christians for Socialism and others) and outside it, which to a considerable extent ensured the main achievement of the West German antiwar movement--the far-reaching success of the Krefeld Appeal for preventing deployment of the new American missiles in the FRG (November 1980). An initiator was Pastor M. Niemoeller, a person enjoying tremendous respect for his selfless activity in the name of peace.

True, far from all Protestant politicians supported the Krefeld Appeal. Thus E. Eppler, prominent SPD figure and himself a Protestant pastor, who is opposed to the deployment of the new American missiles in the FRG and whom the press calls "ally of the antiwar movement," refused to sign it. However, Eppler's position did not meet with understanding in broad Protestant circles, which supported the appeal enthusiastically. As a result by the fall of 1983 the total number of signatures of the Krefeld Appeal was over 5 million, that is, tens and hundreds of times more than collected by all the above-mentioned religious manifestos taken together.

The same reason also explains the success of the 1981-1983 mass antiwar demonstrations, which were unprecedented in FRG history and in which religious, primarily evangelical, participants constituted, according to observers' estimates, the most populous contingent. The Bonn demonstration against the American missiles of 10 October 1981, which assembled over 300,000 persons and caused a whole wave of similar protests in the capitals and biggest cities of other West European states, was held on the initiative of the ASAPS and SSP, which are now known to us, to whose appeal there responded, according to certain (probably incomplete) data, over 600 antiwar organizations and groups.¹⁵ Even more massive were the antiwar demonstrations in June 1982 on the occasion of the visit to the FRG of U.S. President R. Reagan. Some 400,000 persons took part in the 1982 Easter march and over 785,000 in the analogous march in 1983.¹⁶

According to certain estimates, the number of activists of the movement--participants in the demonstrations, marches, meetings and other similar forms of the antiwar struggle--in 1981-1982 alone constituted approximately 2 million. In 1983 this number no less than doubled in connection with the expanded scale of the spring and, particularly, fall demonstrations. There is no doubt as to the great contribution of the religious, primarily evangelical, organizations to the continuing upsurge of the mass antiwar struggle.

True, in the majority of cases the leadership of the evangelical churches itself endeavored to maintain a certain distance from the antiwar movement. But as of the fall of 1981 it has been under dual pressure, as it were--from the masses and ordinary community members who have risen up against the "rearmament" and the middle tier and many representatives of the clergy who with a varying degree of consistency have begun to publicly call in question and criticize the Heidelberg dogma.

From the proposition concerning the "Soviet threat" as the first cause of the growth of the military danger these latter have switched to a kind of version of the "dual responsibility" concept, which in the specific context has actually acquired a manifestly anti-Washington pointedness. As K. Sontheimer, a typical conservative evangelist and well-known commentator, observed, "many members of the Evangelical Church, particularly among the younger generation, theologians included, are publicly expressing doubt that the current policy of the superpowers, particularly the new policy of the United States, is capable of preserving peace in Europe and throughout the world; there are great fears in these groups that American policy could lead to a nuclear war in Europe becoming possible and East-West detente, from which the FRG derived considerable benefit for itself, becoming its opposite."¹⁷

IV

Under these conditions the synod of the Evangelical Church (EC) resolved to issue a new document, if not revising to this extent or the other, at least specifying and somewhat softening the 1959 formula. An EC memorandum entitled "Preserving, Strengthening and Renewing Peace" was published in November 1981. As might have been expected, it proved very contradictory.

On the one hand it proclaimed: "War today can no longer be regarded as a continuation of policy by other means. War would now mean a total and unconditional collapse of policy. The threat of war cannot be regarded as responsible policy. The political task of the present day is with the help of a policy of peace to overcome the threat of the use of force." But here, on the other hand, we also have a reproduction of the proposition of the acceptability "still today" of the arms race, atomic included.¹⁸ Allegiance to a "continuation of detente" was declared, the goal of "ensuring international peaceful order" based on a "close interweave of mutual interests" was set and an appeal for "renunciation of the forcible solution of interstate conflicts" was proclaimed. However, no specific measures for the achievement of these goals were offered apart from a "demonstration of willingness to compromise," "education in a spirit of peace," "awakening a thirst for rapprochement" and encouraging "analysis and information". The burning issue of the deployment of the new American missiles was passed over in silence.

It is not surprising that activists of the antiwar struggle in the evangelical camp were not satisfied by the modest progress which the EC memorandum contained and subjected its propositions, as did, for example, Pastor (F. Dayle), to sharp and comprehensive criticism. Subsequent events have shown that the movement has manifestly outgrown the stage at which the authors of the document would like to hold it.

In August 1982 the Union of the Reformed Church (Calvinists), which has 2.5 million members, that is, almost 10 percent of the country's Protestants, came out with a principled condemnation of weapons of mass annihilation, and its position was practically fully supported, moreover, by the reformed churches of the whole world (approximately 75 million Christians).¹⁹ The EC Synod attempted to dispute the viewpoint of the Reformed Church, but manifestly failed in this polemic.

When, in the spring of 1983, preparations were under way for a new evangelical congress, the antimilitarist forces in the Protestant camp and in broader public circles conducted them under the slogan "An Unconditional 'No' to Weapons of Mass Annihilation!" It was proposed that those who shared this slogan wear a purple armband during the congress.

On the eve of the congress conservative church figures and the rightwing press rained down on the "purples" a campaign of persecution, but were utterly defeated: the overwhelming majority--from 90,000-100,000, that is 80-90 percent of those present, according to observers' estimates--was adorned with purple and violet ties, armbands and handkerchiefs.²⁰ Maintaining "objectivity," E. Eppler, who presided at the congress, did not himself carry a handkerchief, but W. Brandt, on the other hand, demonstratively brandished one during his speech. The most reactionary BILDZEITUNG with its characteristic resourcefulness declared the finale of the purple story the latest "Moscow triumph."²¹

In reality the Hannover congress, like the events of the hot fall of 1983, did not have the slightest connection with any "dirigisme" whatever, not to mention the "hand of the Kremlin". It demonstrated, on the other hand, a very important new quality acquired by the antiwar movement in this section of public forces also--its emergence on the path of mass struggle for the accomplishment of the pivotal, decisive goal--a halt to the nuclear arms race and the banning of all types of weapons of mass annihilation.

V

Particular significance for the prospects of the further development of the antiwar movement in the FRG is attached to the recently discerned changes in Catholic public spheres, although as a whole the intensiveness of antimilitarist protests among Catholics is incomparably lower than among Protestants. The point being that the FRG Catholic Church has always served as a loyal support of the policy of militarization. It may be claimed without exaggeration that it was the support of Catholic circles which formerly helped K. Adenauer to a decisive extent in involving the country in NATO.

Relying on the assistance of Pope Pius XII, who was known for his extreme anticommunism, the CDU/CSU leaders in the 1950's-1960's were able to exclude practically any Catholic opposition to their policy. There were never figures like G. Heinemann or Pastor M. Niemoeller among the Catholics. Not only the church leaders, bishops and cardinals, but also, for example, such a mass organization as the Union of German Catholic Youth (UGCY) unconditionally approved at that time the policy of the creation of a new German army--the Bundeswehr. Only the group of "leftwing Catholics," which had, according to certain data, no more than 7,000 supporters, objected to the building of a new army. But its voice was barely audible.

Even when, in the mid-1960's, after the Second Vatican Council, which condemned "total war," sentiments strengthened in international Catholicism in favor of detente and limitation of the arms race, the West German Catholic upper strata preferred not to notice the new tendencies and occupied a position on the

extreme right. While not venturing to openly criticize the Vatican, the Catholic bishops of the FRG nonetheless made it sufficiently transparently understood that they did not approve and did not share the "utopias" contained, they believed, both in the council decisions and in the encyclicals of Pope John XXIII, with their appeals for disarmament. As far as the highest secular Catholic forum--the so-called Central Committee of German Catholics (CCGC)--was concerned--the episcopate and secular associations of the Catholic Church are represented in this body--throughout the 1960's-1970's it repeatedly permitted itself direct attacks against the papal throne when it found its views diverging from the line of uncompromising struggle against "world communism".

For this reason it is logical in its own way that when, following the NATO decision to "rearm," the antiwar movement in the FRG began to increase in scale, the leadership of the Catholic Church declared decisive battle against it. In November 1981 it deemed it necessary to intervene in the heated dispute over ways to avert the military threat. For this purpose the CCGC published its own memorandum entitled "Concerning the Topical Discussion About Peace".

In accordance with cold war traditions, it put the entire blame for the deterioration in the world political situation exclusively on the Soviet Union, whose defense efforts were portrayed as "going far beyond the framework of security needs." On the other hand, the actions of the West and NATO were categorized as merely a "defensive reaction" for the purpose of "restoring the balance". The document fully justified the deployment of American "Eurostrategic" missiles (and the original version of neutron weapons also) and even presented it as "an example of a policy aimed at arms reduction, detente and peace by way of military balance." Any departure from this strategic precept was condemned as being aimed at "destruction of the policy of peace under conditions of freedom."²²

In other words, the CCGC occupied a front against the entire antiwar movement and even to a certain extent against the Protestant leadership, which had deemed it necessary by this time to make certain concessions to the peace fighters in its ranks.

However, as distinct from the past "firmness" which the upper strata of the Catholic Church had displayed in defense of arms policy, on this occasion it did not pay. Simply "checking those who had gone too far," as they undoubtedly intended, was not successful for the simple reason that by the time of publication of their manifesto the antiwar sentiments had permeated Catholic Strata of the population quite extensively also.

From the start of 1980 many ordinary Catholics had been participating in the antiwar actions conducted by Protestant organizations. In June 1980, during a congress of the Catholic Church in West Berlin, opposition groups conducted their own "congress from below" under the slogan of the rejection of atomic arms. The initiators of the measure released on the eve thereof the appeal "Christians Against Atomic Arms," which said: "We reject any use of nuclear weapons, irrespective of whether of a defensive or offensive nature. ...We demand abandonment of the deployment of additional medium-range missiles."²³

It is interesting that at the meeting of opposition Catholics 6,000 of its participants were addressed not by a Catholic but a Protestant pastor, as main speaker--G. Alberts--who is well known and warmly respected in the FRG as a fighter for peace. Of course, the scale of these protests was considerably inferior to the Protestant protests, but they were practically unprecedented in the Catholic Church.

The discussion about peace embraced the Pax Christi pacifist Catholic organization to a large extent. The Pax Christi movement emerged at the end of World War II in France as an association of former prisoners of concentration camps in France and Germany, which confessed "peace in Christ Jesus". Currently the organization has approximately 65,000 members and operates in many countries, including the FRG, where it has approximately 5,000 supporters (other West European countries where its activeness is observed are Holland, Belgium, Italy and Britain).

Despite its relatively modest numbers, Pax Christi enjoys quite considerable authority in Catholic and broader public circles. But until recently it had far from always been disposed to use this influence in the field of active defense of peace. In particular, in the 1950's, when the decisions concerning remilitarization were being adopted, Pax Christi behaved emphatically apolitically, failing to give the "leftwing Catholics"--the opponents of rearmament--any support. Nor later was its policy distinguished by particular activeness and precision. Since the end of the 1970's, however, possibly to a considerable extent under the influence of similar "sections" in other countries, the West German Pax Christi has been an arena of bitter arguments over the ways of deliverance from the threat of nuclear war.

In November 1980 these discussions culminated in the formulation of a special platform called "Disarmament and Security". It was pointed out plainly here that "the Catholic Church of the FRG does not have the right to continue... to indulge in illusions that peace can long be ensured by military means." In order to ensure true security, the document pointed out, "it is essential to recognize and respect the other side's subjective need for security; security is always another's security also."²⁴ Despite a certain glibness of wording, the Pax Christi document was heard, nonetheless, as a challenge to the official Central Committee concept, in any event, it was as such that it was perceived by the public and the antimilitarist forces in West German Catholicism itself.

Certain top authorities of the Catholic Church also began to permit appreciable deviations from the "strict" line under pressure from the situation that has come about. Thus almost simultaneously with the adoption of the document by the CCCG serious doubts as to the validity of the "balance of fear" concept were expressed in his speech at a regular episcopal conference by the Bishop of Cologne, Cardinal J. Hoeffner. He reproduced the routine proposition concerning the "Soviet threat," it is true, but did not deny the possibility of other opinions on this question and, what is most important, advocated a search for peaceful solutions based on a renunciation of nuclear arms.²⁵ J. Hoeffner formulated his position even more definitely in May 1983 in a sermon

in Cologne Cathedral. "The balance of fear," he declared to the parishioners, "is dangerous and fragile. ...We are all in the same boat. But there are also in this boat brothers at odds with each other with terrifying weapons. These weapons may destroy not only the enemy but the entire boat also." The reluctance to openly condemn the policy of the United States and NATO in such statements, of course, is obvious. But at the same time there is also no doubt about their authors' manifest departure from the squalid proposition that the Soviet Union is "to blame" for everything.

In April 1983 the West German Catholic bishops, following the example of their American colleagues, published their own pastoral message. This document pointed out that "nothing" could "justify" nuclear war, morally condemned "arms and military strategy," emphasized that "a war of annihilation has never been a solution: it is absolutely impermissible" and criticized, indirectly and cautiously, it is true, the West's position at the disarmament negotiations with the USSR.²⁶

But a particularly heavy blow against the position of the unconditional "Atlantic loyalty" of the ecclesiastical upper strata was undoubtedly delivered by the Catholic Youth organization--the same UGCY which had rendered Adenauer such an important service at the dawn of the policy of militarization. The UGCY, which unites 17 Catholic youth organizations and approximately 650,000 members, joined the antiwar movement almost simultaneously with the Protestant organizations and with considerable assertiveness, emphasizing mainly work in the parishes.

In May 1981 the UGCY published the program document "Peace and Justice," which in content was largely similar to the Pax Christi platform. Its appeal for a revision of official "security policy" with regard for "the other side's security needs"²⁷ had great public repercussions and elicited the sharp dissatisfaction of rightwing circles. In particular, at the end of September 1981 the FRG's leading conservative newspaper, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, in a special article directly addressed to Catholic prelates ("What Do the Bishops Say to This?") directly demanded of the latter that they adopt measures to overcome the "confusions of the UGCY, which are dangerous for defense and peace."

However, making the youth and other rebels in the Catholic ranks "see reason" proved far from easy. In any event, the crude threatening shout of the Central Committee in its new memorandum against them failed completely. The UGCY delegation demonstratively voted against the platform "Concerning the Topical Discussion About Peace" and the Pax Christi representative left the meeting in order not to take part in the voting; both were tantamount to direct insubordination, which is unusual in Catholic practice.

In the spring of 1983 the UGCY stepped up its participation in the antiwar movement. A resolution adopted at the end of April 1983 at a union assembly (congress) contains a demand for the "complete rejection of the deployment of new American medium-range weapons in Europe" and, as a preliminary measure, an immediate moratorium on such deployment to ensure the successful culmination of the Geneva negotiations between the USSR and the United States.²⁸

The Central Committee held to its odious position, but even it had to change tactics somewhat. At a congress of Catholics which assembled in September 1982 in Duesseldorf its chairman, the well-known reactionary Bavarian priest, (G. Mayer), he is president of the CCGC, objected to the peace demonstrations. However, the success of the "containment" measures proved modest. Although not on the scale of the evangelical forums, the congress largely assumed, nonetheless, the nature of an antiwar demonstration. In the speeches of the participants, including high Catholic authorities, the proposition that Catholics may hold different opinions on the question of "defense" and that "no one opinion can claim the sole correct understanding of the Gospels or hide behind the authority of the church"²⁹ predominated. This meant a certain victory for the UGCY and the "Catholic student communities"--the leftwing Catholic groups like the "Bensberg group" and other organizations close to them in spirit, which have now acquired the freedom of action of which people previously tried unequivocally to deprive them.

The participation of Catholics, particularly the youth, in the joint actions of various antiwar forces of the FRG is broadening. Attesting this as convincingly as could be were the Easter marches of the spring of 1983 and also the evangelical congress, which attracted a large number of Catholic guests. Particular significance was attached to Catholics' active support for the antimilitarist measures of the fall of 1983 in connection with the proposed deployment of the first American Pershing 2's and cruise missiles on West German territory.

For the first time since the war antiwar sentiments have begun to penetrate the Catholic "strongholds" of the CDU/CSU. The "CDU Members Against Rearmament" organization emerged in Bielefeld in the summer of 1983. Its leader, the television broadcaster and believing Catholic F. Alt, who is well known in the FRG appealed for renunciation of the deployment of the new American missiles in the country as a first step toward the creation of a nuclear-free Europe and disarmament. Alt was subjected to concentrated attacks by the rightwing press, but this in no way prevented and, perhaps, contributed even to the sensational success of his book, which appeared in an edition of several hundred thousand copies, which is unprecedented for this type of publication.³⁰

As many observers acknowledge, it was precisely the emergence within the CDU/CSU structure itself of "anti-rearmament factions" (the phrase of a FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE commentator) which to a large extent doomed to failure the extensively publicized "peace" campaign of the CDU/CSU in September 1983.

At the same time the participation of Catholics in mass demonstrations and protests in the fall of 1983 increased sharply not only compared with the 1980-1982 period but also in comparison with the period of their assertiveness in the spring and summer of 1983. As distinct from in the past, West German Catholics are now making an increasingly substantial contribution to the common struggle against the growing threat.

Being highly heterogeneous in its social composition, the mass religious movement of peace supporters in the FRG has, of course, not only strong aspects.

Its well-known weaknesses are connected primarily with the lack in many instances of a precise goal orientation and infection with various, sometimes very resistant, erroneous evaluation stereotypes.

It is also natural that the devotees of militarist preparations and their ideological lackeys are attempting to abuse certain attributes of the religious antiwar movement, just as they are attempting to play on the weaknesses of the Greens' ecology movement and various "alternative" groups. As the democratic press had rightly emphasized, the dangers of the poisonous idea of intervention under the flag of "religious solidarity" in the internal affairs of the socialist countries which is persistently being thrown to the ecclesiastical organizations, as, incidentally, other actual or potential participants in the antiwar actions, by the military-industrial complex and its propaganda machinery cannot be underestimated. The purpose of such interventions, which are assuming an increasingly persistent, importunate nature, is just one--to attempt to fragment the antiwar movement, scatter its ranks, cause a split in it and thereby condemn it to defeat.

At the same time events speak of something else also. Despite all its internal complexities and acute collisions even and contradictions, the mass antiwar movement, including its religious part, will as a whole not allow itself to be pushed into the wrong path. It is learning to recognize friends and enemies disguised as well-wishers increasingly well and struggling increasingly consistently for the achievement of the decisive goal--nuclear disarmament. The maximum concentration of the energy of all anti-war forces in this direction is a most important guarantee of the efficacy of the protests of the peace supporters.

FOOTNOTES

1. See "Statistisches Jahrbuch Fuer die BRD," Stuttgart, 1981, p 90.
2. See K. Sontheimer, "Die politische Rolle der Kirchen und die nationale Sicherheit" ("Der Neokonservatismus in den Vereinigten Staaten und seine Auswirkungen auf die Atlantische Allianz," Melle, 1982 p 324).
3. "Die neue Friedensbewegung. Analysen aus der Friedensforschung," Ed. R. Steinweg, Frankfurt/Main, 1982 p 257.
4. According to a poll conducted by the well-known EMNID Institute, at the end of the 1970's some 65 percent of citizens in principle expressed their trust in the church as an institution, 33 percent not. For comparison, 59 percent expressed themselves in favor of the system of higher education, 38 percent against; in favor of business 50 percent, 47 percent against; in favor of the unions 48 percent, 49 percent against; and in favor of the press 47 percent, 51 percent against. In last place on this "scale of priorities" were political parties: 43 and 55 percent respectively.
5. DIE WELT, 11-12 June 1983.

6. "Christen im Streit um den Frieden Beitraege zu einer neuen Friedensethik Positionen und Dokumente," Freiburg, 1982, pp 350-352.
7. DER SPIEGEL, 30 May 1983, p 50; UNSERE ZEIT, 10 June 1983.
8. See "Suf dem Weg des Friedens--eine Information ueber die Arbeit der AGDF," Bonn, 1983, pp 1-6.
9. H. A. Pestalozzi, R. Schlegel, A. Bachmann (Ed), "Frieden in Deutschland. Die Friedensbewegung: wie sie wurde, was sie ist, was sie werded kann," Munich, 1982, p 141.
10. In a number of places the basis for them was created by the activity of the "Christians for Disarmament" evangelical organization, which was founded in 1976 by Pastor K. Luebbert.
11. "Aufruf an alle Christen. Ohne Ruestung leben," Stuttgard, O.J., p 3.
12. FRIEDENSFORSCHUNG AKTUELL No 2, 1982, p 7.
13. See H. A. Pestalozzi, Op. cit., p 135.
14. Ibid., p 136.
15. See "Bonn 10.101981. Friedensdemonstration fuer Abruestung und Entspannung in Europe": Berlin (W), 1981, pp 9, 26-30.
16. PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA No 6, 1983, p 11; UNSERE ZEIT, 6 April 1983.
17. K. Sontheimer, Op. cit., p 333.
18. See FRIEDENSFORSCHUNG AKTUELL No 2, 1982, p 5.
19. THE ECONOMIST, 11-12 February 1983, pp 20-21.
20. See UNSERE ZEIT, 13 June 1983.
21. VORWAERTS, 26 June 1983.
22. H. A. Pestalozzi, Op. cit., p 251.
23. "Friedensforschung aktuell...," p 3.
24. "Die neue Friedensbewegung...," p 245.
25. See "Friedensforschung aktuell...," pp 6-7.
26. BLAETTER FUER DEUTSCHE UND INTERNATIONALE POLITIK No 5, 1983, p 661.
27. "Christen im Streit um den Frieden...," p 313.

28. BLAETTER FUER DEUTSCHE UND INTERNATIONALE POLITIK NO 5, 1983, p 661.
29. VORWAERTS, 4 September 1982.
30. DIE ZEIT, 29 July 1983.

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'SPECIFIC CHARACTER' OF CAPITALIST CRISIS NOTED BY MARXISTS

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 12, Dec 83
pp 129-132

[Report on conference of Marxist economists: "The Current Crisis of Bourgeois Political Economy in the Light of Marx's Economic Theory"]

[Text] A conference devoted to the 100th anniversary of the death and 165th anniversary of the birth of K. Marx, which was organized by the GDR Academy of Sciences Central Institute of Economics, the K. Marx University (Leipzig) and the M. Luther University (Galle-Wittenberg), was held at the start of the summer of 1983 in Berlin. This was simultaneously the eighth international conference of Marxist economists on a critique of bourgeois political economy.

Not only scientists of the socialist countries but also Marxist economists from Austria and the FRG participated. Representatives of institutes and higher educational institutions of the GDR spoke in the debate.

The opening remarks were delivered by W. Heinrichs, director of the GDR Academy of Sciences Central Institute of Economics and corresponding member of the GDR Academy of Sciences.

Fundamental problems of the crisis of bourgeois political economy against the background of the growing influence of Marxism-Leninism and the intensification of the struggle for peace throughout the world were raised in the papers of Academician G. Meisner (GDR), "Karl Marx and the Crisis of Current Bourgeois Political Economy" and Academician A. Mileykovskiy (USSR) "Political Economy Aspects of the Struggle for Peace and the Relaxation of International Tension at the Current Stage".

G. Meisner concentrated attention on the need for the further development of the Marxist concept of crisis—a concept employed (and variously, furthermore) not only in political economy but also in philosophy, sociology and the natural sciences. He emphasized the desirability of the interdisciplinary approach to a study of this phenomenon. G. Meisner also formulated his considerations concerning the features determining the differences of the general crisis of bourgeois political economy which has developed as of the second third of the 19th century and which is continuing from the specific crises being experienced by bourgeois science as a result of the exacerbation of the contradictions of capitalist reproduction and their reflection in economic theories. Important for Marx, who ascertained the signs of the crisis state of the bourgeois political economy of his time, the speaker emphasized, was

an analysis of its qualitative change from a scientific character to vulgarization and apologetics. But the further development of bourgeois political economy, in the course of which the exacerbation of capitalist contradictions was reflected, which inevitably caused crises of bourgeois theory itself, continued on this basis.

Thus a crisis situation arose in bourgeois vulgar political economy in the 1870's which was perceived by bourgeois scientists as a "dispute over method". It became a part of economic history under this name.

With the transition to imperialism there began to ripen a new crisis of bourgeois political economy, which was caused by the fact that bourgeois economists, although referring in a description of actual economic development to the appearance of cartels, syndicates and trusts, firmly adhered in theoretical analysis to models of capitalism of the era of free competition. J. Keynes' work, which was published in 1936, was an attempt to lead bourgeois political economy out of this blind alley.

According to the speaker, a whole number of particular features in the development of bourgeois political economy is a reflection of the general crisis of capitalism. Among them are: loss of faith in the future and the viability of capitalism; bellicose anticommunism; and gradual limitation of the degree and sphere of influence of official bourgeois doctrines.

In conclusion the speaker dwelt on a characterization of the crisis of bourgeois political economy which developed in the 1970's, distinguishing its principal features.

First, the collapse of the illusion, recognized by bourgeois ideologists themselves, that it is possible with the aid of state-monopoly regulation of the economy to control the capitalist reproduction process was revealed. And there are two aspects of this problem, furthermore. Taking Keynes' teaching as a basis, the policy of regulation with the aid of high state spending and budget deficits in the mid-1970's was declared bankrupt. But the economic policy competing with it, which has now gained the ascendancy and which is based on supply theory and the action of market forces, does not deny state intervention. Its disciples wish by way of regulating the money supply to do away with inflation; by means of a change in interest rates and tax policy to stimulate investment; and, introducing savings programs, to reduce state spending.

Thus it is a question merely of a shifting of accents, which is designed to broaden the field for the maneuver of the monopolies. However, nor has this produced the expected results. As a result increasingly critical appraisals of this economic policy are appearing in Western economic literature.

Second, the efforts of bourgeois theorists in the sphere of a scientific foresight of economic development and forecasting have been unsuccessful.

Third, the bourgeois concept itself, according to which just income distribution, "social partnership" and also social security contribute to the continuous growth of well-being, has become a center of dispute. Supply-side economics

does not mean a general offensive against the working people's social gains. Instead of a "state of universal prosperity," it demands the creation of a "state of military prosperity".

Fourth, the long-cherished hopes for a rise in the theoretical level of bourgeois political economy thanks to the use of mathematical methods have had to be buried: it has not been possible to overcome the state of theoretical decline even with the help of numerous and thoroughly developed models.

Inasmuch as current bourgeois political economy is by nature unscientific and apologetic and the social thrust of the capitalist system is assuming increasingly sharply expressed features, the intensification of the crisis of bourgeois theory is inevitable.

A. Mileykovskiy's paper was devoted to a most important present-day problem--the struggle for peace--and the part which K. Marx's theoretical inheritance plays in its economic substantiation. The speaker stressed that militarism is a property inherent in capitalism generally and not only in imperialism as its final stage.

Bloodshed, conflicts and wars accompany man's entire history. But only capitalism, which created machine production, switched wars to an industrial footing and engendered the regularities of the expanded reproduction of implements of people's extermination.

For the first time in the history of science K. Marx analyzed the criminal essence of capitalism and established the economic and political regularities at the basis thereof. He concluded that at the basis of these crimes are two factors: a thirst for profit conditioned by the law of surplus value and an endeavor by any means to disorganize and destroy the revolutionary forces threatening the existence of capitalism.

The mid-1970's is characterized by an intensification of the general crisis of capitalism, which introduced a number of qualitatively new features to the political economy aspects of the struggle for peace and the relaxation of international tension. The ideologists of bellicose conservatism implemented measures for the international consolidation of all the political parties which adhere to their program precepts. A system of military-political blocs arose uniting under a common command the three power centers of the imperialist camp--the United States, the West European NATO countries and Japan. Preparations for military operations came to be conducted not only on all continents of our planet but in practically all the waters of the oceans, including its depths, also. Possessed by militarist madness, the Washington administration added a new twist to the arms race spiral, which is designed to support realization of the "limited" or "protracted" nuclear wars doctrine. Together with strategic and tactical nuclear weapons the manufacture of other means of mass annihilation--chemical, bacteriological and laser--is being stepped up. The creation of a variety of "novelties" in the implements of death, whose use is to be a surprise for an enemy, is being stimulated in every possible way.

A real threat of the extermination of all life on earth has arisen. The problem of man's survival has become global. For this reason the struggle for peace and an end to the arms race are becoming a world movement embracing the broadest people's masses.

At the same time the regularities of class struggle ascertained by K. Marx can be discerned in it distinctly. In its vanguard is the working class, which experiences most the burdens of militarization. Workers despite the veil of lies, are understanding increasingly clearly that it is militarization which has given rise to inflation and unemployment.

The papers and speeches at subsequent sessions were devoted to two groups of questions: modern forms of bourgeois criticism of socialism and the particular features of the current crisis of bourgeois political economy and new trends in its development.

The following papers were delivered on the first collection of problems: "Marxist Theory of the Socialization of the Means of Production and its Present-day Anti-Marxist Criticism (in the Example of Poland)" by Prof G. (Kholay) (Polish Academy of Sciences), corresponding member; "Critique of Bourgeois and Social Reformist Attacks on the Theory and Practice of Real Socialism" by Prof Yu. Ol'sevich, doctor of economic sciences (USSR Academy of Sciences); and "The Methodology of Karl Marx and its Significance for Combating Modern Bourgeois Political Economy's Criticism of Socialism" by Dr (G. Fabuinke), professor, rapporteur (GDR Academy of Sciences).

These papers and also the subsequent debate formulated the problems of real socialism which are being used by the enemies of socialism for the bitterest attacks.

Approximately 15 years ago bourgeois economists moved to the center of their criticism of Marxism the processes which allegedly under the influence of state regulation and the scientific-technical revolution had begun to develop not as Marxism had predicted. Now, Yu. Ol'sevich emphasized, Marx's critics have sharply reorganized their front and are attempting to attack Marxism, asserting that the forecasts of the building of a socialist society have not been justified and that, in addition, real socialism even "contradicts" Marx's theory.

These problems are particularly pertinent today for Poland, whose socialist foundations are being sharply attacked by representatives of the so-called "political economy of Solidarity". (G. Kholay) characterized it as a petty bourgeois, essentially anti-Marxist system putting forward anarcho-syndicalist demands against the socialist state. The paper criticized the basic propositions of this "political economy" and its political program, which demands the so-called "socialization" of state ownership, that is, its conversion to group ownership, and also the idea of the perpetuation of small-scale private ownership in agriculture as a "particular" path of the development of the Polish economy.

Bourgeois "socialism experts" are endeavoring to counterpose to Marxism real socialism. They assert that the latter is devoid of stimuli to efficient management, contrary to the imperatives of the industrial society and for this reason condemned to crises and stagnation and so on and so forth. The papers and speeches of the conferees emphatically rebuffed all these inventions. Particular attention was paid here to the problems of ownership, the management and planning mechanism and its stimuli under the conditions of the socialist society. The speakers emphasized the role of K. Marx in the creation of the political economy of socialism and the need for further theoretical work for its development and an improvement in the mechanism of socialist management.

The second set of problems connected with the crisis of bourgeois political economy and the new trends in its development was comprehensively illustrated in the other series of papers: "The Methodology of Karl Marx and its Significance for a Criticism of the Basic Directions of Bourgeois Political Economy" by Dr A. (Matiash), professor (Hungarian Academy of Sciences); "Conservatism and Neoconservatism in Bourgeois Political Economy" by Dr S. Geretik, professor (CSSR Academy of Sciences); "New Crisis Phenomena in the Correlation Between Economic Theory and State-Monopoly Regulation Policy" by Dr K. Mueller, professor, and Dr P. Thal, professor (GDR Academy of Sciences); "The Role of Institutional, Sociological and Radical Concepts in Bourgeois Economic Thinking From Marx Through the Present Day" by Prof T. Trendafilov, doctor of economic sciences (Bulgarian Academy of Sciences); and "The Shaping of Democratic, Antimonopoly Economic Concepts as a Reflection of the Crisis of Bourgeois Political Economy" by Dr A. (Benish), professor (GDR Academy of Sciences).

Discussion of the question of the need, guided by K. Marx's teaching, for the more in-depth development of the concept of crises, which are manifested variously in different processes of social life, but which evidently have uniform content, continued in these papers and also in the speeches. The majority of the speakers supported the proposition that the current crisis of bourgeois political economy is of a specific character.

What caused this crisis, what are its characteristic features, in what direction will the further development both of bourgeois political economy and state regulation of the economy proceed--these were the central questions.

The exclusive nature of the conditions of the development of capitalism in the 1950's-1960's and their uniqueness was emphasized, for example, in his speech by M. Rumler (CSSR). Particular importance, he believed, attached to such factors as the nonsaturated state of the markets, the low energy and raw material prices and the possibility of the simultaneous expansion of the capital and consumer goods markets. It was under these conditions that the Keynesian system of regulation proved acceptable. However, the slowing of the growth of GNP and labor productivity, the increase in capital intensiveness and the reduction in the profitability of capital led to the Keynesian system of regulation beginning to stimulate stagflation which required a considerable change in the forms and methods of regulation of capital accumulation.

Much attention was also paid to the influence of the internationalization and exacerbation of competition on world markets. Not so much the domestic market and the sales conditions therein as the situation on world markets and the competitiveness of the national economy was important for the monopolies of a whole number of developed capitalist countries under these conditions.

A large place in the speeches was occupied by discussion of the question of the crisis itself, the forms of its manifestation and the new trends in bourgeois economic thought which emerged in connection with its development.

The crisis which developed in the 1970's laid bare the groundlessness of the theoretical orthodoxy which had served as the ideological and practical justification for state-monopoly regulation. It was emphasized that it had taken shape on the basis of a kind of combination of Keynesian and neoclassical theories in a so-called "neoclassical synthesis" designed to explain the mechanism of the functioning of the capitalist economy and the processes of production and income distribution and price forming and also to formulate prescriptions of economic regulation for the purpose of achieving stable growth without crises and inflation. Under the conditions of the economic upturn of the 1960's and the comparatively moderate inflation this system of bourgeois political economy coped more or less successfully with the ideological tasks of justification of state-monopoly capitalism. It also performed practical functions, substantiating the economic policy of the ruling parties in accordance with the principles of liberal reformism.

The crisis of bourgeois political economy was manifested in acute criticism of the orthodox economico-theoretical system, particularly Keynesianism; it led to a considerable revision of the predominant theoretical concepts and the revival and strengthening of the positions of the neoclassical school, which supplied the views of the conservative forces of bourgeois society who advocate a limitation of the state's socioeconomic functions.

Conservative trends in all countries are identical. They are manifested in a sharp criticism of the state and state invention in the economy and a revival of the ideology of the capitalism of free competition, which is being idealized under the influence of the increased monopolization and the growth of state intervention.

Reflecting the immediate interests of big capital, the conservative forces are endeavoring to sharply limit even the social gains of the working people--various forms of social security, unemployment benefits and spending on education and health care--which have been "inscribed" in the Keynesian system of income redistribution for expanding demand and facilitating sales conditions.

It was emphasized at the conference that, despite the crisis of orthodox Keynesianism, Keynes' theory remains the ideological and theoretical basis of liberal-bourgeois reformism, and its "leftwing" varieties the basis of social democratic reformism. Reformist circles in the capitalist countries are not about to consign Keynes' theory to the historical archives. They are advocating a "new reading" of it and its "renewal" and new forms of the synthesis of Keynes' theory with other directions of bourgeois political economy.

The conference contributed to a broad exchange of opinions and stimulated further development of Marxist thought in the sphere of criticism of bourgeois political economy.

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BOOK ON INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEWED

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNNYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 12, Dec 83
pp 133-139

[Yu. Borko review: "A Fundamental Study"]

[Text] Painting a panorama of a 30-year-plus struggle of the working class in the centers of present-day capitalism is a difficult task. Providing a scientific, Marxist-Leninist analysis of this struggle is doubly difficult. And the first thing that should be emphasized in this connection is that the group of authors (G. G. Diligenskiy, S. P. Peregudov and K. G. Kholodkovskiy--leaders) has coped fully with both tasks. The volume in question of an essentially encyclopedic publication* organically combines a vast amount of carefully selected and skillfully systematized factual material and an in-depth theoretical analysis culminating in precise conclusions and generalizations..

It is expedient in this review to concentrate attention on the illustration in the book of certain questions of fundamental importance not only in terms of their theoretical and political significance but also by virtue of the fact that they have for many years been at the center of Marxist-Leninists' struggle against their ideological adversaries.

The first of these questions concerns the correlation of the internal and external factors of the development of the class struggle of the proletariat in the capitalist countries and its interconnection with the struggle of all progressive forces of mankind for peace, democracy and social progress. Do we need to recall that the denial of this interconnection, particularly denial of the revolutionizing influence of the example of the socialist countries, is virtually an indispensable element of bourgeois, social reformist and revisionist views of the workers movement in the capitalist countries.

*"Mezhdunarodnoye rabocheye dvizheniye. Voprosy istorii i teorii. T. 6. Robocheye dvizheniye razvitykh kapitalisticheskikh stran posle vtoroy mirovoy voyny (1945-1979)" [The International Workers Movement. Vol 6. The Workers Movement of the Developed Capitalist Countries Since World War II (1945-1979)], Moscow, Izdatel'stvo "Mysl'," 1981, 687 pages.

The book counterposes to this viewpoint the Marxist concept of the organic interconnection between the struggle of the working class in the centers of present-day capitalism and other directions of the world revolutionary process. This most important methodological principle is realized consistently throughout the study. And there is emphasis primarily of the central role of such a factor as the formation of the world socialist system, the continuous growth of its power and the ongoing change in its favor of the correlation of forces between the two main social systems of the modern world.

"Neither the development of the international situation in the postwar decades, the singularities of the workers movement in the capitalist countries, the history of new breaches of the chain of imperialist domination nor the course of the national liberation struggle," the foreword says, can be understood outside of this factor" (p 7).

Defining the essence of the influence of the said factor on the position and struggle of the working people in the developed capitalist countries, the authors emphasize that the existence of the world socialist system has limited their sphere of action. The systematic and diverse influence of the socialist world has played a determining part in the appreciable change in the correlation of class forces which has enabled the working class to develop a socioeconomic and political struggle of unprecedented scale and forced the monopoly bourgeoisie to take the path of maneuvering, considerable concessions to the working people and an easing of the most flagrant manifestations of exploitation. In addition, as the book observes, "to a great extent under the influence of the very fact of the existence of socialism and the competition of the two systems which is under way on a historical scale" the broad working people's masses have begun "to set more serious and far-reaching goals than merely maintaining their material existence and raising their living standard" (pp 11-12).

One further fundamentally important aspect of the impact of world socialism on the development of the workers movement in the capitalist countries is distinguished: thanks to the radically changed correlation of forces between the two opposite social systems, the working people of these countries have for almost four decades now been living, working and struggling under conditions of peace. Past years have provided a convincing answer to the question concerning the correlation of the struggle for peace and the struggle for social progress, which had become the subject of the most acute discussions in the international workers movement. As the book emphasizes, it has been proven in practice that the normalization of the international situation and the replacement of the cold war by relations of peaceful coexistence create more favorable conditions for the struggle for democratic and socialist transformations in the capitalist countries. The authors draw the justified

conclusion that under detente conditions "the positions of anticomunism and anti-Sovietism weakened; the workers movement and other democratic forces were able to oppose more actively the reactionary policy of imperialism both within the capitalist countries and internationally" (pp 131-132).

With the increased attention of the workers movement to the central problem of international life and the formulation of its own foreign policy platform, which is closely tied in with the working people's socioeconomic demands, there has been an increased trend toward the rapprochement of different currents within the workers movement and a constructive dialogue on acute problems has been started between communists and social democrats and trade unions of different ideological-political persuasions. Currently, in the atmosphere of a new exacerbation of international tension caused by the extremely aggressive, hegemonistic policy of American imperialism, it is impossible to exaggerate the importance and relevance of this experience.

The new international conditions which have taken shape in the postwar period have broadened the possibilities of the class struggle of the proletariat in the developed capitalist countries. However, the degree of realization of these possibilities is determined by its own revolutionary potential and the internal conditions of the struggle, an analysis of which constitutes the basic content of the book in question. The authors consistently reveal the dialectics of the workers movement here and ascertain not only the factors contributing to its development but also everything which is impeding it.

A key question which is still on the agenda in Marxists' ideological-theoretical struggle against their enemies is how the postwar evolution of capitalism--changes in the economy and domestic policy, in the social structure of society and the position of the working people themselves and in the sphere of ideology and culture--has influenced the working class. A considerable part of the volume is devoted to answering this question.

Emphasizing that the changes in the production forces and production relations of capitalism are the objective basis of the development of the working class and, consequently, its entire activity, the authors distinguish two key directions: the current scientific-technical revolution and the growth of monopoly capitalism into state-monopoly capitalism.

The book observes that a distinguishing singularity of the scientific-technical revolution which developed in the 1950's-1970's is a fundamental change in the nature of the interconnection between science and production. The present-day production forces in the developed capitalist countries increasingly represent a synthesis of science, technology and production. Qualitative changes have occurred not only in the physical-material aspect of the production forces but also in the characterization of their most important component--the aggregate worker.

Capitalism has made every effort to use the scientific-technical revolution to strengthen the system of class exploitation and achieve "social peace". In the 1950's and 1960's it succeeded in achieving certain results. However,

as the scientific-technical revolution developed, its role as a factor of the intensification of the "old" and maturation of the new economic and social contradictions of capitalism was ascertained increasingly distinctly. They all ultimately amount to a common denominator--an increase in the instability of the capitalist system, which was manifested most forcefully in the latter half of the 1970's and the start of the 1980's.

No less appreciable impact on the conditions, tasks and forms of the working class' struggle was had by the growth of monopoly capitalism into state-monopoly capitalism. The authors observe that this process, which was ascertained back at the start of the 20th century, achieved its greatest strength only after World War II and led to "irreversible qualitative changes in the basis and superstructure of capitalist society" (p 141).

The development of state-monopoly capitalism created new problems and difficulties for the workers movement. First, in the solution of specific questions of their material and social position the working people had from day to day to encounter not only private capital but also state power, more precisely, the united force of the monopolies and the state, between which stable and ramified relations permeating the entire system of control of capitalist society evolved.

Second, state-monopoly capitalism made it possible to expand appreciably the policy of social maneuvering, which in the postwar decades became the principal method of the regulation of relations between labor and capital, for the purpose of ensuring the functioning of the system of capitalist exploitation. Bourgeois and reformist apologists of present-day capitalism, the book says, "aspire to portray the socioeconomic function of state power as a supraclass function catering for the interests of the whole of society, including the working class. It was on the basis of these ideas that there emerged and took shape the bourgeois-reformist 'welfare state' concept, according to which legislative and executive authority by means of purposeful measures alleviates the defects of the private enterprise system, correcting social flaws of the market economy, "optimizing" the processes of the distribution and redistribution of income, regulating the problem of employment and unemployment and so forth" (p 146).

For Marxists and the revolutionary vanguard of the working class the groundlessness of such prophylactic and "repair" measures designed to ensure the optimal social conditions of capitalist exploitation is perfectly obvious. But it is just as obvious that the policy of "social compromise" and "integration" of the working people in the system of state-monopoly capitalism, which has been implemented on an unprecedentedly broad scale, could not have failed at a certain stage to have revived reformist illusions among part of the working people, the more so in that the social democratic parties and reformist trade unions actively contributed to this. Broad strata of the population had by their own experience to be convinced of the groundlessness of such a policy and of the need not only for day-to-day defense of their specific socioeconomic interests but also active struggle for a truly democratic and socialist alternative to the policy of state-monopoly capitalism.

As an analysis of the workers movement in the capitalist countries shows, the basic trend of its development in the past three decades consists precisely of the growing interconnection between the economic and political struggles, between the defense of the immediate interests of the working people and the implementation of fundamental social transformations and between the immediate and ultimate goals of the working class. The significance of this trend is particularly obvious under current conditions, which are characterized in many capitalist countries by a new offensive of the conservative forces endeavoring to liquidate a number of the working people's important social gains. The predominance of this trend is caused by, apart from anything else, the development of the working class itself. The book rightly emphasizes that "the problem of the development of the working class occupies a central place in the ideological struggle between Marxism-Leninism and its opponents" (p 155), who are endeavoring to repudiate the teaching on the world-historical role of the proletariat and asserting that as a result of the scientific-technical revolution it is inexorably being reduced to nothing. On the basis of the Marxist-Leninist understanding of social classes the authors analyze an entire set of criteria determining class membership and draw the fundamental conclusion: "The growth of the leading role of the working class in economic and social progress--such is the principal trend of its development under the conditions of the modern era" (p 158). And it is not merely a question of the fact that by the mid-1970's the proportion of the working class in the gainfully employed population of the developed capitalist countries had increased to 60-80 percent (p 155). No less important is the nature of the changes in the structure of the working class. Although scientific-technical progress under capitalism is exerting a contradictory influence on the content and conditions of the workers' labor, the main trend of the changes is a rise in their professional, skills and general educational levels and a broadening of the composition of the working class from working people connected with new technology and production techniques, thanks to a considerable proportion of brainworkers included.

The broadening of the composition of the proletariat is undoubtedly leading to a complication of its social and ideological-psychological appearance. Dissimilar living and work conditions and the difference in origin, experience and traditions of individual groups of the working class predetermine differences both in the specific demands and day-to-day struggle and level of recognition of general class interests. But this does not mean its disintegration into "old" and "new" and, even less, a multitude of so-called "stria". The proletariat of the developed capitalist countries, which by the end of the 1970's numbered 220-240 million, is a powerful social and political force exerting daily influence on all aspects of the life of society and determining its future; as before, the source and cause of the struggle for this future are the work and everyday living conditions of the working people (p 188).

It has to be emphasized immediately that the question of the direction, scale and significance of the changes in the economic situation of the working class of the capitalist countries which have occurred in the postwar decades is also invariably the focus of the ideological-theoretical struggle between Marxists

and their enemies. It was in this period that the bourgeois-apologist "abundant society," "revolution in incomes," "full employment" and post-industrialism" concepts became widespread. What is common in the content of all these concepts which has been thoroughly and sharply criticized repeatedly in Soviet and foreign literature, is the one-sided interpretation of the changes in the position of the working people and the endeavor to pass off this positive change or the other as a stable and irreversible process allegedly testifying to the "transformation" of capitalism and its loss of its exploiter nature.

The most graphic example of the underprovision of the basic social conditions of the worker in the capitalist world remains mass unemployment. The book shows convincingly the irreversibility of the collapse of the "full unemployment" myth, which was born in the specific situation of the 1950's-start of the 1960's. At that time a temporary trend was discerned in many Western countries toward a reduction in the reserve army of labor, but it was very soon replaced by a sharp growth of unemployment, which was a natural consequence of scientific-technical progress under the conditions of capitalism, monopoly concentration of production and the exacerbation of the crisis of the capitalist system of the economy. In the six leading capitalist countries alone (the United States, Japan, the FRG, France, Britain and Italy) the number of officially registered fully unemployed increased from 5.1 million in 1965 to 14.3 million in 1980 (p 192).

Another myth--concerning the so-called "revolution in incomes" and the approach of the "abundant society"--was dispelled also. As is known, such assertions were backed up by the fact that from the start of the 1950's right through the mid-1970's real wages grew and the volume and structure of the working people's consumption changed appreciably in the developed capitalist countries. The book analyzes thoroughly and on the basis of a vast amount of factual material the processes which occurred in the sphere of wages, distribution of national income and consumption. Without dwelling on all aspects of the analysis, we would note the fundamental proposition formulated by the authors that "the significant increase in the active role of the working class in the functioning and development of the entire economic mechanism was also reflected in the dynamics of such an essential component of this mechanism as the cost of manpower" (p 198). In other words, the increase in the cost thereof, particularly its historical and moral component, is a natural process. "Objective economic processes," the book says, "create the material prerequisites for an 'elevation of requirements'; the growth of the consciousness of the working class and its struggle against increased capitalist exploitation contribute to the practical realization of these prerequisites" (ibid). At the same time factors which impede the manifestation of the said trends are revealed and the basic methods of the actions of the monopolies and the state for the purpose of securing the priorities of capitalist accumulation are examined.

The development of the class struggle of the proletariat against capitalist exploitation is inseparably connected with the growth of its class consciousness. Analyzing the development of the social mentality of the working class

in the postwar period, the authors emphasize that this process was by no means rectilinear, which was caused both by the active impact of bourgeois ideology on the working class and the changeability of its objective social existence. The postwar years have brought much that is new in this respect: "deep-lying socio-psychological processes which prepared the proletariat's acute conflict with the entire system of state-monopoly capitalism occurred in the working masses" (p 230).

A higher level of perception of the social strength of the working class nurtured by the experience of the victorious socialist revolutions and the successes of its own struggle; the parochial narrow-mindedness which was receding into the past, being replaced by an understanding of the interconnection of day-to-day interests with fundamental interests and local and group interests with class interests; the growth of the cultural and intellectual level and broadening of the outlook--such are some important features of the new socio-psychological appearance of the working class in the capitalist countries. However, these features are not always adequately reflected in the sociopolitical arena. Where in mass workers' organizations there are no precise class positions and there is no consistent program of struggle against state-monopoly domination, the revolutionary-transforming potential of the working class, which is based on the new level of its social consciousness, does not find an outlet and a considerable proportion of working people remains in thrall to bourgeois ideology or is in a state of political apathy.

A considerable part of the book in question is devoted to an analysis of the actual socioeconomic and political struggle of the working class--the basic directions, dynamics, forms and particular features in individual capitalist countries. The question of the historical trends of the development of this struggle and its goals and character has always been the focus of the ideological-theoretical polemic with the opponents of Marxism-Leninism. Day-to-day sociopolitical life in the developed capitalist countries, which is filled with acute social conflicts, in the postwar years also contradicted too sharply the trivial assertions of bourgeois apologists that the ideas of "class peace," "social partnership" and so forth were triumphant in the countries of the West. For this reason this "generalization" was far more often served up in a more subtle form: It was asserted that the conflict between labor and capital had lost the nature of class antagonism, having become a kind of "bargaining" in which both sides defend their specific interests, but at the same time are coming increasingly close together in an understanding of common "social responsibility" and, primarily, of the joint interest in a stable economy (based on capitalist principles, of course!).

There is no opportunity in this review to dwell on the Marxist counterarguments revealing the groundlessness of such assertions. We would emphasize the main point--the book's analysis of more than 30 years of the history of the struggle of the working class in all the main centers of modern capitalism--North America, West Europe and Japan--testifies convincingly that the class struggle of the proletariat remains the main transforming force of social development in the capitalist countries influencing the production forces and production relations, the political superstructure and ideology.

It is least like a rectilinear process here. Noting its unevenness, which is manifested both during a comparison of individual countries and upon an examination of individual chronological periods, the authors at the same time show with great convincingness that the general trend of the development of the movement in the postwar period is that of quantitative and qualitative growth.

In fact, if we turn to such a most important indicator as the scale of the mass strike movement, following somewhat of a decline in the 1950's it grew virtually continuously from the mid-1960's through the latter half of the 1970's. The average annual number of strikers, which in the 1950's constituted 8.4 million, increased in the next decade to 12.7 million and in 1971-1979 to 21.7 million (p 307). This mass character is in itself becoming a factor of paramount significance. But this is not all. The changes occurring in the content and forms of the mass actions would seem very important. As of the 1960's the strikers' demands have increasingly gone beyond the traditional framework of collective-bargaining practice and have increasingly been addressed not only to private capital but to the state also, and their sociopolitical thrust has shown through increasingly sharply. "A certain type of large-scale strike, which prepared and brought about sociopolitical crises unknown to the capitalist system in 'peaceful' periods of its history began to take shape" on the eve and at the outset of the 1970's (p 332). The "red May" of 1968 in France and the 1969 "hot fall" in Italy are the most impressive examples of such national actions of the working people. But similar protests occurred in Britain, Belgium, Spain, Japan and other countries.

However, the trend toward "politicization" of the working class' struggle is manifested not only in such "peaks". It has also been expressed in a persistent endeavor to surmount the narrow framework of bourgeois democracy. Evidence of this endeavor is the demand put forward by the workers' organizations and supported by the masses that the working people be granted the right of actual participation in production management and the solution of urgent economic and social problems at the local and state levels. At the same time the working class is characterized by a far more precise understanding of the need for the defense of the political rights which they won in the past and struggle for their further expansion or for their restoration where they have been flouted. In this respect the victories of the democratic forces of Spain, Portugal and Greece, which achieved the liquidation of fascist or military-police regimes in the 1970's, were of importance not only for the working people of these countries but also for the entire West European workers movement.

The ongoing development of the class struggle of the proletariat has also been manifested in the positive processes which have occurred throughout the post-war decades in the trade union movement of the overwhelming majority of developed capitalist countries. The change in the content and nature of the socioeconomic struggle of the working people brought about by the continued socialization of production, the scientific-technical revolution and the extensive and constant intervention of the bourgeois state in economic life has struck palpably at the traditions of trade unionist economism and anarchosyndicalism, which emerged back in the 19th century and which for a long time determined the appearance of many trade unions. Under the influence of the said factors and under continuous pressure from the growing mass movement

they renewed their programs considerably, broadened the range of demands and made changes to the tactics of the struggle. A further increase in the strength of the trade unions occurred on precisely this basis: by the mid-1970's they united 84 million members in 18 developed capitalist countries (p 363). At the same time the sociopolitical role of the trade unions increased considerably.

Something else is important also: the trends toward a left turn of the entire workers movement and the unity of action of the working people and their organizations manifested themselves earliest and strongest precisely in the trade unions, and the latter, moreover, is persistently blazing a trail for itself not only within the framework of individual countries but also internationally.

Summing up their analysis, the authors emphasize yet again that state-monopoly capitalism has made tremendous efforts to "integrate" the working class and its organizations, which would mean an end to the workers movement as an independent sociopolitical force. "It is all the more important to state," they write, "that the class struggle of the proletariat has inflicted a serious defeat on this policy: of all the mass movements which exist in the capitalist society, the workers movement is today the most powerful, efficient and organized opponent of the omnipotence of monopoly capital" (p 669). A whole number of features and trends of the current stage of the development of the workers movement of the capitalist countries, the work goes on to note, "testifies that its revolutionary potential and capacity for the socialist reorganization of society are growing as a whole" (p 677).

At the same time realization of the objective potential of the successful struggle of the working class against the power of capital which exists currently is being held back by the overall political and ideological level of the movement and the degree of its assimilation of its own experience. Lenin's forecast that "it is immeasurably more difficult to begin in Europe," that is, revolutionary transformation of society and for socialism, retains its force in this respect. And it is not simply a question of the fact that the capitalism of the industrially developed countries still possesses huge economic resources, a powerful machinery of oppression and a wealth of experience of political maneuvering and ideological influence on the working people. The development of the revolutionary struggle is being impeded by the reform ideology and policy of the social democratic and socialist parties and also the trade unions of a social democratic, Christian-syndicalist or purely economist trade unionist orientation.

An analysis of the positions and activity of the reformist organizations, their role in the class struggle of the proletariat and their evolution in the post-war decades continues throughout the book. The authors note that the development of the social democratic movement in the 30 years since the war bears the imprint of duality. Rightwing trends undoubtedly dominated therein right up to the end of the 1950's. In this period the social democratic forces participated actively in the implementation of a number of urgent socioeconomic reforms which corresponded to the interests of the working people to a certain

extent. However, "the main import of the reform activity of social democracy amounted to the modernization and expansion of all forms of state intervention in the economy and social relations and the accelerated development of state-monopoly capitalism" (p 572). The essence of the ideological-theoretical evolution of social democracy in this period amounted primarily to a fundamental shift in the correlation of the socialist and bourgeois-liberal concepts in favor of the latter. The "general welfare state," the "socially lawful state," "pluralist democracy," "mixed economy" and so forth concepts appeared in the ideological equipment of its rightwing leaders. The Keynesian prescriptions of macroeconomic regulation were adopted. Rightwing social democratic theorists announced the approach of the "postcapitalist" society or even the start of the "era of the realization of socialism".

However, despite the total nature of the ideological-theoretical reorientation of the majority of the social democratic parties in the said years, it did not lead to the complete eradication of traditional socialist ideas. This circumstance, as the work shows, is explained primarily by the fact that the working class and the strata of wage workers linked to it constituted the mass social base of the social democratic parties, as before, and that not only the political influence but the very existence of social democracy were linked with its preservation. It was precisely this social base which nurtured the leftwing trends, which strengthened appreciably as the groundlessness and illusoriness of the attempts to substitute social reformism within the framework of a "renewed" capitalism for socialist ideals were revealed. Attention in this connection is attracted by the fundamental proposition formulated in the volume in question: "The intraparty struggle which developed in the latter half of the 1950's-start of the 1960's in a number of parties manifestly went beyond in its significance the framework of purely internal contradictions in social democracy and was essentially a struggle to preserve the socialist character of a substantial part of the workers movement and against the deepening and perpetuation of its division" (p 580).

The book analyzes in detail the course of this struggle in individual parties throughout the 1960's-1970's and the evolution of the views and the maneuvers of the right wing and devotees considerable space to a characterization of the groupings of the left in social democracy. While noting that social democrats of the left accept the Marxist analysis of the basic contradiction of capitalism and a class approach to social phenomena, regard the class struggle as the driving force of social progress and occupy positions on a number of questions of social reorganization close to those held by the communist parties the authors at the same time reveal serious weaknesses of the currents of the left--both theoretical and organizational. It is the cause of these weaknesses that the left has been unable to turn the social democratic movement onto the path of consistent antimonopoly struggle and unity of action of the working class. Nonetheless, the book emphasizes, "the activity of the left is contributing to the ideological-political differentiation of social democracy and a strengthening of the positive trends in its ideology and practice" (p 606).

On the boundary of the 1980's life has confronted social democrats with new force with the cardinal questions: concerning the attitude toward capitalism and the goals and means of struggle of the accomplishment of the urgent tasks

confronting mankind on the threshold of the 21st century. The political defeats and failures of a number of social democratic parties in recent years on the one hand (in Great Britain, the FRG, Norway and so forth) and, on the other, the deepening all-around crisis of capitalist society are prompting a search for answers to these questions.

The key problem of the workers movement in the developed capitalist countries is, as before, that of restoration of its unity. The book analyzes in detail both the objective factors determining the need for unity and the processes in the workers movement which have led to a strengthening of the unitary trend. The authors emphasize that the inner logic of the increasing class struggle itself under the conditions of state-monopoly capitalism as time goes by is becoming increasingly contrary to the limitations imposed on it by division, overturning the barriers which have been put up and dispelling prejudice. The spontaneous trend toward the unity of action of the working people's masses has been underpinned by the purposeful activity of the communist parties, which consistently champion the idea of unity.

The objective situation in the capitalist countries, the book says, is evolving in favor of the trend toward unity in the workers movement. Attempts to interrupt this process lead in practice to a strengthening of the rightwing, authoritarian forces in the sociopolitical life of the capitalist countries, which, in turn, could cancel out all the positive changes which occurred in the international situation in the 1970's. Such a turn of events does not suit social democracy either, whose successes and failures largely depend on the fulfillment of the promises to lessen the social consequences of the present exacerbation of the crisis of capitalism and contribute to the processes of detente and disarmament which it has given the broad masses. This fact is noticeably limiting the measure of its concessions to the political parties of the right, to restrain which it needs support from the left.

"Many current difficulties in the development of the workers movement," the authors write in conclusion, "are explained by the rapidity and unprecedented scale of the changes in international and domestic conditions and the content of its activity. As a whole, however, these changes, considerably broadening and enriching the experience of the revolutionary struggle, are leading to a growth of its forces and its ideological and political maturity. The final decades of the 20th century will undoubtedly be marked by major new class battles and the conquest by the working class of the capitalist countries of new beachheads in the struggle for peace, democracy and socialism. The efforts of the working class aimed at protecting mankind from the mortal threat hanging over him as a result of the aggressive policy of imperialism--world thermonuclear war--are of truly world-historical significance" (p 680).

In concluding the description of the book I would like to emphasize that its appearance is a far from ordinary event. It is one of the few works which it is customary to call fundamental--in the significance of the problems studied, the concentration of factual information and ideological-theoretical level. It illustrates and interprets the development of the working class and the workers movement in the centers of modern capitalism throughout the postwar period and analyzes the tremendous, 30-year-plus experience of its struggle against capitalist exploitation, for peace, democracy and social progress and

for the socialist transformation of society. To accomplish such a task the group of authors and the editors had to perform a colossal amount of work. And we would note at the same time that the richness of content of the book in question has been ensured by the efforts not only of those who participated in its preparation directly but also of the large group of Soviet social scientists who have for many years been studying modern capitalism and its economic and sociopolitical life and the workers movement in the capitalist countries.

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DEVELOPMENT OF AGRO-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX ON CUBA EXAMINED

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 12, Dec 83
pp 140-141

[L. Klochkovskiy review: "Valuable Experience of Socialist Creation"]

[Text] The Cuban people are preparing to festively commemorate the 25th anniversary of the victory of the revolution. In a short time the republic has scored big successes in the main spheres of the life of society: economic, social and political. The socialist mode of production has become firmly established in all sectors of the national economy, including agriculture, where the process of forming the peasantry into cooperatives will have been completed basically in the next few years. The successes in the formation of a rational agro-industrial complex (APK) are considerable. The social achievements of the Cuban revolution are impressive. The international position of the Island of Freedom has strengthened.

Twenty-five years is not a long time, but quite sufficient to sum up the results, make a serious comprehensive scientific analysis of the path traversed by the first American socialist state and portray the current state of Cuban society. Such, successful, in our view, an attempt is made in the collective monograph in question,* which continues the series of works of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Latin America on a study of the experience of the Cuban revolution.

The compositional structure of the book is successful. Its structure is subordinate to the basic task of the study--a comprehensive analysis of socialist building in the country. It makes it possible to consistently reveal the most fundamental problems of the creation of the new society on Cuba. The central questions of economic and sociopolitical development, an elucidation of which is essential for a correct comprehension not only of the current state of Cuban society but also the prospects of its further development, are organically blended here within the framework of a single work.

* "Kuba: stroitel'stvo sotsializma. Ekonomicheskiye i sotsial'no-politicheskiye aspekty" [Cuba: The Building of Socialism, Economic and Sociopolitical Aspects], Moscow, Izdatel'stvo "Nauka," 1983, 288 pages.

The monograph opens with an analysis of the problems of agro-industrial integration and the development of the production forces in agriculture. It is well known that the Communist Party and the Cuban Government regard these questions as most important elements of their economic policy at the current stage.

For the first time in Soviet historiography the book traces how the development of agricultural production and the industrial sectors connected therewith and the infrastructure conditions the ways of the formation of the actual APK. Its formation is intended to be a most important factor of the strengthening of the republic's positions in the international socialist division of labor.

Cuba's experience in this respect is of considerable interest. The APK is the country's biggest structural economic formation accounting for 30 percent of the gross product, 70 percent of the industrial product and approximately 60 percent of all those working in the sphere of material production or 43 percent of persons employed in the national economy (pp 7-8). The export of products of agro-industrial production is the main source of the resources for the development of the sectors with no direct economic relations with the APK or connected with it only indirectly (nonferrous metallurgy, construction materials industry and others). In one way or another the APK permeates all sectors of the national economy and serves as a foundation for the Cuban revolution and the basis of the formation of the national economic complex.

Separating the APK into three production (agricultural, processing and resource) and socioeconomic spheres, the authors show that the composition of this structural formation is represented by specialized complexes or end-purpose subsystems, the biggest of which is the agro-industrial sugar cane complex. Questions of its formation and development occupy an important place in the study.

Having embarked on the path of socialist building, Cuba encountered the objective need for industrialization. It alone could resolve the contradiction between progressive political power and technical-economic backwardness. Socialist industrialization became here the main and decisive means of the creation of the material-technical base of the new society.

The book also reveals the important part played by the centralized planned location of the production forces in the creation of the material-technical base of socialism. The maximum saving of social labor is the determining principle of the location of the socialist production forces. The study shows graphically that among the most important factors of the realization of this principle at the current stage increasingly great significance on Cuba is attached to the comprehensive use of natural and the rational use of labor resources. the optimum parameters of production and its organization and also the high efficiency of production relations.

Comparing the capitalist past and the socialist present, the authors show convincingly that the planned location of the production forces is an important advantage of the socialist system of the economy. It plays a big part in the accomplishment of the complex economic and social tasks confronting Cuba.

The work pays great attention to the problems of managing and planning the economy. The specific features of the forms and methods typical of each specific stage of its realization are revealed in the course of the analysis of this important economic activity of the state. The book examines the new system of the management and planning of the economy currently being introduced on Cuba, the principal task of which is securing a sharp increase in the efficiency of social production and commissioning available potential.

A merit of the monograph is the fact that it pays considerable attention to a study of the place of the working class in the process of the formation of the new social-class structure of Cuban society. The study examines the socio-economic prerequisites and factors of the conversion of the Cuban working class into the leading political force, the process of the conversion of the proletariat into the ruling class of the new, socialist society and the basic trends of its intraclass changes in the course of the creation of the material-technical base of socialism. The fact of the historical readiness of the country's working class for socialist revolution on the eve thereof is proven convincingly.

The development of the Cuban proletariat in the prerevolutionary period and, primarily, the formation in its structure of a populous detachment of agricultural workers was, the authors believe, the decisive condition making it possible to pose, following the conquest of power by the working class, fundamental tasks of its conversion into a new, socialist-type working class capable in a very short time of becoming the leading force in the creation of the new society. The said process occurred under the specific conditions of a Latin American country. The value of the Cuban experience in this case is further increased by the fact that, despite the great specifics, the effect of the common regularities of the coming into being of a new type of working class in the course of implementation of socialist transformations was manifested in all fullness here also. The analysis of the basic factors and conditions of the shaping of the new social image of the Cuban working class made in the study in question is of undoubted interest.

The building of socialism and a progressive movement toward social homogeneity are impossible without the establishment of the public ownership of the means of production in all sectors of the national economy, in agriculture included. The work traces the basic landmarks of the process of the unification of the Cuban peasantry in cooperatives. Accomplishment of the tasks of the complete socialist reorganization of agriculture inevitably leads, as the authors rightly observe, to the need for the use of the fundamental propositions of Lenin's cooperative plan for the transfer of individual peasant farms to the tracks of socialist production. Proceeding from this, the monograph studies the basic phases of the development of the cooperative movement on Cuba and its basic trends, singularities and forms. A number of aspects is studied for the first time here.

The book concludes with an analysis of the mechanism of political power, with whose help the process of revolutionary building is set in motion and constantly maintained. The leading and directing role of the Cuban Communist Party in socialist creation is revealed. It is shown on the basis of a large

amount of factual material that the Cuban Communist Party has now become firmly established as the genuine leader of society. The authors have succeeded in showing convincingly that the strengthening of the leading role of the Cuban Communist Party and the full-fledged and assertive activity of the representative official authorities and mass voluntary working people's organizations serve as live testimony that the Cuban people have achieved big successes in the creation of a developed political system of socialism.

It should be emphasized in conclusion that the scientific study of the problems of building socialism on Cuba contributes to an understanding of the general regularities of the creation of a new society. The republic's experience is of great international significance. It is particularly valuable for the peoples of Latin America which are struggling for their national and social liberation. Simultaneously the study of specific problems of socialist building affords great opportunities for an increase in the efficiency and extension of Cuba's cooperation with other socialist community countries. The appearance of the monograph in question contributes to the further development of such topical problems.

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PRICE-FORMING PROCESSES ON CAPITALIST MARKET EXAMINED

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 12, Dec 83
pp 142-144

[V. Cheplanov review: "World Prices: Regularities and Trends"]

[Text] There was a constant increase in the last decade in questions pertaining to price forming on the world capitalist market. This was brought about by a set of factors, the main one being the continued intensification of the internationalization of economic life and the growth of the interrelations and interdependence of the national economies, mediated to a considerable extent by international trade.

As of the mid-1970's the prices on the world commodity markets revealed a sharp spasmodic growth. In the 1970's the overall level of world prices (expressed in U.S. dollars) increased by a factor of more than 3.7 in contrast with the relative stability thereof in the two preceding decades. Understandably, this growth was unevenly distributed in time and also in respect of certain commodities and commodity groups.

This situation caused a whole number of difficulties in the foreign economic sphere of the participants in international exchange and correspondingly engendered a number of extraordinarily complex domestic problems in the national economies of the majority of countries. Particularly those whose economy depends to the greatest extent on the functioning of its foreign economic sector.

However, even states whose economy is less dependent on the world capitalist market also encountered problems of a foreign economic nature. For example, it is well known that in their reciprocal trade the CEMA countries build their prices on the basis of the generally recognized prices of the world market, in which capitalist and socialist partners participate. And in this case in the plane of their reciprocal exchange the processes occurring in price forming on the world capitalist market are of a far from abstract-theoretical nature, although the conceptual interpretation of this problem is also of great significance.

At the same time there have been practically no important discursive works on this very relevant topic in recent years either in our country or abroad.

The book in question,* which was prepared by a group of authors of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economy and International Relations and the USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade All-Union Scientific Research and Design Institute, is essentially one of the first such studies. It embraces as a whole the post war period of price forming on the world capitalist market, particularly attention being paid here to the most complex and tempestuous stage of the movement of prices--the 1970's. It was in this period in the world economy and commerce that changes occurred, a sufficiently full recognition of the meaning and significance of which possibly still lies ahead and which are the subject of sharp discussion between economists both in our country and abroad.

The authors of the monograph have responded very opportunely to the events which occurred, attempting to collate the experience of the past decade, which was tempestuous for world trade as a whole and individual sectors thereof. Their idea of the compositional structure of the work, which essentially consists of two parts, is understandable in this connection.

One of them (the first three chapters) represents an analysis of the general regularities of price forming on the world capitalist market. There is a description and classification of the types of world prices, which are distinguished by great variety--the prices of major commercial deals and long-term intergovernmental agreements, market quotations, producer prices, transnational company transfer prices, regional prices and others. Examining the connections of the structure of world markets of actual commodities with forms of price forming, the authors rightly observe that the type of world price depends mainly on the nature and structure of a given market. Under the current, increasingly complex conditions of the production and marketing of commodities and in the atmosphere of struggle both between monopolies and outsider firms and between the corporations themselves different market structures emerge and exist in parallel within the framework of one and the same commodity market. This leads to the formation of a multiplicity of prices, that is, the existence on the world market simultaneously of two or more prices for one and the same commodity. Consideration of this circumstance, which has assumed the nature of a regularity in recent years in respect of a number of commodities (which is subsequently illustrated in specific examples), is exceptionally important in the plane of all the basic directions of an analysis of world prices--their levels, dynamics, structure and correlations. The book reveals the basic aspects of the emergence and development of this phenomenon.

The current state of world prices in all its intricacy and complexity is a subject of examination in the monograph. The reasons for the rapid growth of prices in the 1970's are characterized--the impact of inflation in the developed capitalist countries and the currency and energy-raw material crises and the influence of international raw material producer associations, international commodity agreements, major monopoly companies and so forth. An analysis of

* "Tsenoobrazovaniye na mirovom kapitalisticheskem rynke" [Price Forming on the World Capitalist Market], Exec. ed. S.M. Nikitin, doctor of economic sciences, Moscow, Izdatel'stvo "Mysl'," 1982, 318 pages.

the entire complex of these factors ultimately enables the authors to make a general evaluation of the prospects of the dynamics of prices, which in itself is a highly difficult task even in the general conceptual plane.

The fact that the researchers express their fundamental position in respect of the role of prices of energy resources--primarily oil--in the price-rise process in world trade is of particular interest.

In the course of the analysis of the prospects of a change in prices in world trade and the role in this process of energy resource prices the work criticizes the views widespread in the Western press concerning the lack of economic justification for the price of oil (and, consequently, of other energy resources also) in connection with their alleged "estrangement from production costs." The authors show convincingly that the economic basis of the new prices for oil are the considerably higher production costs in the "worst sectors" (North Sea, Alaskan and synthetic oil, not to mention other energy sources capable of adequately replacing oil in the corresponding areas of energy consumption).

A further set of problems examined in the monograph is the interconnection of domestic prices of the main industrially developed capitalist countries with world prices. The authors reveal the economic nature of the interconnection of domestic and world prices, analyze the numerous causes of the differences in their level and dynamics engendered both by the particular features of domestic price forming in individual countries and the specific features and structure of the world markets of individual commodities and also the specific features of the transitional stage of a commodity's movement from a national market to a foreign market (imposts, dues, subsidies and so forth) and provide a qualitative and, for a number of commodities and countries, quantitative description of these differences.

The book draws two important conclusions pertaining to the problems of the interconnection of domestic and world prices. The first is that in the 1970's there was a sharp increase in the influence of the currency crisis on the correlation and dynamics of the said prices. Under the conditions of the protracted nature of the latter this proposition is of great importance in the plane of forecasting and evaluating the prospects of the dynamics both of world prices and of the changes in the domestic price forming of the capitalist countries. According to the second conclusion, the dynamics of domestic and world prices for commodities exported by the principal capitalist countries are, as a whole, of a unidirectional and, in the majority of cases, parallel nature. Despite the deviations from one another of domestic and world prices, they gravitate here toward mutual equalization. We have to agree with the thought expressed in the monograph that the said regularity is grounds for the development of simple methods of forecasting prices of the international trade in individual commodities (particularly industrial) proceeding from the dynamics of the domestic prices of their main exporters.

A further "seam" of the study may be considered the questions of the influence of intercountry differences in labor productivity on world prices which are examined in the monograph. A number of interesting and important problems is

analyzed here on the basis of a large amount of statistical material (mainly with respect to processing industry) with the use of economo-mathematical methods. As is known, the labor productivity indicator is the most capacious and extensively employed characterization of the conditions of production ultimately determining the costs and competitiveness of a specific country in a given commodity market. The efficiency of the use of labor resources remains a most important factor influencing competitiveness here. Considering the relative intercountry mobility of labor resources and also the trend toward the industrialization of exports, the authors put forward the substantiated supposition that the influence of intercountry differences in the efficient use of live labor on world trade will increase (p 90).

The general questions of price forming pertaining to the world capitalist market as a whole which are examined are specified to this extent or the other in the book upon the characterization of prices of and price forming for the basic commodities circulating in world trade: energy carriers (oil, coal, natural gas, uranium raw material), ferrous and nonferrous metals (aluminum, copper, lead, zinc, nickel, tin and magnesium), foodstuffs (cereals, meat, fish, tropical plantation crops, sugar), wood-paper and chemical commodities, engineering products and gold.

We would note that the scale and seriousness of the currency-finance problems and the degree of their influence on price forming on the world capitalist market need, of course, further extended study. The absence in the monograph of a special analysis of these aspects could, perhaps, be put down as one of its weak spots. Another sphere which the authors have touched on insufficiently is a characterization of the influence on world market prices of ecology problems, which are extraordinarily important for an evaluation of prospects not only in the sphere of price forming but also the world economy as a whole.

At the same time the breadth and multiformity of the subject to which the work in question is devoted, the level of theoretical interpretation and also the comprehensive nature of the approach to the study of such a complex and important set of problems testify that the readers have acquired an interesting and useful book.

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POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF ENERGY PRICE DYNAMICS CONSIDERED

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 12, Dec 83
pp 146-148

[M. Gel'vanovskiy review: "Serious Problem"]

[Text] The exacerbation in the past decade of the global energy problem is attracting a wide circle of researchers, which is caused both by its extraordinary relevance and exceptional complexity.

The rapid development of the international exchange of energy resources as a result of the unevenness of their location on the one hand and the extension of the process of the internationalization of economic life and the international division of labor on the other has led to the intensification of the energy problem being manifested most strikingly in the foreign economic sphere. In this connection the monograph in question,* which provides not only an analysis of the basic trends of the international exchange of energy resources in the postwar period but also an evaluation of possible directions of its development for the period up to the end of the 20th and first quarter of the 21st centuries, is of scientific-theoretical and practical interest.

It should be emphasized that despite the abundance of works on energy which have appeared in recent years, the problem of the international exchange of energy carriers is studied so discursively and on the basis of the development of world energy supply systems in national literature for the first time, possibly.

Examining the main stages of the development of world power engineering as a whole since the end of the last century, the author endeavors to ascertain the objective trends in this process. Of these, the following are the most interesting: the constant growth of the level of concentration of the production of converted types of energy and energy resources and their transportation facilities and also the further centralization of the distribution of primary energy resources and different types of energy; and the reorganization of the structure of energy balances in the direction of a stimulation

* L.S. Vartazarova, "Mezhdunarodnyy obmen energeticheskimi resursami (osnovnyye tendentsii)" [International Exchange of Energy Resources (Basic Trends)], Moscow, Izdatel'stvo "Nauka," 1983, 152 pages.

of the use of more concentrated energy resources and a reduction in the consumption of the latter in the production of a unit of ultimate energy.

L. Vartazarova rightly notes (and this concurs with the viewpoint of the majority of specialists in this field) that the current stage in the development of power engineering should be considered "the start of the major reorganization in the 21st century of the world's energy balance in the direction of a change in the structure of the use of organic fuel in favor of coal and the extensive use of nuclear fuel and renewable energy sources" (p 26).

The book provides a generalized picture of the formation and development of the systems supplying the main energy-consuming parts of the world with the individual principal types of resources and illustrates the particular features of international exchange, including questions of price forming, connected with them. Analyzing the capitalist world oil supply system, the author shows convincingly that a more or less unified oil market took shape only by the start of the 1970's, when the United States joined the majority of the remaining industrially developed countries as a principal importer of oil from the Near East and North Africa region. This fact created the prerequisites for the forming of a common basis in oil prices in world trade.

Examining questions of price forming in the world capitalist oil market, the author, in contrast to numerous assertions of Western experts concerning the alleged arbitrary nature of the price rises on the part of OPEC, argues the viewpoint according to which the growth of the price of oil in the 1970's has an objective basis in the form of the production costs of this energy carrier at the worst, but sufficiently representative deposits (p 42).

As the book observes, not only the exporters but also the importing states, which obtain considerable revenues from the sale of petroleum products on their own domestic markets, and the oil monopoly firms, particularly the members of the International Oil Cartel, which, oriented in their policy toward "optimization" of activity in the long term, have essentially become "energy giants," have an interest in a rise in oil prices (p 44). The author believes that the increase in oil prices at the start of the 1980's was a temporary, market-related phenomenon and that in the long term their dynamics will be characterized more by a trend toward moderate growth (*ibid.*). It has to be said that, as a whole, this conclusion is not contradicted by the OPEC countries' decision on a reduction in the price of oil adopted in 1983 in London. If account is taken of the real change in the oil price (in relation to the prices of other commodities which are experiencing a falling trend), it turns out that even when reduced from \$34 to \$29 per barrel, it is still at approximately the level of 1980--the year of its last official increase. If the overall downward trend in oil prices is maintained over the next few years, the OPEC decision not to change the oil price until 1985 will essentially mean a moderate growth thereof.

Upon an analysis of the development of energy supply systems, the basic singularities of this process for individual important regions of the world connected both with natural and socioeconomic factors are clearly outlined. In

particular, the book describes the specific features of the power engineering of the CEMA countries and their participation in the international exchange of energy carriers, in which the socialist community countries occupy leading positions in the formation and successful development of big power engineering systems.

On the basis of research that has been performed, using national and foreign material, the author makes her evaluation of the prospects of the development of world power engineering and the international exchange of fuel-energy resources for 40-50 years ahead. She believes that preservation of the existing world oil supply system and the speedier development of other sources are the most probable in the next 15 years. In the long term the international exchange of energy carriers will develop on the basis of the trend toward the greater "stratification" of their use in electric power generation and as boiler-furnace fuel (nuclear fuel, coal) on the one hand and in the specialized use of organic energy resources (oil and gas with their heavy refining) as motor fuel and raw material for chemical industry on the other. This will serve as the basis for a change in the conditions of the trade in energy carriers and could lead to a corresponding "stratification" in price forming both in terms of types and also within individual types of energy carriers. As a result the prices of nuclear fuel and coal, L. Vartazarova believes, will show a trend toward relative stabilization at the present level, while for oil and, partially, for natural gas will increase with regard for the completion of the balance of natural liquid fuel by artificial fuel.

Despite the monograph's indisputable merits, critical remarks also may be leveled at its author. Thus, insufficient attention, we believe, is paid to the market aspects of the problem of the development of the international exchange of energy carriers. The current energy market represents, despite its conditional nature, a complex not only of purely energy-economic but also general economic, currency, political and even social problems. Furthermore, a number of opinions expressed in the book are somewhat categorical, particularly in respect of prices. The relatively low level of production costs of oil for the main exporters does not permit us, possibly, to exclude in the future an increase in the amplitude of price fluctuations both for it and for other energy carriers, which could influence appreciably the development of trade and the energy supply systems themselves.

In conclusion we would note that the book in question is useful and interesting not only for specialists in the said sphere but also for a broad range of readers.

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[Editorial Report] Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 12, December 1983 on page 160 notes the addition of I.A. Sokolov and A.N. Yakovlev to the MEMO 'Editorial Collegium'. The list of editors now includes: Ya. S. Khavinson (chief editor), E.A. Arab-Ogly, O.N. Bykov, V.A. Vinogradov, I. Ye. Gur'yev, B.A. Yelmanov (deputy chief editor), V.V. Zagladin, I.D. Ivanov, N.A. Kosolapov (deputy chief editor), V.V. Lyubimova, M.M. Maksimova, V.A. Martynov, V.N. Nazarova (responsible secretary), S.M. Nikitin, V.F. Petrovskiy, Ye. M. Primakov, A.M. Rumyantsev, I.A. Sokolov, D.G. Tomashevskiy, V.M. Falin, I.P. Faminskiy, V.N. Shenayev, A. Ya. El'yanov, A.N. Yakovlev. Technical editor V.F. Chepurnykh.

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